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Editors’ Note:
The second annual Program of Atlantic Security Studies (PASS) conference, entit-
led “Energy and Security: Global Challenges – Regional Perspectives”, convened 
between October 19–21, 2004 in Prague. PASS is a joint project of the Prague 
Security Studies Institute and the Association for International Aﬀairs. 
When debating how to present the results and conclusions of the conference 
both to our esteemed participants and interested public, we decided not to tran-
scribe the proceedings of the conference with all of the comments and interjecti-
ons made. Instead, we selected some of the most interesting contributions that 
represented a wide range of opinions on energy and security and compiled them 
in book form. In doing so, we made a concerted eﬀort to limit the number of 
changes we made and to maintain the original intent of the speaker. The changes, 
therefore, are minimal and serve only to clarify the point. Any remaining errors 
are our own. 
We hope that you ﬁnd the content of the book as interesting as we did and 
would greatly appreciate any feedback via e-mail to pass@pssi.cz
We would like to thank all who made the conference and this book possible.
Devon Branch-Elliman    Petr Mareš    Oldřich Černý    Jan Havránek
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Introduction
Two of the key strategic decisions of the Czech government in the 1990s were to 
diversify its energy supply and to decrease its almost total dependency on Russian 
gas and oil. Since 2000, conversely, Europe has decided to base its energy policy 
mainly on using Russian supplies. On the other side of the globe, growing Chi-
nese and Indian economies have boosted overall global demand for energy.
Organizing our second annual conference on energy and security interdepen-
dence thus appeared natural. There were two events in paricular that made this 
topic very timely.
The ﬁrst issue we looked at was the constant ﬂuctuation in oil prices in 2003, 
which raised many questions about the impact of oil markets on regional and 
world security in the future. One of the most signiﬁcant themes of this debate 
was the question of the “oil motivation” for the campaign in Iraq.
Another concern was caused by some disconcerting developments in the 
business and political culture in Russia. In October 2003, a Russian security force 
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arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the largest Russian oil producer, Yukos. 
Earlier in 2003, when discussing the topic of this conference, Khodorkovsky ap-
peared to be a potentially excellent speaker for such an event.
When we were opening our conference on “Energy and Security: Global 
Challenges – Regional Perspectives”, the situation still had not changed signiﬁ-
cantly. On the contrary, the world had experienced a shock in form of record high 
oil prices, and many of our concerns seemed to be fulﬁlled. Similarly, the personal 
endeavor of Mr. Khodorkovsky to lead Russian business out of the shadow of the 
state economy was buried, as he was still sitting in jail, waiting for judgment.
At a time of rising global demand for oil, the world was looking to Russia to 
be a dependable supplier of both oil and gas. But recent developments have raised 
serious doubts about Russia’s ability to be a signiﬁcant alternative to Middle East-
ern oil. Thus, the world faces uncertainty in both the Middle East and Russia. 
The Yukos aﬀair and overall development in Russia might have been the main 
reasons that led the Energy and Security conference participants, without repre-
sentatives from Russia, to express, their concern “over growing reliance of Central 
and Eastern Europe on gas supplies from Russia” in the adopted.
By the time that these proceedings are published, it seems that all arguments, 
concerns and conclusions expressed during the conference will be, unfortunately, 
vindicated. The former chief of Yukos has been sentenced to nine years, prices of 
oil and gas have sky-rocketed, the war on terror with all its threats implications is 
far from over, and consumption will certainly not abate. Therefore, the need for a 
discussion about the diversiﬁcation of energy resources, has only intensiﬁed. 
We believe that our publication can serve as a useful guide to this continuing 
and important debate. Indeed as the Principles note, alternative sources of energy, 
such as nuclear power, clean coal, biomass, and other renewables—coupled with 
energy eﬃciency—will all be essential. Also, the world should continue eﬀorts to 
diversify its oil and gas supplies, including using greater quantities from African, 
Latin American, and North Sea reserves. 
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This conference is about energy and security, but I am going to take a diﬀerent 
stance on these sensitive issues. I am going to use four speciﬁc examples of areas 
where I am relatively optimistic that the type of challenges that we confront will 
be resolved.
I would like to start with the U.S. Our energy policy consists of three issues: 
resources, technology, and defense. In regard to resources, we need to expand 
our oil and gas deposits, especially in Alaska; we need to build an Alaskan gas 
pipeline to the lower forty-eight states, and we need to drill for oil in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge. We also need to increase our nuclear power; I chair 
the U.S. committee on this issue, and I am optimistic. I will talk about why that 
is in a moment. Some of you may not know, but the Department of Energy has 
employed 40,000 scientists in our national labs, and I am very encouraged by the 
recent work of the Department of Energy on hybrid cars and hydrogen economy. 
But let us talk about the real U.S. energy policy. I call it, “import and defend.” 
William Martin 
Fmr. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy
Security and Energy 
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When I say defend, I mean the Iraq war – not the most popular war around. The 
Gulf War of 1991 was not popular either, but let us face the facts: we need stabil-
ity in the Middle East, and the American presence there is going to guarantee 
long-term security and send a signal to countries like Iran that they should abide 
by International Atomic Energy Agency edicts, or there will be consequences. 
While people may be upset about Iraq, let me say that, having struggled with 
this myself and having served in the Department of Defense last year for Paul 
Wolfowitz, I think it was the right decision.
Enough of Iraq: let me go on to Europe. Roger Robinson, Richard Perle, and I 
worked 22 years ago to encourage Europeans to diversify their natural gas sector. In 
fact, while working in the International Energy Agency (IEA), we agreed that Eu-
ropeans should be no more than 30% dependent on Soviet gas. The reason for this 
amount was that we wanted to give an opportunity to the Norwegians and others 
in Africa to develop gas for Europe, so that Russia, then the Soviet Union, would 
not have Europe in its grip through natural gas. In fact, today I noticed that almost 
50% of Europe’s natural gas imports are now likely to come from Russia. Obvi-
ously, the Soviet Union is no more and Russia has made tremendous strides, but it 
is not a good economic principle to be more than 50% dependent on one source. 
And I think that Europe should consider a greater balance in its sources of gas. 
The third issue is atoms for peace. Conventional thinking about nuclear energy 
is as follows: it is a worthy option, but many people are skeptical of it. Indeed, I 
think I would have put myself in that category for a long time, until I chaired the 
U.S. Nuclear Energy Committee. I am not a nuclear energy expert, and that is why 
Secretary Abraham probably appointed me to that position. But I am an energy 
expert, and I am an environmentalist. I do support making progress towards issues 
like the ones in the Kyoto Protocol, and I do not see how we achieve energy security 
and Kyoto objectives without nuclear power. Nuclear energy is very interesting. For 
example, let’s look at the deal between Russia and the United States to burn highly-
enriched uranium. Is it not a wonderful idea to takine weapons, convert them into 
nuclear energy, and solve the global warming problem at the same time? It almost 
sounds too good to be true, and there is a challenge here: non-proliferation.
Recently, I have had the opportunity to visit both the Rokkasho-Mura re-
processing plant in Japan and the La Hague reprocessing plant in France. I think 
these sophisticated technologies oﬀer hope for the long-term use of uranium, as 
well as better capabilities to store nuclear waste. Right now in the United States, 
we will need two Yucca Mountains to store the waste from our reactors. Repro-
cessing, done correctly and at the highest non-proliferation standards, as required 
by the IAEA, is the way to go. Reprocessing and enrichment in the wrong hands 
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is a threat, represented by Iran and North Korea today with their enrichment 
programs. But we should have enough safeguards, especially with modern tech-
nology, to assure the safe use of nuclear power.
My fourth point is about North Korea. I have had the honor in the last few 
months of being a facilitator for the United Nations on the matter of North 
Korea. This came about because the six parties that are currently working on the 
issue are Russia, China, the U.S., Japan, and North and South Korea. Sometimes 
the talks go on, and sometimes the talks stop, depending on who North Korea 
thinks will win the U.S. election. I can say right now that if they are waiting for 
Kerry, they are probably going to be waiting for a long time. The fundamental 
issue is that North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons program. This is 
something the Chinese agree with. I have had talks in Beijing: the Chinese do 
not want nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and the Chinese do not want 
an unstable North Korea because that would invite the U.S. and South Korea 
right up to the Chinese border. Japan certainly does not want nuclear weapons in 
North Korea. Nobody does. But at the moment, as John Kerry says, Kim Jong-Il 
has seven to nine nuclear weapons. I do not know that number, but that is what 
Kerry said. They also have a submarine ﬂeet, so you have to worry not only about 
air-borne missile delivery of a possible weapon, but also underwater delivery from 
a submarine. This is an enormous problem.
I think that the one thing that would help North Korea, if it were to disman-
tle their weapons, is energy. The Chinese have told me that the entire situation 
is all about energy. I would not, as the Clinton administration did, provide two 
nuclear reactors to North Korea. That, to me, does not make a lot of sense, since 
North Korea does not have an electricity grid. There are plentiful resources in 
Asia: abundant gas reserves that presently have no market, including the Sakha-
lin Island. That gas could be piped from the Sakhalin Islands through North 
Korea to South Korea. It would be something like a “peace pipeline” that would 
integrate North and South Korea economically.
There are also abundant resources in Siberia that could come through China, 
then go to South Korea, and maybe up to North Korea. There is a lot of coal in 
North Korea, but clean coal technology would be an important improvement. Some 
day, if it wishes to have a nuclear reactor, and if it has shown that it is a responsible 
nation, and if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can assure us that it 
follow safeguards, then ﬁne, let North Korea have a nuclear reactor. The point I want 
to make is that if North Korea were to turn and say that it is giving up its weapons, 
then there could be tremendous economic expansion and integration of the entire 
northeastern Asian peninsula. And it would be connected through energy.
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By the way, just to make a small point here, most of the Middle Eastern oil is not 
going to the U.S.: it is going to Europe and Asia. Therefore, the greater the extent 
to which Asia itself, including China, can rely on resources from its own region, 
the greater the beneﬁt for everybody. This is not to say that I am optimistic about 
North Korea. I think we are dealing with a stubborn dictator, and if he keeps his 
nuclear weapons, he will not have economic prosperity in the future for his na-
tion. I think he will remain a threat to the region.
Let me conclude by speaking about Prague a little bit. The Czech Republic 
sees energy as a possible constraint on its economic growth. We know that central 
Europe is going to grow rapidly because of its wonderful people, the high-quality 
of the technology, and the deep culture, represented especially here by Prague. 
But how does a nation like the Czech Republic develop energy security? How can 
it diversify its energy resources? How can it work within the EU system? How can 
it work within the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide energy secu-
rity for its people? At this conference, we have scientists, foreign policy special-
ists, economists, and politicians, and, more than that, we have an extraordinary 
opportunity to share perspectives on energy and security topics with each other, 
so that we can see the whole picture. I think that is the challenge of this meeting, 
and I hope that from this historic city will come some historic principles that we 
can provide to the world.
MARTIN: SECURITY AND ENERGY
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We always try to deﬁne energy security as being the continuous availability of 
energy in the right forms, in suﬃcient quantities and at reasonable prices. This 
deﬁnition contains, unfortunately, contradictory aspects. It requires the existence 
of “the right forms,”although the only forms of energy available now, and likely to 
continue to be available in the future, are fossil fuels. It says “suﬃcient quantities” 
and “at reasonable prices,” yet abundant, suﬃcient quantities and cheap, reason-
able prices do not tally. In other words, therefore, we have a problem, which we 
are just now experiencing. 
Fossil fuels are the only source of fuels that are reasonably abundant world-
wide. In its three forms, oil, gas, and coal, there are suﬃcient quantities to keep 
the world economy going for decades to come, probably until the end of the cen-
tury. We talk about one trillion barrels of proven oil reserves, but, quite honestly, 
when we look into proven and unproven and unconﬁrmed sources of oil there 
are something like 8 trillion barrels of oil that can be produced toward the end of 
Hisham Khatib
Honorary Vice Chairman, World Energy Council
Business As Usual
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the century. The alternatives to fossil fuels are new and renewable energy. These 
have an uncertain future to say the least because they are dispersed, intermittent, 
ineﬃcient, and not tradable. They will remain part of the global energy mix, but 
not in very suﬃcient quantities. 
When I look at the conferences, the huge gatherings, the ministerial meet-
ings, and all of this propaganda about new and renewable energy, I, as an energy 
engineer and energy economist, feel a little bit dismayed. Somebody is trying 
to mislead the world.  There is no future, no immediate future, for renewable 
energy. The only viable source of energy for the universe for decades to come is 
fossil fuels. This is the fact that we have to understand, and we have to live with 
its implications.
The other alternative is nuclear energy. This can oﬀer major energy contri-
butions.  Its well-tried technologies can provide abundant sources of energy at 
reasonable, or slightly expensive, prices. But this is sort of energy is not accepted 
by the public in most OECD countries. And the contribution of nuclear energy, 
percentage wise, is likely to continue to decrease slowly over the next few years. 
For the foreseeable future, oil is and will continue to be the major energy source. 
The production today of 83 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2004 will grow to 
something like 116 bpd by the year 2030, an average growth of 1.4-1.7% annu-
ally. That has been the trend during the past 30 years and is likely to continue to 
be the trend during the next 30 years.
Oil, which is now supplying around 36% of global energy requirements, will 
continue to do the same in the year 2030. When the oil crisis erupted in 1973, a lot 
of people felt that it was the end of the oil era; they felt that we were then moving 
to use new energy sources. At that time, oil supplied 37-38% of the global energy 
demand. Today, oil is still supplying about the same percentage. In 30 years, it is 
going to continue to supply 37-38% of the energy demand. These are the realities 
of the market: we have to understand them and live with them and try to make the 
best out of them. There has not been a crisis in oil supply since those in 1973 and 
1979. And as for the prices – yes, they are high today. But when you compare them 
with the prices in 1973, they are only ˝ the prices they were then in real terms.
OPEC will be supplying more than one-half the world’s oil in 2030. Now, 
they are supplying thirty-million barrels per day of oil, and they will be doubling 
this over the next twenty-ﬁve years. What is going to happen, really, is that slowly 
but surely, signiﬁcant quantities of non-conventional oil, tar sand heavy oils, will 
ﬁgure increasingly in the oil supply equation. There are 8 trillion barrels of oil in 
conventional and unconventional forms, proven and unproven, and all of this has 
to be utilized in the foreseeable future.
KHATIB: BUSINESS AS USUAL
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High global economic growth, 4.5-5% in this year, is fueling the growth of the 
demand for oil. In the 1970s, we spoke about the decoupling of energy from the 
economy, and that happened for only a few years. Now energy and economy are 
directly related. Economic growth will lead to higher energy growth. The only 
diﬀerence is in energy eﬃciency.
I propose this equation:
Energy annual growth = economic growth - eﬃciency improvements
Eﬃciency improvements are now 1.5-2% annually, so there is going to be 
a growth in demand for energy which will exceed 3% in this year. Eﬃciency 
increases can only spell changes through dramatic increases in the prices of oil 
products in the U.S. and China, and also by changing transport tastes.
I would like to highlight the diﬀerences in how oil is being utilized in dif-
ferent parts of the world, comparing North America with Western Europe. The 
price per gallon of gasoline in the U.S. is two dollars. In Western Europe, it is ﬁve 
dollars per gallon.  Taxes in North America are 41%, in Europe 300%. Oil con-
sumption in America has gone up by something like 16% in the last thirty years. 
In Western Europe it has gone down by 21%. Average miles per gallon per car in 
America are only twenty-four, in Europe thirty-six. Diesel engines constitute two-
thirds of the cars in Western Europe, but  less than one percent of cars in North 
America.  Diesel engines are 30% more eﬃcient than petrol engines.
With such a wasteful approach to oil and such disregard for its scarcity, there 
is a price to be paid, and that is what is happening today. I am saying that all sup-
ply security problems, like 1973 and 1979, are now behind us. Oil exporters are 
anxious to supply as much as users are anxious to import. There has not been a 
OIL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS NORTH AMERICA VS EUROPE
North America West Europe
Prices of Gasoline/Gallon $ 1.9 $ 5
—Of which taxes 41 % 300 %
Oil consumtion 2003–1973 $ 1.9 - 21 %
Miles/Gallon 24 36
Diesel Engine Cars 
(30% more eﬃcient) 0.5 % 66 %
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supply security problem in what is considered to be an unstable part of the world. 
But prices now are no longer controlled by exporters. They are raised by spec-
ulators, strict regulators, strategists’ fears, reﬁning limitations, rapid economic 
growth, and limited investments. As long as we have rapid economic growth, as 
we have had this year and last year, prices are going to be a problem. Ultimately, 
these price problems will limit economic growth. Waste and cheap gasoline in the 
U.S. are major causes of the crisis we are now facing.
I have not spoken about the environment.  I am not saying that it is not im-
portant, but Kyoto 135 is likely to be ratiﬁed any day now, but it contains such 
ﬂexible terms that it is rendered less eﬀective. We cannot expect miracles from 
Kyoto. Developing countries—including China, of course—where most of the 
world’s growth is happening, are concerned with the local rather than the global 
environment, and they are outside Kyoto. The inertia of the energy system is 
huge. It will take decades to change facilities, technologies and behavior; this is 
a fact that we have to understand about the energy industry. This is not the tele-
communications industry, where consumer behavior and technology change the 
facts of the day every other year. This is diﬀerent. Change in the energy business 
is slow, and its investments are very large. Once you build a coal power station, 
you have to live with it for thirty or forty years, whether you like it or not. If you 
build a pipeline, you have to use it, and it goes on like this. Investments in the 
energy system have an awful lot of inertia that will keep the business going, as it 
is, for many decades to come. 
Unfortunately for many of us, and fortunately for some of us, the near and 
mid-term energy future is, in my humble view, business as usual.
KHATIB: BUSINESS AS USUAL
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I was asked to provide an update on the oil market and to give background as 
to why oil and gas prices are what they are today. I shall use the current market 
situation as a basis for questions and propositions that I believe fringe on the core 
subject of the conference, namely security of energy supply.
The world price of oil is exploring new territory in current dollar terms. Since 
most of us do not buy crude oil, the distinction between the real and the nominal 
price of crude is not very relevant. $55 for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude 
oil last Friday seems a suﬃciently new high, even though it is really only about 
two-thirds of the price reached in 1980. This new oil price is a consequence of 
a set of factors and events that have converged and compounded to put the oil 
market into a very tight condition. Some analysts believe prices could go higher as 
we go into the high demand period of the northern hemisphere winter. Without 
digging deeply into the whole compost heap of economic history and the evolu-
tion of oil supply and demand, I will attempt to summarize how we got here.
Robert Skinner
Director, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Is the Canary 
  Nodding Off?
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Throughout the nineties, world oil demand increased by a little less than a million 
barrels per day per year. During the early nineties, China’s demand sailed along 
at the modest but steady pace of a little over 200,000 barrels per day per year. 
Our attention then was on the rest of Asia, which together had annual demand 
increments averaging 520,000 barrels per day (b/d). The region then disappeared 
into the economic fog bank of the Asian Crisis and the post 9/11 recession. Since 
1999, having emerged from the fog, China and the rest of Asia have almost exactly 
reversed their weights in oil demand growth—the rest of the region’s growth is less 
than half of what it was, and China’s annual growth has averaged 520,000 b/d.  In 
retrospect, therefore, we should not have been surprised that this region has had 
for some time the potential to increase oil demand by over three-quarters of one 
million b/d per year—and thereby constitute a major driver of world oil demand. 
On top of this Asian demand, the Middle East and North America together 
have added over 3 million barrels per day (MMb/d) since 1999, and that just 
about ﬁnishes the demand story. The OECD European countries have not been 
a factor, with less than 100,000 b/d of net growth between 1999 and 2003. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) in its latest report expects world demand 
this year to increase by 2.7 million b/d, an increment not seen for nearly three 
decades, and at a rate more than twice any since 1985. This increase in oil de-
mand reﬂects the steep jump in the world’s GDP, which grew 5% over the last 
year, the greatest increase for the last 20 years, pulled by the North American 
and Chinese locomotives. 
In very simple terms, America’s consumption-driven economy is in part 
pulling China’s production-based economy. But China is also a major consumer 
of commodities, which it transforms and partly exports. It is now the second 
largest oil consumer after the U.S., importing nearly 3 million b/d mostly for 
petrochemicals and for diesel to generate power and to move coal in trucks to 
power stations because of the shortage of rolling stock and rails.
Perhaps this will be a bit too much like a cartoon, but what has been driving 
the world oil market might be characterized as follows. If a boat carrying any 
convertible commodity ﬂoats out onto the Paciﬁc ocean, it gets sucked into a 
Chinese port, oﬄoaded and, with services and equipment imported from neigh-
bouring Asian countries, converted into stuﬀ that is exported to America, where 
it is moved about the continent on trains and trucks to Big Box stores where 
consumers go 24/7 in their SUVs to buy it.
Is this a sustainable condition? Americans are consuming as much as ever and 
not saving, having received a boost from generous election-year monetary and ﬁs-
cal policy tonics. Some commentators believe this is feel-good based consumption 
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and is therefore illusory and can not last. America is in its ﬁrst ever jobless recovery, 
which prompts many to suspect its consumption rate will recede. While the Ameri-
can consumption boom might be temporary, China’s is not necessarily so. There 
are some huge underpinning structural reasons why China’s demand will continue 
to grow robustly. But those are the economies and governments to watch closely in 
the months ahead.
With world oil demand rising over the past three years or so, we encoun-
tered problems with supply. The following are just a few examples of factors that 
whittled away surplus capacity:
 Unrest in Venezuela and Nigeria reduced oil output;
 The continued disappointment in Iraq’s exports;
 Declines in oil production from the North Sea, the U.S.A. and in Oman and 
Indonesia;
 Extra calls on oil for power generation in Japan, to replace shut-down nuclear 
reactors of TEPCO (although strictly speaking, not a ‘supply’ issue);
 The Yukos aﬀair and cuts in its output, and threats to close it down;
 An ill-timed strike by Norway’s oﬀshore workers;
 Four recent hurricanes in the US Gulf, which have disrupted production and 
crude imports.
Fortunately OPEC, under Saudi leadership, drew on surplus capacity to sup-
plement the million barrels/day of incremental non-OPEC supply, which came 
mostly from the former Soviet Union with contributions from the deep marine 
margin plays oﬀ West Africa, Brazil and the U.S. Gulf Coast, as well as uncon-
ventional oil from Canada and Venezuela. 
Of critical importance have been the rapid and serious erosion of spare pro-
ductive capacity and the market’s perception of just what capacity remains. 
Through this period at least three myths have fed the media:
 
1. OPEC sets the price: OPEC does not set the price of oil. Like other market 
players, it examines the ﬂood of imprecise information about demand and 
supply and tries to adjust its volume of supply to keep prices within its tar-
get price range believed to assure its members of adequate revenues for their 
economies. Its record has not been stellar in this regard. It has attempted to 
send signals to the market players, not always successfully, by announcing 
cuts and increases in quota when it felt these were needed. Therefore, politi-
cians can not blame their economic problems on OPEC.
2. It is all the fault of the ‘speculators’: The hedge funds or ‘non-commercial 
commodity traders‘ (whom the popular press refer to as ‚speculators‘) have 
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not set the price. They correctly anticipated the counter seasonal growth in 
demand in the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 and increased their positions accordingly. 
But when they subsequently oﬀ-loaded, the price continued to rise. The in-
crease was not due to speculators. Some believed that the ‘reading of political 
factors’, including the attacks on foreigners in Saudi Arabia and the on-and-
oﬀ threat to pull the plug on Yukos, generated a ‘Fear Premium,’ which leads 
to a third myth. 
3. The oil price does not reﬂect the fundamentals: While many oil analysts 
are fond of showing a graph of the historical relationship between inventories 
and price to show that the price should be lower than it is, the critical issue 
when determining price is spare capacity along the production, transporta-
tion and processing chain. How market players view this spare capacity inﬂu-
ences what they are willing to pay for oil, especially as we go into the northern 
hemisphere’s winter. Spare capacity trumps inventories every time, and the 
current absence of spare reﬁning capacity of the right kind even trumps vague 
assurances that heavier (and therefore undesirable) grades of crude might be 
available in 40 days. Not being sure you can meet customers’ needs drives the 
market and is, at the end of the day, a critically important fundamental.
This leads to the following question: is this just another cyclical up-tick in prices 
juiced up into a ‘Perfect Storm’ by a convergence of accidents and political events? 
In other words, as these prices begin to bite, demand will shrink, new supply will 
surge and prices will collapse. Or, is there a major structural shift underway in the 
industry and, are these prices, then, like a canary in the coal mine, alerting us to 
a deep-seated problem?
It is well known that oil is less important today in OECD economies than 25 
years ago; that taxes on oil products dampen the eﬀect of crude price increases; 
that central banks are better at shifting monetary levers to inﬂuence macroeco-
nomic responses, and that non-dollar economies feel the price eﬀect less. While 
not a price forecast, the NYMEX forward curve indicates that buyers of oil for 
delivery in 2010 are prepared to pay $15 to 20 more today than they were willing 
to pay last year for 2010 deliveries. So, crude buyers believe oil has jumped into 
a new domain. I would add the following: Over the last year or so almost every 
major fuel sector has experienced some form of crisis that has put them back onto 
the public policy agenda: 
 oil we have talked about; 
 natural gas supply tightened in North America, and, in the UK, the media 
and some politicians are anguishing about becoming a net gas importer; 
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 the electricity sector experienced major supply interruptions in North Ameri-
ca and Europe and saw the shutdown of nuclear power reactors in Japan, with 
knock-on eﬀects in the oil and LNG markets. 
Energy supply investments are large, ﬁxed and long-term. Notwithstanding all the 
eﬀorts at market reform and liberalization (often given the misnomer, “deregula-
tion”, which connotes the absence of government), these capital investments take 
place very much within policy and regulatory frameworks set by governments. 
Over the past two decades, many governments attempted to reform their invest-
ment frameworks from ones of state ownership or direction of investments to 
ones that rely on competition among private investors. The reform eﬀorts seemed 
vindicated as long as capacity surpluses in most sectors lasted.  (No sane govern-
ment would liberalize a market without ﬁrst being satisﬁed that a supply surplus 
existed.) Some of the early cohorts in the liberalization adventure, such as Canada, 
the US and the UK, are now experiencing tight supply and higher or volatile 
prices. Free markets are symmetrical when it comes to prices: they give us both low 
and high prices. But consumers and, therefore, politicians are very asymmetrical in 
their expectations of markets: whether fettered or free, they only want low prices. 
On the other side, since the 1985-86 oil-price collapse, private oil companies 
have found it hard to get the kinds of returns and value they want for their share-
holders. They have cut costs, merged and acquired, and ﬁddled around, and not 
actually found great assets to invest in, to generate the kinds of returns that their 
shareholders had been accustomed to. And they went for the pretty girl down the 
street called the “dot-coms” and so things kind of went dead for a while. Many 
state owned producing companies were not left with suﬃcient capital to expand 
capacity adequately. Indeed, with 5 to 7 million b/d of spare capacity in OPEC 
just a few years ago, what sense would it have made for its members to spend lim-
ited capital on more idle capacity? 
There has been much discussion about the subject of spare oil production 
capacity, which developed accidentally as ‘fall-out’ from the demand crash of the 
eighties. There are some rather abstract notions ﬂoating about, appropriating Kyo-
to jargon such as ‘burden sharing’ and ‘fairness,’ implying that surplus capacity 
somehow should and can be developed under the aegis of governments, perhaps 
under the umbrella of the ‘producer/consumer dialogue.’ In eﬀect, through in-
ternational discussions, consumer governments would somehow agree to assist in 
the cost of developing spare capacity in producing countries. This would be fair, 
it is argued, since it is consumers who beneﬁt most from the availability of spare 
capacity and it would begin to address the producer side of the security-of-supply 
coin, namely ‘security of demand.’ 
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Frankly, this reminds me of the dashed dreams of State-to-State Oil Deals of the 
seventies and early eighties; it derives from either an accountant’s mindset or from 
people too accustomed to the state making all the decisions. It certainly reﬂects 
an over-developed faith in governments and an under-developed conﬁdence in 
the power of markets, technology and private capital. The ‘producer/consumer 
dialogue’ at government level has a lot of merit and much to do. This important 
dialogue would be going down the wrong track if the goal is intergovernmental 
underwriting of spare capacity. 
This issue is linked to the question of ‘access’ to resources. There are many fac-
ets to the ‘access’ issue: environmental restrictions preventing exploration (mostly 
North America), access by new entrants to a region and the incumbents’ control 
of infrastructure—recently addressed in the UK continental shelf.  Recently we 
have seen the call from some major oil companies for access to the oil resources 
of OPEC and of the Middle East countries in particular. First of all, there is only 
one country in the region whose upstream oil sector is not open, Saudi Arabia, 
and it does not need to be. ARAMCO is demonstrably quite capable of develop-
ing Saudi oil. 
Other countries are open, but the terms are evidently not suﬃciently attrac-
tive to the international oil companies to take up the invitation; at what price 
they will change their minds remains to be seen. Some suggest that private ﬁrms 
could not accept having their production cut back as part of OPEC’s volumetric 
adjustments. Is this a negotiating position? IOCs accept and manage all kinds of 
risks: I am sure they would ﬁgure out how to factor in and manage the risk that 
their share of production from a project might be reduced under OPEC’s pro 
rationing of volume. Pro rationing is not new: it was invented and practised for 
decades by governments in North America. Meanwhile, OPEC has much work 
to do on its whole system of volume management.
I should not leave the subject of the oil producing perspective without adding 
that oil producers would say: ‘if you consumers are so worried about high prices, 
why don’t you reduce your taxes on oil? You make much more revenue on our oil 
than we do as producers.’ While this is complex, any energy minister of a con-
suming country should squirm uncomfortably before calling on OPEC, as they 
always do when the price goes up, ‘to do something’.
I mentioned the gas supply situations in the U.S. and in the UK, the two 
countries that have dashed for gas in power generation. The UK does not, in our 
view, face a serious supply concern. Ample supply projects are contemplated that 
could, if anything, lead to a gas bubble in the UK. North America is diﬀerent. 
I believe it faces serious natural gas supply constraints, but they are not without 
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solution. Many observers of North America believe the current crisis in its gas 
and power sectors is due to policy failure rather than a case of resource depletion. 
Indeed, North America is the only gas market in the world that needs gas, has gas 
resources yet is not developing them. The industry is lobbying hard to get explo-
ration access to oﬀshore areas, currently oﬀ limits, expedited approvals for LNG 
terminals, ﬁscal and loan assistance for the Alaskan gas pipeline (recently tacked 
onto a military appropriations bill), and a host of other actions including greater 
regulatory ﬂexibility on emissions.
Before Europeans jump to the conclusion that the Anglo-Saxon experience 
conﬁrms why we must not liberalize and integrate markets in Europe, North 
America’s experience merely conﬁrms that you must take a comprehensive policy 
approach that does not prevent access to gas resources, that does not foreclose on 
electricity generation options and that sets in place a regulatory institution which 
facilitates interstate wheeling of electricity and stimulates investment to make it 
happen. 
Europe is blessed by being surrounded by gas-rich countries. Had we been 
honoured by having the Chairman of Gazprom speak on this panel, rather than 
me, I am sure he would remind us that Gazprom has been, is and will continue 
to be a reliable supplier. He might also say that they will make the necessary 
investments to meet future requirements. He might not add, however, that you 
Europeans do not make his task very easy because what you are doing or may be 
doing with gas and power sector reform and environmental regulations creates 
uncertainty, making it very hard to ascertain just how much gas you will need 
and when. In this regard, consultation is needed because complicating the down-
stream end of the gas supply chain has implications for the upstream.
Market reform or liberalization presents challenges for gas security, but they 
are not insurmountable. Large, multi-billion dollar investments in gas infra-
structure are made more complex by competition in that a rate of return might 
not be guaranteed, but large supply systems are not impossible (the $3.5 billion 
Alliance Pipeline in Canada built into the most competitive gas market in the 
world in 2000). However, it remains to be seen whether competitive markets 
will induce investments in double-digit billion dollar projects like the Alaskan 
pipeline and some of the immense schemes proposed out of Russia, both to 
Europe and to the East.
 Gas infrastructure is capital-intensive and needs gas ﬂowing through it to pay 
for it. This, along with the mutual co-dependence of the parties at either end of 
a gas pipe, enhances its security of supply. Producer dependence on the revenues 
compounds the security just as competition can increase suppliers’ interest in 
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making sure gas is ﬂowing to customers when they need it. The security of supply 
concern largely comes down to the low probability of short term, high impact 
interruptions. History conﬁrms that most interruptions are either self-imposed 
or due to operational failures or accidents. Transit country interruption is a con-
cern and is being addressed, but Europe has continued to be supplied. Moreover, 
downstream companies have a variety of contractual and technical measures to 
manage the load in the event of an interruption of supply. LNG adds to diversity 
and will reduce ‚dependency‘ on single sources, but not likely for this region of 
Central Europe. LNG does have, however, the potential to catch the Chernobyl 
Syndrome—an accident anywhere means an accident everywhere.
The organizers asked if I would talk about coal. I would only oﬀer the fol-
lowing observations, recalling from 1991/92 when I led the ﬁrst IEA review of 
the then CSFR Energy Sector, that central European countries were and are very 
coal-intensive.
 With energy security back on the agenda, so is energy diversity – the key 
means of enhancing security of supply. 
 Coal is an essential part of Central Europe’s energy system.
 This region would have an impossible diversity and security challenge if it 
were to close its coal and nuclear plants. They provide half of total energy 
supply and 80% of electricity in the accession countries, with coal alone pro-
viding nearly two thirds of electricity. 
 The environment need not suﬀer from continued coal use. The Commission 
estimates that over 60% of coal capacity in the enlarged EU is more than 30 
years old. Average thermal eﬃciency in Central Europe is less than 33% (cf 
38% in the EU 15). Replacing old coal plants with modern equipment would 
reduce CO2 emissions by 30% much more cost-eﬀectively than getting the 
same reduction via renewables. 
 After adjustment and rationalisation following EU membership, consump-
tion is likely to stabilise in Central Europe as it has over the past 10 years in 
the EU 15, while production is likely to decline.
 Central Europe will continue to need coal for security and can use it without 
harming the environment. 
I want to close by recalling some of the paradoxes of energy security.
 Paradox 1: ‘Middle East oil is insecure’. While the Middle East without 
doubt appears politically unstable and has had numerous wars over the past 
four decades that have aﬀected the price of oil, the world’s oil demand has 
been met and since the ﬁrst and only time a few producers used the so-called 
‘Oil Weapon,’ the region’s producers have made up for interruptions in oil 
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supply from other countries. This was demonstrated last year when Saudi 
Arabia increased production in the face of the invasion of Iraq while supplies 
were reduced from Venezuela and Nigeria.
 Paradox 2: The ‘Oil weapon’. Since 1973, the so-called oil weapon has been 
used mostly by consuming countries against producing countries in the form 
of sanctions (Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, now perhaps Sudan, and there have 
even been threats against the Chavez government of Venezuela); by consum-
ing countries against consuming countries (South Africa), and by producers 
against producers (against Russia in the late eighties and against Venezuela in 
the late nineties.)
 Paradox 3: ‘Energy independence is the key to energy security.’ While 
energy security is often couched in concerns about external threats, many 
interdictions of supply originate internally (UK Coal Miners’ strike in 1984 
and Fuel Protests and blockades in Europe in 2000; Alberta cut oﬀ crude to 
eastern Canada in 1981; numerous union actions in France including in June 
this year when the union cut over 13 GWs of power during an anti-privati-
zation strike, including speciﬁc, commando style targeted cuts of power to 
homes of political leaders).
 Paradox 4: ‘Government intervention can assure security of supply:’ Gov-
ernment policies to enhance security of supply sometimes lead to inverse re-
sults. The oﬀ-oil policy of Japan, expressed partly in terms of building nuclear 
plants, led to Japan having to increase oil imports in 2003 because of the 
generic problems in TEPCO’s nuclear plants. Nuclear is a technology with 
many merits, but it is exposed to the risk of ‘problem somewhere/problem 
everywhere.’ If a design ﬂaw is generic, several or all reactors in a system 
may have to be shut down. This dependence on a single technology owing 
to government’s ‘picking winners’ can compound rather than reduce energy 
insecurity.
While based on the empirical evidence, I believe our pre-occupation with energy 
supply is misplaced or overblown, and, in any event, too focused on the political 
rather than the real technical/strategic aspects. I have spent enough of my career 
dealing with energy policy, both nationally and internationally, to be sensitive 
to the realpolitik of energy and the asymmetrical expectations of consumers and 
politicians regarding markets.
Price volatility has recently increased and higher prices always get the atten-
tion of politicians. It is simply inconceivable that a politician could waive oﬀ a 
signiﬁcant rise in energy prices. I believe volatility and a sustained higher price is 
like the canary in the coal mine: it is an important signal for action, action that 
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is conducive to sound policies that stimulate investment in both supply and in 
end-use eﬃciency.
Governments of consumer countries and exporters must work together to 
understand the real issues in supply security, and politicians need to focus on 
where their policies or their lack of policies prevent timely investment in energy 
supply. It takes a very, very long time from when a policy is changed to when new 
energy supply happens, and the canary is already nodding oﬀ.
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In this presentation, I would like to focus on the world energy outlook, with an 
emphasis on the oil market. The current conditions in the world oil market high-
light our common challenges to acquire secure energy supplies and bring stability 
to energy prices, so that we can continue sustainable economic growth. I want to 
then share with you a picture of what our broad energy strategy is in the U.S. to 
meet our energy challenges both today and in the future.
I think the Bush administration deserves a tremendous amount of credit for 
its methodology of the blueprint established in the National Energy Plan, and I 
think that I can say that as a career non-political appointee to the Department 
of Energy. We are investing, and I think that Research and Development is part 
of the answer. I will describe some of the important areas of R & D in which 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is investing. We are investing in energy 
technologies of the future, in partnership with other countries, with a hope that 
our future discoveries will support economic growth, protect the environment, 
reduce poverty, and strengthen our energy security.
Giulia Bisconti
Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Under Secretary for Energy
The U.S. Energy Plan 
and the Challenges 
of Oil Market 
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The world oil market has experienced wide swings over the past three decades, 
reﬂecting in part events like the Arab oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, the 
Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, and more 
recent events such as unrest in Venezuela, the ongoing conﬂict in Iraq, and tight 
markets in the face of strong growth in world demand. 
Oil prices in nominal terms reached a new record on the NYMEX recently, 
closing at $52.10 per barrel. Prices began rising in February 2002 and peaked 
during the Venezuelan strike in advance of the Iraq war. Since then, prices have 
remained well above the so-called OPEC price ban, and they have been rising 
steadily since January. There are several reasons why prices have been high. OPEC 
repeatedly reduced production quotas in 2003 and 2004 in response to their 
expectation of a possible weakening in price. OPEC has reversed itself beginning 
last April, but they have lost control of the market. OPEC (OPEC 11, includ-
ing Iraq) is currently producing at its highest level since 1979, 30.2 mmbd in 
September, but prices remain high. World surplus capacity, at 0.5-1.0 mmbd, is 
currently near its lowest point of the past 30 years, leaving little to cushion any 
potential supply disruption. As a result, perceived risks to supply are magniﬁed 
by the market, and inventories remain at historically low levels for both crude oil 
and products. 
In October 2004, the IMF and World Bank raised their forecasts of global 
GDP growth to 5.0 percent for 2004, the highest growth rate in 30 years. Some 
slowdown is expected in 2005; an even greater slowdown is expected if oil prices 
remain around $50 per barrel. World economic growth continues, oil demand 
growth stays strong, and supply remains tight.
Annual world oil demand growth averaged just over one million barrels per day 
in the 1990s, but fell sharply in 2002. Demand regained strength last year, rising 
by over 1.2 million barrels per day, and is projected to rise by 2.5 million barrels 
per day in 2004 to 84.2 million barrels per day, and almost another two million 
barrels per day in 2005. In particular, Chinese demand growth has shown remark-
able strength, where demand is now projected to grow by one million barrels per 
day in 2004, before slowing to half that rate in 2005 as a result of the eﬀorts by 
the Chinese government to slow demand growth. U.S. demand is forecast to grow 
around 390,000 barrels per day in 2004, and 360,000 barrels per day in 2005.
A major concern for the world oil market has been the steady erosion of excess 
production capacity as demand has surged. IEA currently estimates global excess 
production capacity at approximately one million barrels per day. Some analysts 
have lower estimates. Suﬃce it to say that producers’ ability to respond to a dis-
ruption in the oil supply is very limited. 
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With little spare production capacity and low inventories, any supply disruption 
would be expected to push prices up even higher. In the U.S., inventories of crude 
oil and all major petroleum products are well below ﬁve-year averages. Distillate 
heating stocks are extremely precarious as we head into winter. Given the small 
amount of excess capacity, the market has intensiﬁed its focus in regions where 
disruptions could occur. As you know, Iraq has seen periods of disruption due to 
sabotage; there has been ethnic labor unrest in Nigeria, and terrorists have struck 
in Saudi Arabia. 
High oil prices will not go away. For many diﬀerent reasons, we are in a pe-
riod of relatively high prices that are expected to continue to remain high for the 
next year, and that is without a major supply disruption. Oil continues to be the 
dominant energy source. Oil’s share of world energy is currently projected to re-
main unchanged at 39% through 2015. Use of natural gas and renewable energy 
is expected to grow a bit faster than coal and nuclear over the projected period. 
Much of the expansion in renewable energy is expected to result from large-scale 
hydroelectric power projects in Asia.
I am not going to go into detail, but let me just note that we have a concern 
about natural gas prices as well in the U.S. Gas prices have tripled over the past 
few years, and consumption has greatly increased. 
I would now like to talk about the U.S. strategy for addressing our energy 
challenges, including meeting dramatic energy demand growth that is projected 
over the next two decades in the U.S. First, we view energy security as a key re-
quirement for sustainable development. Energy supports economic health, which 
in turn funds conservation, eﬃciency, and environmental improvements for sus-
tainable development. Countries with strong economies are in a much better 
position to take advantage of opportunities to have a clean environment. Energy 
provides a basis for increasing the world’s health, environment, and standard of 
living. We all recognize that energy needs will grow much faster in developing 
countries. 
U.S. energy policies are laid out primarily in the National Energy Plan issued 
in May 2001. This is basically our key blueprint of what we are trying to do to 
move our energy plan forward. It has been very impressive for me to watch how 
methodically the recommendations laid out in the Energy Plan have been fol-
lowed through. Almost all of the recommendations that could be implemented 
by executive order have already been acted on. There are only a few areas that 
are still under consideration or debate, but it has really been impressive how 
methodically our government has been able to move forward on those recom-
mendations.
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I would like to address several elements of the U.S. Energy Action Plan for En-
ergy Security and a Sustainable Future. The National Energy Plan is aimed at 
developing a reliable, aﬀordable, and environmentally friendly energy mix. In the 
short term, the United States is moving to complete the ﬁlling of our strategic 
petroleum reserves for the ﬁrst time in history to 700 million barrels. We have 
had about 670 million barrels in the reserve and our ﬁll-rate is determined by our 
need to avoid creating adverse price impacts on the market. Some people wonder 
why we are ﬁlling it even when the price is so high, and the answer is that we are 
trying to create a stable eﬀect on the world oil market. 
We are also working with the IEA to strengthen the reserve policies in other 
countries, particularly in major consumers such as China and India. Our policy is 
to use the reserve only in the case of a severe disruption in world oil supply. On a 
case-by-case basis, we have also used oil from the reserve to ensure continued supply 
to domestic reﬁners who have had their supply interrupted by storms or accidents. 
Most recently, we loaned oil from the reserves to reﬁners who suﬀered supply losses 
due to Hurricane Ivan. One of our key midterm strategies is to improve the ability 
of the economy to grow while using less energy. One strategy for accomplishing 
this is working to improve the eﬃciency of power production. 
Another strategy that we have is to improve our fuel and source diversity. We 
want to grow our renewable energy capabilities. The DOE spends more research 
dollars on renewable energy and energy eﬃciency than on any other sources. We 
want to expand nuclear power. We want to shore up domestic supply through 
developing more of our reserves; we want to improve the transmission and trans-
portation infrastructure for our energy. We want to integrate the North American 
supply with Canada and Mexico and to diversify our international supply. 
The U.S. did not join the Kyoto protocol, but we are committed to reduc-
ing our greenhouse gas emissions in ways that do not harm our economy. Much 
of our eﬀort is focused on technological solutions. To this end, the DOE has 
made increasingly larger investments in science and technology research and 
development to meet our energy challenges for the 21st century. We have a 
major research commitment to carbon sequestration and emissions reduction to 
enable the clean use of fossil energy. We are predicting a 50% increase in the use 
of carbon based fuels over the next twenty years. If that increase is going to oc-
cur, a robust sequestration program is vitally important for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
A tangible measure of our commitment to carbon sequestration is our Future-
Gen project. This is a ten-year, one-billion-dollar program to create the world’s 
ﬁrst zero-emissions fossil fueled power plant. When operational, it will be the 
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cleanest fossil power plant in the world. Virtually every aspect of the plant will be 
based on cutting-edge technology; rather than using traditional coal combustion 
technology, it will rely on coal gasiﬁcation. It will be a living prototype, testing the 
latest technologies to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, and sequester green-
house gas emissions from coal. FutureGen will help lead the development of clean 
fossil-fuel power plants across the world. Because of the obvious international ap-
plication of FutureGen, we are opening the project to global participation. 
We are going to expand the use of emission-free energy sources, including the 
advanced design nuclear power plants and renewables. The U.S. government and 
private sector are working together in initiatives that should result in new nuclear 
power plants in the 2010 timeframe. In the meantime, our 103 nuclear power 
plants have become extremely eﬃcient and productive. Since 1990, our nuclear 
power plants have increased their electricity output equal to 26 new power plants, 
enough to power 26 cities the size of Boston or Seattle. 
Our long-term strategy is tied up in hydrogen, fusion, the emissions trapped 
fossil I was just discussing, and future nuclear resources. Hydrogen could become 
the clean transportation fuel of the future. However, hydrogen is not a source of 
energy, but a carrier of energy: it must be produced by something. We are looking 
at nuclear and emissions trapped fossil as the most likely large energy sources to 
produce hydrogen, with renewables also as an important component. 
The U.S. is committed to spending 1.7 billion dollars in the ﬁrst years to fund 
the ambitious Freedom Car Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, which will develop emis-
sions free automotive operating systems that will run on hydrogen. If our plans 
are successful, by 2040 hydrogen could replace more than eleven million barrels 
per day of oil in America alone, which would, besides lessening our energy de-
pendence, have a tremendous impact on lowering the levels of carbon emissions 
into the atmosphere. 
In regard to fusion, the U.S. is one of the world’s largest supporters of fusion 
research. We are hopeful that ITER parties will conclude successful negotiations 
of the ITER project, which will be the next stage in fusion development. As for 
Generation Four nuclear energy, great strides are being made to reduce costs and 
improve safety, reduce waste amounts and toxicity, and improve the non-prolif-
eration attributes of this important energy source. 
Lastly, I want to conclude with our international energy strategy. We want 
to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships. We want to prevent and 
eﬀectively respond to supply disruptions. We want to integrate and improve the 
connectivity of regional energy systems, both in North America and with other 
countries and their neighbors. We also want to improve the producing and 
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consuming countries’ relationships. We want to support the development of 
transparent, open, fair, and competitive markets. We want to engage other coun-
tries facing similar energy challenges so that we might tackle those challenges 
together. 
One way we are doing this is by developing and leading new international 
initiatives to collaborate with other countries on large scale projects. The carbon 
sequestration leadership forum brought thirteen countries together last year to 
begin working on ways to sequester greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels. 
In a similar fashion, we launched the International Partnership for the Hydrogen 
Economy with ﬁfteen countries and the EU to work together on hydrogen. By 
pooling our technological expertise, by establishing a common set of workable 
codes and standards, and by setting realistic goals and timetables, we will speed 
the coming of the hydrogen revolution in a way that would never be possible 
independent of other nations. We must work together on these goals. 
The last area that I will mention is international cooperation and the new 
Methane to Markets International Partnership. The initiative is designed to pro-
mote cost eﬀective near-term methane recovery by targeting three methane sourc-
es for action: landﬁlls, underground coal mines, and natural gas and oil systems.
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Risks 
of Import Dependency 
What do consumers want? Above all, consumers want a good life. They want 
mobility, they want heat, they want power to work their computers and their 
factories, and they really do not care how that happens. They are prepared to 
sing folk songs or do country dancing or deep breathing if that would deliver the 
result. The question of whether it comes by one form of energy or another is a 
secondary question.
I suggest that there are really three headings. One is the traditional energy 
policy area: consumers want reliable supplies at reasonable prices, and that is a 
contradiction. Somebody has to trade oﬀ reliability against price; the question 
is: does that trade-oﬀ get made by governments or get made in the marketplace? 
And even there, the answer is slightly diﬀerent for diﬀerent conditions. Secondly, 
consumers are also citizens, and therefore they are concerned about national se-
curity and foreign policy and the defense and independence and freedom of their 
country. Thirdly, and this is what I will concentrate on most, consumers are also 
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humans; they have consciences, and they want to know that what they do is sup-
plied by energy which is derived in a way which is acceptable from an environ-
mental point of view, from a social point of view, from an ethical point of view. 
That is something that nobody has mentioned so far. 
Let me say a word about the traditional energy issues. Much has been said, 
but there are some things that deserve to be said again because it is so seldom 
realized how important they are. We have to start with physical facts. The physi-
cal facts are that resources of energy, whether coal, oil, or gas are where geology 
has put them over millions of years. They are there, but the demand for energy is 
elsewhere. The demand for energy is where history and development have put it, 
so we have 60% of the oil reserves in the Middle East and 27% of the gas reserves 
in Russia, but half of the energy demand for oil and gas is in North America and 
Europe. 
In the future, this balance will shift. Half of the increase in energy demand, 
we are told, will be in Asia. The point is that trade is inevitable, and the phrase 
that talks about energy dependence, meaning import dependence, is actually a 
great direction post in the wrong direction. Dependence is good, trade is good; 
we all learn as economists that trade is beneﬁcial because it enables things to be 
delivered at the cheapest possible cost. There may be some problems, and we have 
to deal with them, but trade is inevitable, and that is important because when 
consumers want reliable supplies, and they want cheap supplies, trade is the way 
to deliver the lowest cost solution to the world’s energy problems. 
Not surprisingly, when we look at the ﬁgures, there is indeed very substantial 
trade; something like 20% of the world’s energy is traded. Of that 20%, there are 
three main movements: the movement from Russia to Europe, which accounts 
for about a third of it; the movement from the Middle East to Asia, which ac-
counts for another third; and the movement from a variety of sources into the 
United States, into North America, which accounts for about a quarter. 
The numbers are much larger if you look at oil alone. Something like 60% of 
world oil supplies are traded, and to bring that to an end would be impossible in 
all sorts of ways. The only two countries that are not deeply involved in energy 
exports and imports, and they are in fact marginal exporters, are Canada and the 
United Kingdom. They are not necessarily models that anybody else can follow 
because they happen to have a coincidence of demand and resources. 
If we look ahead, to where the expansion of oil supply is going to come 
from for the next ten years or so, more than half of it will come from outside the 
Middle East. Of that, much of it is being developed by the private sector. We have 
a kind of energy policy formula which says, “yes, there is trade in fact,” though 
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that is not often admitted. But in the internal markets, security and the lowest 
cost are provided by liberal markets, competition, and all of those things that you 
are very well aware of in the European Union and the Czech Republic, and the 
construction of those markets is a subject in itself. 
Let me move to the question of the future supplies of energy for interna-
tional trade. There are two quite diﬀerent problems. One is the investment by 
Middle Eastern countries, where the oil and gas resources are a state monopoly; 
are they going to invest? When are they going to invest? The other is the invest-
ment by mainly private sector companies in the rest of the world, especially 
outside the United States, which has rather limited energy resources, and in 
Russia, which is very diﬀerent from the rest of the world. The interesting thing, 
I think, is that this investment is very concentrated. Outside North America, 
something like 63 billion dollars are spent every year on oil and gas exploration 
and development. Half of that money is spent by six companies: it is a very con-
centrated business. You could also say that half is spent by 50 or 100 companies, 
but nevertheless, a very small number of companies make a very large part of 
this investment.
The IEA has indicated that, as it looks forward, very large amounts of invest-
ment are required in developing countries to provide energy for export. A large 
part of that is going to be either in OPEC by the state monopolies, or it is going 
to be by this rather small number of private companies. Now, the thing about the 
small number of private companies is that they are very exposed to a lot of things. 
They are exposed to political pressures; they are exposed to national pressures, and 
to social and ethical pressures. 
Before I get to the ethical question, let me just say what the international 
agendas aﬀecting this investment appear to be. First, the OECD governments 
are promoting a whole series of wishes about how foreign investment should be 
treated. They are expressed in diﬀerent ways; they are expressed in the NG Char-
ter Treaty; they are expressed in the General Agreement on Trade in Services; they 
are expressed in the General Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 
the so-called Singapore principles. All of these things are laid down by developed 
countries to encourage and develop investment of all kinds, but certainly includ-
ing energy investment, primarily in developing countries. 
The NG Charter Treaty is particularly targeted at Russia. The companies, of 
course, generally prefer what are called “production sharing agreements,” which 
are common in Latin American and African countries, which create a kind of 
legal enclave for the foreign company to operate independently of local taxes and 
laws. This is the case with the Baku Pipeline, which has a little agreement that 
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does just that. There are one or two agreements in Russia which do this also, but 
it is evident that this is not the way they are going in general. 
There is a set of initiatives to bring foreign developing countries which have 
the resources into line with what you might loosely call OECD principles, and 
these have to do with what you would expect: stability of laws, stability of con-
tracts, controlling corruption, transparency in where the revenues go, accounting 
standards, a general minimizing of the state role, and mixed-up objectives of 
privatization, with the objective of promoting opportunities for companies from 
the developed world to invest in developing countries. 
There is an international agenda which is chugging through a number of 
channels, where the World Bank and the international ﬁnancial institutions also 
participate. This is sometimes called the Washington Consensus because it is part 
of a general mode to create in developing countries a kind of functioning market 
economy. And more and more emphasis is given, particularly in World Bank 
activities, on realizing that you cannot have stable functioning market economies 
without having good governance. And good governance also means democracy 
and electoral processes. It means building the capacity of the governments con-
cerned by various kinds of aid programs. 
That is the kind of conventional set of pressures, and to that we have now 
added what I would call the missionary agenda. The missionary agenda comes 
from human rights groups; it comes from NGOs; it comes from all of those peo-
ple who appeal to the consciences of consumers. Some of this agenda is the same 
as what I would call the OECD agenda, but it goes further because it puts much 
more emphasis on human rights and the social impact of energy investment proj-
ects which bear on exports. One of the reasons that these movements have lever-
age is because, for the private sector, so much of the investment is carried out by a 
small number of large companies, based in Europe or North America, which are 
vulnerable to these pressures, not just from public opinion, but also from their 
investors, from fund managers, increasingly from ethical investment funds, from 
pension funds or share holders in these things, who now want to say that they do 
not want their investments to be in companies that are going to have continual 
conﬂict on their hands. It is altering behavior: the Burma gas pipeline, the Aceh 
ﬁeld in Indonesia, the problems of the people in the delta in Nigeria, the use of oil 
revenues in Angola and Sudan, the gas pipeline route in Bolivia, which brought 
down a government, the pipeline through Turkey from the Caucasus, the Three 
Gorges Dam in China, the whole series of human rights issues in Colombia. 
There is a very active agenda, which the big companies, because of their exposure 
to it, are trying to address, but they all add up to companies, governments, and 
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international institutions taking on a reforming, missionary role in many of the 
developing countries from which these resources and exports will come in the 
future (more diﬃcult to do in the case of the Middle Eastern countries because 
they are quite strong countries, really).
To sum up, I think that consumers are looking for a lot of very diﬃcult ob-
jectives to coincide. In the short term, they are looking to avoid nasty surprises, 
crisis management, and the use of oil stocks. Shocks and surprises will be with 
us. In the medium term, there is a more complicated agenda. We have to take 
the political risks on a case by case basis. Mere fact of dependence on imports, 
apart from being inevitable, does not necessarily create a political problem. If 
you are totally dependent on Norway for gas imports, I do not think that anyone 
would say that there was a security problem. If we were totally dependent on 
Trinidad for gas imports, I do not think that people would say that there was a 
security problem from the point of view of the government of Trinidad trying 
to inﬂuence the policies of Europe. There may be an explosion in Trinidad, but 
that is a diﬀerent problem, which is not going to be used to inﬂuence the poli-
cies inside Europe. We have to be certain that there is a coincidence of import 
dependence and political power, which matters and which could, under certain 
circumstances, be a threat. 
I think that if we take that test, we are left with two situations. One is Europe 
and Russia, and the other is the possibility of combined Islamic action against 
people whom they regard as a threat to their interests inside the Middle East. 
Otherwise, dependence is something which is part of life. In the medium term, I 
think we have to look at some type of dialogue with the OPEC producers. They 
have interests and concerns about the instability of the market, about diﬀerential 
taxation, and so on. Dialogue in the International Energy Forum Administers has 
been friendly, and it has become friendlier, but there is no substance to it. Lastly, 
we have to look at the acceptability from the ethical and social points of view of 
these missionary attempts to change the rest of the world.
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I am going to talk about risks, the risk associated with operating nuclear reactors 
and the risk associated with the electrical distribution network. I am going to do 
that in terms of something called a “risk equation.” For some of you that is old 
hat; you have seen it a lot. For others, it may be a new concept, so I would like 
to introduce it in terms we can all identify with: ﬂying on an airplane. I will go 
through the terminology and then go through that equation, talking about the 
reactors and talking about the distribution system.
The ﬁrst thing to recognize is that the risk is never zero. No matter what we 
do, or where we go, or what kind of system we design, there is always a ﬁnite 
chance that if we fail in any way, it could be catastrophic. The risk equation is 
pretty simple in concept; it is the consequence of failure. That is, what will hap-
pen if the airplane crashes—you will die. Now, that can be expressed in prob-
ability terms, it turns out, but it is diﬃcult to analyze because it requires looking 
at, for example, the threat, the capability of the agent implementing the threat 
43
(let us say, terrorists from Al-Qaeda), and their technical capabilities, as well as 
their desire to do something to a particular system. So, let us do it in terms of an 
airplane. We all made the decision to come here, even though we know that the 
consequence of that airplane you were on crashing would almost certainly have 
been death.  But, when we look at the next term in the equation, the ability of 
the terrorist to bring down the plane, we know they have the technical capability. 
They demonstrated it through explosions in Pan Am, through carrying a shoe 
bomb on board in the case of Richard Reed, who was only defeated because the 
passengers attacked him, and by missiles, which have also been used in the past. 
The fact that it is not happening all the time means that terrorists have chosen not 
to put the resources there, so the probability of that attack occurring on the plane 
that you or I happen to be on is less than one, substantially less than one, in fact, 
because of the number of aircraft ﬂying.
The next is the vulnerability or, rather, the reduction in vulnerability to at-
tack. And that can occur in a number of ways. In baggage handling, for example, 
it could be addressed by using containers that are explosion-proof.  Another al-
ternative is to keep the explosives oﬀ the plane; that is what we are doing now 
in the U.S. by detection in airports to keep people from carrying explosives onto 
the plane.
We are all too familiar with the delays of going through airports, getting on 
the aircraft, going through the inspections. So the risk in the decision we made to 
ﬂy here, we determined, was very, very small because we hardly ever think about 
it, about getting on a plane. To look at risks that have a much larger potential 
impact, such as the risk of a failure of a nuclear reactor, there is an organized 
methodology that can be applied. At Sandia, we call that methodology a “risk 
assessment methodology” or RAM, and it has been applied to reactors and water 
systems and many other things. I would like to walk you through that kind of 
approach now and talk about reactors and why I am, in fact, very comfortable in 
extolling the virtues of nuclear power because the risk is so small, even though 
the consequences are great.
The ﬁrst thing to do in making that assessment is to look at the assets and 
characterize them. What is it about reactors that could cause a problem, and 
what is it that is inherently safe in them? Determine the consequences of failure. 
In terms of reactors, that means the consequences of the reactor vessel being 
breached and the core melting to release radioactive materials into the environ-
ment, which could ultimately kill somebody. Deﬁning the threats looks at the 
desire of terrorists, in this case, to attack a reactor, and also at their capabilities. 
Now unfortunately, they have proven that they know how to get their hands on 
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large missiles and aircraft, so that there is a demonstrated capability to do that. 
Now hitting a reactor, as opposed to the Trade Center Building, is a much more 
diﬃcult thing to do because it presents a smaller target. And, in fact, getting the 
aircraft is much more diﬃcult now because of the examples I cited earlier: the 
inspection of people and locking the doors to the cockpit. Also, safeguards are 
built into reactor systems. The reactor containment vessel is a meter or more of 
concrete, highly reinforced, and there are redundant safety systems as well. So 
containment and the safety and security associated with the act of operations 
is very good. Although not intended to protect against the attacks, particularly, 
when they were designed, they serve that purpose admirably.  
By going through this process and employing a model, and the model’s com-
plexity depends on how serious the issue is, we can come up with a reasonably 
good number for a risk in analyzing a given system, and then policymakers can 
make the determination: is this risk acceptable or is it not? And if it is not, then 
you can go back through that cycle again and seek opportunities to reduce the 
risk still further.
In my opinion, reactors are very safe; the risk number is extremely low for this 
kind of attack. Sometimes when I am asked, I say that I would rather live next to 
a reactor than live in downtown Washington, D.C., where I see the probability of 
an attack as being somewhat higher.  
Let us go through that same cycle again, looking at power systems, but this 
time, not thinking about it in terms of the immediate deaths which would come 
from a reactor attack, but rather the impact on economics. (Once again character-
izing these assets as relatively complex because they are very broadly distributed, 
but the consequences of their failures can be extremely negative.)  In the report 
that was handed out for this meeting (which I found fascinating, by the way, and 
I enjoyed reading it), the consequences of failure of electrical grid systems was 
considered to be not terribly disruptive over a short period of time. 
In fact, the right kind of attack on a grid system can cause it to fail for a very 
long period of time because there are critical nodes in grid systems that use, for 
example, very large transformers of which, the last time I looked, there was one 
spare in the U.S. They are all built outside the United States, and the lead time 
is around a year, and so an appropriately planned attack could disable the power 
grid for a long period of time with very severe consequences. The threats, again, 
are desires on the part of terrorists to attack economic targets, as opposed to ones 
associated with the death of the people who are near them. The safeguards in the 
past were relatively modest. Now, over the last several years, they have increased 
dramatically, particularly when it comes to protecting against software-related 
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attacks, where one could go in with computers, causing the grid to crash in an 
unacceptable way and damage the equipment. Nevertheless, they are vulnerable 
simply by the fact that they are spread out, and watching the oil pipeline destruc-
tion going on in Iraq is a very good example that we see everyday. 
Again, analyzing these systems for risks suggests to me that, in fact, they are 
at a much higher risk of disruption and are a much higher risk of causing grave 
economic damage to a country or region than is an attack on reactor, for example. 
And so, as we look at that from an economist’s point of view, the grid is, in fact, 
remarkably vulnerable. We have made a lot of progress on addressing the vulner-
ability. There is, in my view, a long way to go. It is the heart and soul of protecting 
our economies. And it is because it is not just the grid: it is the things associated 
with the grid, the so-called interdependencies. When the power grid goes down, 
the ability to pump water goes away, the telecommunications will fail in a couple 
of days when the batteries go dead and they are not going to charge the genera-
tors anymore with diesel fuel, and so they will die, and emergency services follow 
there after. And this cascading eﬀect of long-term outages (long-term being more 
than a few days) is very serious.
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Protection of Key 
Energy Infrastructure
I want you to remember that we cannot continue with business as usual, that we 
have to be very sensitive to how much time it’s going to take us to change the 
situation, that we don’t have a lot of time, and that there are things that we can 
do to change the situation. I will brieﬂy go over each of these issues. I am going 
to focus on the oil sector and speciﬁcally on oil terrorism. The reason we need 
to care about oil terrorism is because we have almost zero wiggle room in the oil 
market right now. With growing demand from the developing world—China 
and India together are a third of humanity, and China’s oil consumption grew 
thirty percent last year, largely driven by the transportation sector—spare ca-
pacity has eroded severely. Any severe act of terrorism can really aﬀect the oil 
market. While it is true that we no longer need to be concerned about oil shocks 
of the type we saw during the Arab Oil Embargo, we are now looking at a very 
diﬀerent kind of oil shock, a next-generation oil shock. That is, an oil shock that 
is carried out by non-state actors, by terrorists, and these terrorists have clearly 
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put oil in their crosshairs. I am just going to cite for you an Al-Qaeda statement 
made after the attack on the French oil tanker, the Lindberg, oﬀ the coast of 
Yemen in 2002. That statement said, “by hitting the oil tanker in Yemen, the 
Mujahedden have hit the feeding line in the provision to the artery of the life of 
the crusader nation.” I do not think one can get a more clear statement of how 
well people understand that oil is an Achilles’ heal of the West; it is really the 
lifeblood of the West, and our societies would grind to a screeching halt if it were 
severely interrupted.
Let us go into speciﬁcs. First of all, two thirds of the world’s oil reserves are lo-
cated in the Middle East. If we expand beyond the Middle East, we see that three 
quarters of oil reserves are located in countries in which Islamic fundamentalism, 
and the terrorism that goes with it, is on the rise. What that means is that there is 
ample opportunity and motive to attack oil targets.
What kind of targets are we talking about? First of all, pipelines are extremely 
vulnerable, with Iraq providing an example. Iraq has over four thousand miles 
of pipeline, much of it above ground, and we have seen a sustained campaign 
of sabotage against these pipelines, and these are not random attacks. We track 
the attacks on Iraqi pipelines, and there have been over one hundred ﬁfty attacks 
since the oﬃcial end of hostilities. They fall into two categories. They are attack-
ing with clear strategic intent, number one, to disrupt the ability of Iraq to export 
oil and thus make the eﬀort of the coalition much more expensive by putting that 
cost on coalition taxpayers, and number two, to disrupt the ability to provide 
electricity to Iraqis and thus create resentment against the coalition. They attack 
at critical points; they attack parts that are more diﬃcult to replace than spare, 
oﬀ-the-shelf parts, and they attack when a pipeline goes back up. They do not 
bother attacking if it is not a really important pipeline or if it has been damaged. 
They wait until it has been repaired, and then they just go at it. 
It is very concerning that we see these types of attacks occurring in other parts 
of the world—India and Russia have seen these types of pipeline attacks, certainly 
not on the scale of Iraq’s, but it is just a matter of time. I want to remind you that 
this type of attack is not a new thing. If you look at Colombia, for instance, the 
major pipeline in Colombia has been attacked so many times that it is known as 
“the ﬂute.”
Pipelines are really of big concern if you look at one of Iraq’s neighbors, Saudi 
Arabia, which has over twice the pipeline mileage that Iraq has.  So if we see 
these types of attacks spreading there, it would really be very disturbing, espe-
cially since Saudi Arabia is essentially the only holder of spare capacity in the oil 
market, which is why it is the most important country in the world oil market. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that it has 25% of world oil reserves, it is really the spare 
capacity that makes it critical.
Next, it is important to mention chokepoints brieﬂy. Oil, because it is located 
so far away from the consuming countries, has to travel by sea. Unfortunately, the 
sea is just not a very safe place. Some of the chokepoints are Malaka, Hormuz, 
and there are several others, but they all are located in areas in which terrorism, 
again, is on the rise, and more than terrorism, if we just focus in on the Strait of 
Malaka between Indonesia and Malaysia, what we see is that piracy is really a big 
problem. Piracy there is at the worst level that it has been over the past twenty 
years. There has been a slight improvement over the past four months because 
of coordinated patrols by the littoral states, but it is still a very big problem, and 
there is a huge concern about collusion between pirates and terrorists. Commu-
nications indicated that they considered attacks on shipping in the area in intel-
ligence intercepts of Jemaah Islamia and also in confessions of Jemaah Islamia 
terrorists in Indonesian custody. The Free Aceh Movement, an Islamist separatist 
movement in Indonesia, also has a practice of highjacking vessels.
Now when we look at what we have seen in terms of oil terrorism on tankers, 
ﬁrst of all, we see that it is not just the Lindberg. In October of 2001, there was 
a coordinated suicide attack on a tanker oﬀ the coast of Sri Lanka. Of course, we 
had the same kind of attack on the U.S.S. Cole; if they can attack a ship like that, 
they can attack a tanker. Tankers are very diﬃcult to protect. Of course, the crew 
is not armed; you cannot put electric fencing up on them, so you cannot really 
prevent hijacking, and you certainly cannot prevent a suicide boat from coming 
at them.
The other thing you should remember is the attempted attack on the Basra 
terminal oﬀ the southern coast of Iraq: a suicide boat coordinated attack which 
fortunately failed because of the soldiers patrolling in the area, but if it had suc-
ceeded, a signiﬁcant amount of Iraq’s ability to export would have been curtailed 
on that day.
Oil facilities are of particular concern. Notice that I am focusing on all the 
upstream issues here because, while the impact when you attack downstream is 
signiﬁcant to the particular consuming country that you are attacking, it is obvi-
ously much, much more damaging if you are attacking upstream. If you want 
to aﬀect the world oil supply, you attack in the generating countries and at the 
transportation points. The issue of most concern, really, is a successful attack 
on Saudi oil facilities in particular because of the spare capacity issue. Unfortu-
nately, you are talking about a system design that has very few critical points that 
each process enormous amounts of oil, and again, when we talk about attacks 
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(airplanes and so forth), your ability to damage these facilities is there.  There was 
a plot to attack the control systems in the Ras Tanura terminal in Saudi Arabia, 
and that was thwarted because of good intelligence, but this remains a concern.
There have also been attacks on oil personnel. We have seen those in Nigeria, 
and certainly in Saudi Arabia, Kolbar, and Yanbu Al Bahr, and again if we listen to 
the statements after these attacks, we see a clear understanding of the correlation 
between the jump in oil price and the attack: it is a clear statement of intent.
Nigeria is a good example of a country that is outside of the Middle East, 
and yet we see all the same problems that we see in the Middle East in terms of 
vulnerability of the oil supply. Nigeria is half under Asari, the major warlord, who 
is ﬁghting a pipeline war against the government right now, is waging his own 
mini-Jihad, and is responsible for many, many supply disruptions in Nigeria.
So what can we do about all of this? What can we do about all of this given 
that the world is not likely to become a more peaceful place any time soon? These 
countries are not likely to become any more peaceful in the amount of time it 
takes for technology to diﬀuse through the market. If we look at cell phones or 
the internet, it took a long time, and if we look at the types of technologies that I 
am going to talk about, we are looking at ﬁfteen or twenty years of eﬀort to really 
get things out there.
When we look at oil, we need to focus on the transportation sector. In the 
U.S. the transportation sector accounts for two-thirds of oil consumption; elec-
tricity accounts for less than 2%. So displacing oil into electricity generation does 
not improve your oil issue. The growth in oil consumption in the developing 
world is driven in large part by the transportation sector.
What can we do in the transportation sector? We cannot focus on technolo-
gies that are just in the R&D stage right now. Hydrogen is all well and good, 
but even the experts in the hydrogen industry themselves say we are not going to 
make a dent until the mid-2030s, and we do not have that kind of time.
I am going to highlight two types of technologies that are available today. First 
of all, we need to focus on electrifying transportation. Electricity does not have to 
be generated from oil. Coal, nuclear energy, renewables, gas, and electricity can 
be used to power our vehicles. If we look at the new cars that DaimlerChrysler 
is coming out with, they represent the next step after hybrid vehicles. They are 
cars that can be fueled by a combination of liquid fuel and electricity. You charge 
the car by plugging it into an outlet, but you also have a liquid fuel tank, so you 
do not face the range-limitation of all-electric vehicles. What that means is that 
85% of your driving is done on electricity. You get one hundred miles per gallon 
on a plug-in hybrid vehicle; I think that is forty kilometers per liter, if my quick 
KORIN: PROTECTION OF KEY ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
50 ENERGY & SECURITY
calculation is correct, a very signiﬁcant improvement, and in a technology that 
we can move toward right now. It is wrong for us to wait for fuel cells; this is 
something we can do now.
The next thing we need to look at is ﬂexible fuel vehicles. In the U.S. we have 
three million ﬂexible fuel vehicles on the road. These are cars that can run on any 
combination of gasoline and alcohol fuel, alcohol being ethanol and methanol. 
They are standard cars, costing an auto manufacturer less than one hundred dol-
lars per car to make a ﬂexible fuel vehicle as opposed to a standard vehicle. These 
alcohols can be made from coal; methanol can be made from coal at less than ﬁfty 
cents per gallon, and the U.S. Department of Energy spent a lot of money devel-
oping this technology. There is a commercial-scale plant in Tennessee that does 
this. Ethanol can be made from biomass. Ethanol can, of course, also be made 
from natural gas. Combining ﬂexible fuel vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles, we 
get cars that have ﬁve hundred miles per gallon of gasoline. 
I am going to close my comments with this. We have to do something, and 
there are things that we can do. We should not wait for the perfect technology 
to come along and then implement it because the enemy of the very good is the 
excellent, and we are in a very vulnerable situation right now in the world, and 
we need to act. If we do not change our course, we are going to end up exactly 
where we are going.
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What is the nature of an extensive terrorist threat? It is not going to go away any 
time soon. It is deeply, intensely ideological in nature. It is rather like Nazism 
or Communism. The terrorists about whom we have every reason to be most 
concerned are driven by vision rather like the vision of the Nazis and the Com-
munists, in which they seek to bring about what they regard as a “proper” order 
for the rest of us, the rest of us being inﬁdels who are not ready to embrace an 
Islamist state. They will not give up easily. And unlike most of the terrorists of 
the past, they are motivated in signiﬁcant numbers to sacriﬁce their own lives to 
achieve their vision.
Unhappily, almost all our systems of security, developed over many years, 
depended on confronting enemies who were neither suicidal nor so fanatic. 
Moreover, the enemies of the recent past were responsible for territory, and that 
territory could be threatened with retaliation, which gave us in the West a major 
deterrent capability. But you cannot deter a threat that cannot be properly identiﬁed, 
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and you cannot deter a threat that has no property to protect. And of course, it 
hardly needs saying that you cannot discourage action by threatening death to 
people who desire to die as martyrs. 
So, for all of those reasons, we are left with a very new challenge, a security 
challenge of unprecedented nature and dimensions. And as we look at some spe-
ciﬁc elements of that threat, at the relative robustness of nuclear facilities, and the 
relative vulnerability of critical infrastructure nodes with respect to fossil fuels, we 
see that virtually none of our installations were designed against the threat of sui-
cide fanatics. A chain-link fence is perfectly adequate (was thought to be perfectly 
adequate) to protect power plants, chemical facilities, port facilities, and the like. 
And chain-link fences are ﬁne until you encounter someone who is prepared to 
drive a vehicle laden with explosives right through that chain-link fence, and then 
suddenly you discover that the task of protection of critical infrastructure, includ-
ing plants producing lethal products, for example, is enormously overwhelming. 
This drives me to the conclusion that the key challenge for us is less the protection 
of individual vulnerable installations and rather more the importance of defeating 
this terrorist movement.
Now, that is not easy. And we certainly will not succeed in doing it if we do 
not understand its nature. We have thought in the past, in my country, and I 
dare say that it is continued to be believed in most countries, that terrorism can 
be dealt with by police forces, by a criminal justice system, by identifying and 
bringing terrorists to trial and, in the process, by the way, according them Con-
stitutional protections of a very high order. But I do not believe we can defeat the 
terrorists in this manner. They are too driven.  They are too extreme. And ﬁnding 
them one at a time, two at a time, is not going to protect us from the next catas-
trophe. Let me just say parenthetically that the next catastrophe will be rather like 
some previous catastrophe, but this time with the potential addition of weapons 
of mass destruction—chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear material, 
radiological weapons. So the challenge is assuring that the combination of weap-
ons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists is not permitted to emerge. 
This is the essential motivation for the policies of the Bush administration. 
You know, after September 11, the President asked himself, “What might happen 
tomorrow or the day after? How many other attacks were in the planning stages 
on the 11th of September? How many might emerge in the future? What is likely 
to be their nature? What is likely to be the consequence if they are successful?” 
And he came to the commonsense conclusion that preventing the acquisition of 
weapons of mass murder by terrorist organizations was the single greatest chal-
lenge we faced.
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How to cope with that? Well, one part of the answer was to deal ﬁrst with the 
Taliban to demonstrate that governments were no longer immune from retribu-
tion. It is an extraordinary thing to realize that on the 10th of September 2001, 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan received more humanitarian assistance from 
the United States than from any other country. And substantial humanitarian 
aide: we were feeding the people of Afghanistan to a signiﬁcant degree. And yet, 
that government invited a terrorist organization to locate on its territory and sup-
ported it in its plans to deliver destructive acts against the United States. 
Now you have to ask yourself, “Why would the Taliban have done that?” The 
answer, in part, is that they seemed not unreasonably conﬁdent that no action 
would be taken against them as a result of their hospitality toward terrorists out 
to destroy the United States and, more broadly, Western civilization. The reason 
is that we had never before said that we would hold responsible countries that 
oﬀered sanctuary to terrorists. It was not said in the administration that preceded 
September 11th or the one before that. It was never said. I recall debating this 
very issue with Stansﬁeld Turner, former head of the CIA, in 1997. The topic of 
the debate was whether “we should use military forces in the ﬁght against terror-
ism.” He was dead set against it, and no American administration had embraced 
the policy of holding states responsible. The American administration under Bush 
did embrace this policy and changed fundamentally our approach to dealing with 
terror. The Bush administration did this because it realized that we must deprive 
terrorists of the sanctuary they need, of the infrastructure they need, of the labo-
ratories, of the ability to bring people and recruit, and train, and identify talent, 
and plot and dispatch people to the places from which they will operate. If we 
take that away from them (their ability to do all the things we have been talking 
about: to attack tankers on the high seas, or do damage at the chokepoints like 
the Straits of Malaka, or get at a nuclear facility), we can signiﬁcantly diminish 
the scale of the threat that we face, so that is what we must do. 
When you take actions to manage risk, and it turns out that you learn sub-
sequently that some of the information upon which you took that action was 
wrong, you do not go back and reassess the risk as though you could have acted 
on your reassessment at that time. Nobody does that. Has anyone here canceled 
their insurance when you have not had an accident for a year? Of course not. 
It looked very much to President Bush, to French Intelligence, to German In-
telligence, I dare say to Czech Intelligence, to the United Nations—remember 
Butler—it looked to the world as if Saddam Hussein was hiding an inventory 
of weapons of mass destruction because we had documented their construction, 
and he had refused to document their destruction. He was invited to do so. In 
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the famous report that was delivered on the 6th or 7th of December to the Blix 
commission, there were 16,000 pages and no new information about what had 
happened to the stockpiles of nerve agent and biological weapons, which had 
been identiﬁed as having been produced.
So what conclusion could one draw? You had a regime that had a history 
of weapons of mass destruction that refused to account for what had happened 
to them. This regime had a history of hiding and deception. Anyone managing 
that risk seriously would have concluded exactly what President Bush concluded, 
which was that leaving Saddam Hussein in place entailed a signiﬁcant risk. The 
lesson of September 11th for Americans was that it is possible to wait too long 
before confronting a known risk. We waited too long before dealing with Al-Qa-
eda in Afghanistan. We observed what they were doing; we saw the training; we 
knew about the previous acts of terror, but we waited, and we will not again wait 
too long. And if you are looking for an explanation for why we went into Iraq, 
that is a big part of it.
We have other places in the world to worry about, obviously. We have to 
worry about Iran. Iran is clearly moving in the direction of a nuclear weapon, 
and, with all the help from the IAEA, Iran will not be suﬃciently pressed until 
the choice is a far more dramatic one than it is today because they are highly ma-
nipulative, and they are buying time; it is clear that they are buying time. At some 
point we have to bring that to a conclusion, not necessarily by military action. My 
preference, for what it is worth, is to do something that we have done in the past 
and for which we should be grateful: to align ourselves with the forces of freedom 
that exist in Iran today, as they existed in Czechoslovakia under the communists. 
There are tens of millions of Iranians who want to free themselves from the rule 
of these mullahs, and we are doing virtually nothing to help them. We ought to 
reconsider that, not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it may be a 
better waz to change the policies of the Iranian government than some diplomatic 
process, in which they buy time, and we give them time.
Let me conclude with a couple of bullet points about my own country’s con-
tribution to energy and security. We have, and it is an accident of history, the 
burden of the capability to back up any international regime because it is not 
coming from the European Union, and it is not coming from individual coun-
tries that one might identify. At the end of the day, if the international com-
munity is going to seek to impose norms that involve our protection, it is my 
country that provides the bulk of the energy and the bulk of the force. I am sorry 
about that; I wish the burden were more evenly distributed. Even when it comes 
to something that is manifestly non-violent like the maintenance of a petroleum 
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reserve, the U.S. supplies half of the petroleum reserve of the world. If there were 
a catastrophic disruption of energy supplies, our petroleum reserve would serve 
not simply the United States, but the world as a whole. And where is the rest of 
the world in sharing the burden of maintaining an adequate strategic petroleum 
reserve? I think it is a scandal that we should bear so much of the burden. Even 
though we admittedly use more energy than other countries, our contribution to 
the reserve is double our consumption. We maintain the sea lines of communica-
tion, without which energy could not move from its source to its place of con-
sumption, and we do that almost single-handedly. What do we do for the future? 
Well, let us all hope that the U.S. continues to play this role. There are some, 
particularly in Europe, who hope that we will cease to play this role, that we will 
be diminished in our eﬀectiveness, or marginalized, or balanced, or countered by 
others, who really ought to be on the same side.
Two very small points. It is a scandal that we do not have more stand-by 
capability to intervene after a catastrophe. We should have not one standby infra-
structure, but we should have an array of standby infrastructure, and it should be 
done on an international cooperative basis: we all have an interest in keeping the 
system going if it fails, and to be without these large infrastructure elements that 
take a year or more to build and cost quite a lot of money is not a good position. 
We have got our heads in the sand if, in the current threatening environment, we 
cannot do better than that, so we ought to invest in our infrastructure, and we 
ought to do it on an international basis. We have to promote the technologies, 
particularly the coal conversion technologies, and we must not shy away from 
nuclear power, particularly if we move to the electriﬁcation of transportation as 
we should. We must not shy away from it on the theory that it is too unsafe; we 
have allowed too many luddites to stand in the way of good science. We can do a 
decent job of protecting what we need to protect, but to rule out an instrument 
as important as nuclear power for the future would be very foolish indeed.
And ﬁnally, we have to make inroads in this war on terrorism. We have to 
reduce this number of people who are out there determined to deliver a blow 
against the lifeline, and it is the lifeline. They are smart, and they understand our 
vulnerability. They can look at a terminal, at a major terminal, and it is stars in 
their eyes. It is a question of time; they will attempt these attacks, they have al-
ready done so in Iraq, and one of these days they are going to succeed. The race is 
between our ability to diminish their ranks and provide hedges, and provide some 
protection against their unrelenting eﬀort to impose their vision on all of us.
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The Pillars of the 
EU Energy Future
From the perspective of Brussels, from the perspective of members of European 
Parliament, we have three or four crucial issues or problems that we should 
solve during the near future. First are the structure and format of European 
Commission hearings. Second is the 2007-2013 budget, and we know how im-
portant it is. We also have quite a peculiar ﬁeld of interest. It is a new legislation 
procedure for chemicals, which for our chemical industry could be dangerous, 
but could be very helpful from the point of view of environmental protection, 
and we are discussing it almost every week in the European Parliament. But 
the most crucial and important problems we have now in the Parliament and 
the Commission are the energy supply and an energy crisis. Every week, every 
day, you have at least one or two events on this topic in Brussels about these 
important issues. 
Politically, I think, energy is probably the most important issue on the 
agenda. Your conference is just in time, especially because it concerns Eastern 
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Europe. It is, in my opinion, a key region for European security of energy sup-
ply. It is a key region for political and geopolitical security in general. 
If we answered the main Prague conference questions, there would not be 
any work in energy for the European Union in general because everything would 
be solved. Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer such important questions 
during one conference.  We clearly have a long way to go, and so I would like 
to ask, “Why is energy so important?” The question is very simple, and so is the 
answer. Everything in our civilization, everything, depends on energy supply. Our 
civilization, as a matter of fact, in this industrial age, began together with the dis-
covery of coal instead of wood and other renewables as an energy source two or 
three hundred years ago. So now everything depends on that energy supply. And 
another question: is it the ﬁrst time during the last decades that we are in such a 
situation? Of course not. Since the 1960s, every ten, ﬁfteen years something like 
an energy crisis occurs. It means, quite simply, political crisis in the world. And it 
happened twice, thrice, or four times during the second half of the 20th century.
The main assumption is also very, very simple and very obvious. Energy de-
mands and necessity of supply of energy are out of discussion. We do not want 
to stop economic growth, and we do not want to stop our civilization, so energy 
supply and energy demands are out of discussion. I do not think we should discuss 
this problem, except for the ﬁgures. As for ﬁgures, we are probably talking about 
no less than twice as much of an energy demand in thirty or forty years as com-
pared to today. Due to China and India’s consumption, by 2040, the global energy 
demand will have doubled. A doubling of demand represents enormous growth.
There are three pillars on which we are building our energy future as a means 
of building our civilization’s future. These three pillars are reserves, environmental 
protection, and politics. I will say a few words about each of them.
In terms of reserves, the ﬁrst source of energy is renewables. Even if we do our 
best in this area, it is not possible to have more than twenty-ﬁve percent of our 
global reserves from this source. In fact, even this much is probably impossible, 
but let us say twenty-ﬁve percent. Therefore, one-fourth of our supply comes 
from renewable sources. We have renewable sources almost everywhere, much 
more in the Sahara Desert or in Norway, and much less in the Czech Republic or 
in Poland because we do not have as many mountains or as much sun, but still, 
we have some.
I am just talking about primary sources.  I am not going to speak about hy-
drogen because it is, in any case, not a primary source. We must say very, very 
strongly that it is only an energy carrier, quite similar to electricity. It is not an 
energy source, of course, because we need coal or oil to produce electricity, so 
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it is not a primary source.  The second primary source, historically speaking, is 
coal, both hard and lignite. As the name implies, we will have renewable energy 
sources forever. Coal supplies should last for quite a long time: two-hundred to 
two-hundred-ﬁfty years. 
Then we have oil and natural gas. We must say quite simply: our children will 
live in a world without petrol, and our grandchildren in a world without natural 
gas. It is our perspective that, in the future, we should not speak about energy 
supply and strategic decisions without taking into mind today our children with-
out petrol, our grandchildren without natural gas; it is not a fantastic perspective 
for our civilization. The ﬁfth source is nuclear energy, of course, and we can also 
say that, as with renewables, we have a lot of it.
What is our problem in the second pillar—the environment? Taking into ac-
count the second pillar, why do we have this problem with energy? The answer is 
that we cannot use such a source like coal in large amounts today. From the point of 
view of the second pillar—environmental protection—we have a problem with coal 
as a matter of fact. We can not avoid this problem. What does it mean? It means 
that if we could overcome this problem, especially CO2 capture, which is very cost-
ly, we could use coal in much greater quantities. Bearing in mind our children and 
grandchildren, this would be great. We should speak and think about that.  
So what is the problem with CO2? We know the Kyoto Protocol and all the 
achievements in this ﬁeld. It is very costly. If we take sulfur dioxide, we do not have 
any serious problem with sulfur dioxide, and electricity prices will increase by 7%, 
8%, 9%, not more than 10 %. We are capturing all the SO2; the emitted sulfur 
dioxide is relatively insigniﬁcant. Also, nitrogen oxides are not a big problem. We 
have ﬂuoride burning, and it is not a problem in general, scientiﬁcally speaking, 
or in research. Also with dust, we had this problem forty years ago, but not today. 
The problem we do have is CO2.  If we want to capture it, it will probably result in 
energy, electricity, for example, costs rising more or less 50-60%. That is a big diﬀer-
ence, and it is very diﬃcult to go through that, but we need to capture the CO2.
Disposal is also very important, and it is a major problem. If we can overcome 
this problem from an environmental point of view, we will be in quite a diﬀerent 
situation. For countries such as Germany and Great Britain, but especially the 
Czech Republic and Poland, it is crucial that we should also take into account 
lignite, not only, of course, hard coal. We have big reserves. From the point of 
view of coal reserves in the EU, ten new countries change the situation com-
pletely. Such countries as the United States and Australia have developed special 
programs, clean coal technology programs, for billions of dollars every year. Yet 
we do not have anything like that in the EU.
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Of course, in every case we must take into account the eﬃciency of using energy 
and also of producing energy. When I graduated from the Energy Department of 
the Silesian Technical University in Gliwice, the whole coal power plant had an 
eﬃciency rating of not more than 30%. Now the average in Europe is 38%. And 
some coal power plants are above 40%. That is big progress, and we must go in 
this direction from many diﬀerent directions.
Let me say a few words concerning environmental protection and nuclear 
energy. The waste disposal, which is very costly and very dangerous, must be 
mentioned as well. It is, for example, a very, very clear problem for the Czech 
Republic, as you are all well aware. In trying to build new nuclear power station 
you must always think about this problem.
The third pillar is politics. What do I mean by “politics?” I mean the location 
of the reserves and the means of transport. Why do we have crises? We have them 
because the location of the reserves and the means of transporting them exist in 
the countries and regions of the world with great political tension: the Middle 
East, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus area. We have some trouble thinking 
about Russia as well because we know it is not going in the direction of democ-
racy. We feel it. Russia is always dangerous, from our point of view, from the 
point of view of democratic, free-market economies and human rights-respect-
ing countries. Transport roads are another problem. For example, we have some 
problems with Turkey in the Black Sea region. 
Central Europe, our countries, are now geographically a key point of our 
continent and the European Union because we are just between two parts of 
Europe—East and West—on the best lines of oil and gas transport. I am just 
speaking about oil and gas because all the last crises are about of oil and gas, not 
about coal, not about nuclear energy, generally speaking. I am not speaking about 
tension on the border because Austria and the Czech Republic are quite diﬀer-
ent. I am just speaking about tension in the whole world. It is our point, and it 
is because political tension is inﬂuencing energy supply. We cannot stop energy 
demands, and we cannot change from oil and gas to coal and nuclear energy and 
renewables so easily. We must do it; we must go in this direction. We are think-
ing about our children, especially, but also about security of supply. We need to 
research renewable nuclear waste, CO2 capture, and eﬃciency.  We need big, 
extremely big research in the European Union in all these ﬁelds.
It is time to build the vision of a common European energy market, a true 
common market. It is an essential moment for the countries of our region, and 
we should play a crucial role in it. We are facing a great challenge to make the 
most of our natural trumps, which have been our weak points so far.
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As noted above, we are strategically located between the natural resources of East-
ern Europe and the market of the highly developed countries of Western Europe. 
Each of our countries has its own business, of course, sometimes creating contra-
dictions. We compete over electrical energy; we argue about environmental pol-
lution, but, in my opinion, now is the moment to work out a common strategy 
of middle-European countries, ﬁrst of all, the Visegrad group, and some other 
countries which are around us. We already have a tradition of cooperation, and 
it should be continued within the conﬁnes of the EU. Our transit location is our 
chance, both economical and political. Because of the political balance, we must 
remember Ukraine and Belarus; we should not avoid thinking about them. The 
economic independence of these countries also means our safety; it is not only 
about the power industry. There is also a quite diﬀerent future for Russia. We 
want Russia to be a rich, strong, well-organized country. This much is obvious. 
But it also should be a democratic country. 
As I said earlier, because of the diminished resources of crude oil and gas, it is 
coal, which should be favored again, and the European Union has already taken 
this position. We are just now working on it in the European Parliament. Lately, 
we have had three or four events about clean coal technology, together with the 
Czech members of European Parliament. First of all, it is a great opportunity for 
the minds of the Czech Republic, Poland, and East Germany, but also Hungary 
and even Romania. I am talking about lignite, not only hard coal. Our region is, 
for now, politically stable and free from natural calamities, so the coal supplies 
are, generally speaking, more reliable and less sensitive to disturbances than oil or 
gas, but they demand creating the technology of clean coal. Here is a chance for 
the research institutes in the whole of Europe. 
One of the advisors of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently said 
that the warming of our climate is more dangerous than terrorism. We are fully 
aware that they are both big problems that we must cope with. I know that in our 
countries we possess scientiﬁc potential, which, supported ﬁnancially by the EU, 
can ﬁght carbon dioxide and, for many centuries, place it at the bottom of fjords, 
oceans, and mines which are not used anymore. We are not able to estimate 
how much intellectual and ﬁnancial potential must be invested in this second 
problem—I mean terrorism. I hope that people’s positive creative abilities prove 
stronger than their destructive possibilities.
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Energy and Security: 
The IAEA Mission
Energy and Security–both of these key words are anxiety-provoking. They con-
jure up images of withdrawing inside a fortress, and building up supplies, and 
increasing vigilance. In my remarks, however, I am going to urge that, for pur-
poses of energy security, a much more open approach is needed to ensure en-
ergy resiliency.  It is essential, in particular, to retain the nuclear power option as 
an important component of the world’s energy mix. However, that option (the 
nuclear power option) is simply not possible without proper control over (here 
again, without proper world-wide security of ) nuclear material. We must guard 
against both the threat of the misuse of it for military and weapons purposes and 
the threat of nuclear terrorism. As one minister put it in Vienna a few weeks ago, 
we must keep nuclear materials away from madmen and murderers.
So allow me ﬁrst to discuss what I call this overarching question of the secu-
rity of nuclear material since it, in my opinion, is a prerequisite for international 
security, in general, and for the continued use of any nuclear technology includ-
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ing nuclear power. For it is clear that the diversion of material from the civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle to produce a weapon or the use of radiological material in what 
we have all come to know as a “dirty bomb” could have a devastating eﬀect world-
wide. It could suppress international cooperation in the use of nuclear technology 
and inﬂict serious damages on national nuclear power programs. In this regard, 
you may have noticed the front page, above the fold article in the International 
Herald Tribune on just Monday of this week entitled “Nuclear Comeback Stokes 
Terror Fears.”
This is an area where the IAEA is recognized as playing a rather central role 
in the international eﬀort to, in fact, strengthen barriers and increase vigilance. 
There are two interdependent, interrelated components to this, dealing respec-
tively with state and non-state actors. First, it is veriﬁcation through the IAEA 
system of inspecting states’ undertakings not to pursue nuclear weapons, and this 
is commonly referred to as “safeguards.” Second, it is security against nuclear ter-
rorism which, of course, has received far greater attention since 9/11.
Let me begin with veriﬁcation. Safeguards, as originally conceived, were largely 
a matter of simply verifying that nuclear material and activities that were declared 
to the IAEA by a state remained in peaceful use. Over the years, repeated eﬀorts 
had been made to make this system more rigorous and to give the inspectors more 
authority, but frankly, it took the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons pro-
gram in Iraq in the wake of the ﬁrst Gulf War to generate the necessary political 
will, and, after extensive deliberations in 1997, what was called the “additional 
protocol to safeguards agreements” was approved. So now, for countries that have 
an additional protocol in force, far more information has to be provided by the 
state to the IAEA and our inspectors on the ground have far greater physical access. 
Signiﬁcantly, the protocol now gives us the capability to verify the absence of un-
declared material, that would be clandestine activities, in addition to what we had 
under the lighter regime, which was simply the ability to verify the non-diversion 
of what had been declared to us. To date, to give you a status report, sixty countries 
have an additional protocol in force, and we have extensive eﬀorts underway in 
the diplomatic community to increase that number. The Iraq experience, although 
unique in some ways, demonstrated that inspections, while requiring time and 
patience, can indeed be eﬀective, particularly when backed by international pres-
sure. This is true even when a country under inspection, like Iraq, was providing 
far less than cooperation. All evidence to date indicates that Iraq’s nuclear weapons 
program had been eﬀectively dismantled in the 1990s through IAEA inspections, 
as we had all but concluded in the run up to the second Gulf War. As the recent 
Iraq survey group, or the Duﬂo Report indicates, there is little doubt.
WALLER: ENERGY AND SECURITY  THE IAEA MISSION
66 ENERGY & SECURITY
More recent inspections in Iran and Libya took advantage of our experience in 
Iraq and have also proven eﬀective in revealing in great detail these countries’ 
nuclear programs. But, they have brought to life two disturbing facts. First is the 
existence of an extensive illicit market for the supply of nuclear weapons, and it 
is clearly driven by demand. The relative ease with which AQ Khan and associ-
ates were able to operate an extensive sub-national illicit network demonstrates, 
clearly, the inadequacy of the present system for controlling the export of sensi-
tive materials. It has, to date, relied on mere informal arrangements among a 
limited partnership, called the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the information it 
requires is not even systematically shared with the IAEA. 
Second is the fact that the technological barriers to mastering the essential 
steps of uranium enrichment, and, for that matter, to designing weapons, have 
eroded over time, and they no longer, of themselves, provide protection against 
proliferation. Indeed, by some estimates, today, perhaps forty or more countries 
have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons. This means that if any of these 
countries have acquired the necessary highly-enriched uranium or plutonium, we 
are basically counting on their continuing good will. 
The North Korean situation also carries a disturbing lesson. For over a de-
cade, this country has been in non-compliance with its international obligations 
under the NPT. In January 2003, it capped its non-compliance by withdrawing, 
as you will recall, from the NPT, the only country ever to do so. I will call IAEA 
“the agency.” The agency’s Board of Governors promptly referred this matter to 
the UN Security Council, but now, more than a year and a half later, the Council 
has done nothing. They have sub-contracted the matter out to the six-party talks 
that are going on now. This creates a very dangerous possibility: namely, that a 
country could, while adhering to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and while reporting dutifully to us at the IAEA, acquire nuclear 
power technology, including uranium-enriched technology, ostensibly for peace-
ful purposes. It could then withdraw from the NPT at a point where it was well-
advanced toward developing a nuclear weapon, perhaps as short as months away 
from doing so. And, of course, a further problem has arisen in recent years with 
regard to simply the large amount of poorly-secured, largely military nuclear and 
radiological material, particularly in countries of the former Soviet Union. And 
this poses an obvious threat in terms of access to terrorists.
Given these growing vulnerabilities, the agency’s Director General, Mohamed 
El-Baradei has been publicly warning that “the events of the past few years have 
placed the NPT and the regimes supporting it under unprecedented stress, expos-
ing some of its limitations and pointing to areas that need to be strengthened.” 
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A year ago, in an invited article that he wrote for The Economist, and again, in 
June of this year in a speech at Carnegie at a non-proliferation conference held at 
Washington, he laid out a series of proposals.  These included tightening export 
controls over sensitive nuclear materials and technologies, helping countries to 
stop using weapons-usable materials in civilian nuclear programs, increasing the 
physical security of such materials, and eventually, eliminating stocks of pluto-
nium and highly-enriched Uranium. The proposals also included placing limita-
tions on the production of new nuclear material, possibly by agreeing to restrict 
this exclusively to facilities under multinational controls, while providing at the 
same time international guarantees of supply of nuclear fuel to the legitimate 
would-be users. Dr. El-Baradei’s proposals also called for reinforcing the integrity 
of the NPT by eliminating the provision that allows a state to withdraw by simply 
giving three months notice. In light of recent events, I think it is clear that such a 
period is now viewed as nothing short of cavalier in the context of a treaty that is 
the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Finally, Dr. ElBaradei urged that 
the additional protocol become the universally accepted norm.
Earlier this year, the Director General and I met in Washington with Presi-
dent Bush on this subject. The discussion took place not long after the President, 
in a February address to the National War College, pointed out his proposals for 
strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and that discussion very encourag-
ingly conﬁrmed that there was a signiﬁcant commonality of focus and inter-
ests of these two men in improving the situation. Since that time, the Director 
General has established a group of eminent experts from around the world to 
identify the issues and the multilateral approaches to strengthening controls 
over sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is a major challenge to ﬁnd 
combinations of the necessary political and economic incentives that promise 
real non-proliferation beneﬁts and that facilitate, or at least do not obstruct, the 
spread of the beneﬁts of nuclear power to those who want them. It is a talented 
group, and we look forward to their report, which is scheduled to come in early 
next year.
On a parallel track, in May, the U.S.-Russian Global Threat Reduction Initia-
tive, the so-called GTRI, was inaugurated in Vienna. This initiative seeks to elimi-
nate the use of weapons-usable material in civil research reactors by converting 
those reactors, so that they can use low-enriched uranium and recover and secure 
vulnerable nuclear material and abandoned radioactive sources. In terms of threats 
from the non-state players, also known as terrorists, there has also been renewed 
international commitment to security against nuclear terrorism in the form of 
strengthening the physical protection of nuclear and radiological material. 
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The IAEA has a comprehensive program in this regard, helping countries to assess 
the risk, to increase their border controls, and so forth. Thus, the clear message 
regarding the security of nuclear material is that the events of the past few years 
have been a very loud wake-up call regarding the inadequacy of the current in-
ternational regime. But I think it is particularly encouraging to note the interest 
and activism of world leaders on these topics. In fact, I found it most interesting 
that the one key point on which the U.S. presidential candidates did agree in the 
recent debates was that nuclear proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons by terrorists were the single greatest threats to global security. The good news 
is that a serious dialogue has begun focusing on reinforcing this system to face the 
challenges of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Having discussed the theme of security of nuclear material as, what I call, a 
prerequisite to international security, I will now turn brieﬂy to energy security 
more speciﬁcally. Here, as I said a moment ago, it is our essential point that the 
nuclear power option must remain open, and I will look brieﬂy at energy security 
more generally and then come back to nuclear to close out.
In a 2002 European Commission Green Paper on the security of energy sup-
ply, one of the most widely-quoted conclusions was that Europe’s energy-import 
dependency would likely rise from 50% where it was at that time, 2002, to about 
70% in the year 2030. Forecasts of this kind often stimulate talk of building up 
domestic strategic petroleum reserves and enhancing self-suﬃciency. Indeed, I 
think, we all remember that at the time of the oil shocks in the ‘70s, there was 
frequent mention of energy independence as an appropriate goal, and you still 
hear echoes of this in the post-9/11 world. In the second presidential debate, 
one of the candidates stated that he had “a plan for energy independence within 
ten years.” In fact, even where that might be attainable, energy self-suﬃciency 
is not necessarily synonymous with security. Just to cite one example, Brazil got 
87% of its electricity from domestic hydro in the year 2000, which is admirable 
self-suﬃciency, at least until the failure of the rains among other factors led to 
rationing in the next two years. 
What matters then is supply resiliency. Where strong domestic energy 
supplies contribute to resiliency, that is most fortunate. Where building up 
domestic reserves to cushion supply shortfalls can enhance resiliency, that is 
useful. But building up a country’s network of alternative suppliers, raising the 
reliability of those suppliers, and broadening the portfolio of energy options 
are also important parts of increasing resiliency, and we all know they oﬀer op-
tions beyond a country’s border, limited only by human will, not by geological 
endowment.
69
Turning now to the nuclear power option, one essential aspect of the IAEA statu-
tory mandate is keeping that option open for those countries that may wish to 
take advantage of it for a variety of reasons and, indeed, also contributing to 
nuclear power’s continuous improvement in terms of economics, safety, prolif-
eration resistance, and environmental impact. Nuclear power, like any other en-
ergy resource, is not a one-size-ﬁts-all solution. Right now, new construction and 
nuclear expansion are centered in Asia, but nuclear power is also expanding in 
Eastern Europe. Of the twenty-six units now under construction, ﬁfteen are in 
India, China, South Korea, and Japan, but remember that seven of them are in 
Romania, the Russian federation, and the Ukraine. Moreover, Finland will start 
construction of a new unit next year, and France is expected to pick a site to begin 
its program of replacing its old reactors with new ones.
The real attractiveness of nuclear power in any given country depends on 
several things. First, obviously, what are the alternatives that are available? If you 
are in North America, where there is abundant coal and gas, it is not so attrac-
tive, but if you are in Japan or South Korea, it is a diﬀerent story. Second, the 
attractiveness of nuclear power depends partly on how fast a country’s economy 
and energy needs are growing. In the large, rapidly expanding economy, China 
and India’s the obvious examples, nuclear makes particular sense. Third, it de-
pends on whether there is an investment environment that encourages long-
term thinking. Nuclear plants are expensive to build, but they are cheap to run, 
so an investor that is looking for a quick return does not like them, but, if an 
investor or a country can take a longer view, these plants can prove most advan-
tageous and proﬁtable. 
Two developments that push in that direction at present are, as noted today, 
the rise in natural gas prices and the latest impetus given to the Kyoto protocol by 
President Putin’s decision to refer it to the Duma for ratiﬁcation.
So while it is true that nuclear power does not ﬁt the needs and situations of 
all countries, it is equally true that it provides a valuable option for many. Assur-
ing its availability for countries that can beneﬁt from it and keeping that option 
open (indeed, continuously improving it) are essential parts of energy supply 
resiliency and, thus, very important parts of energy security.
In the intervening years, I have learned a good deal about what it is that the 
IAEA does to contribute to the maintenance of nuclear power, and I will just 
quickly go through these. It is safety, of course, safety, and safety, for another 
Chernobyl would be disastrous. But we also work on capacity building, life-cycle 
optimization, decommissioning, and so forth. Particularly important is support 
for innovation in terms of reactor and fuel-cycle technologies. 
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Very important is nuclear power’s contribution to avoiding greenhouse gas emis-
sions. The complete nuclear power chain, and this is often not appreciated—we 
are talking about from resource extraction to waste disposal and including the 
construction of the facilities, the reactor, and so forth—emits only two to six 
grams of carbon per kilowatt hour, about the same as wind and solar, and well 
below the fossil fuels. Put another way, worldwide, if all existing nuclear power 
plants were replaced with a representative mix of the non-nuclear sources, the 
result would be an increase of six-hundred million tons of carbon per year which, 
by the way, is approximately twice the amount targeted for avoidance by the 
Kyoto protocol in 2010.
At the global level, the resolution of diﬀerences about nuclear power has 
boiled down to a fundamental understanding, and it was reached after extensive 
debate, but it is very simple, and that is that the countries agree to disagree, rec-
ognizing that some consider nuclear power an important part of their sustainable 
development, whereas others consider nuclear power and sustainable develop-
ment fundamentally incompatible.
So to sum up, the word “nuclear” does carry with it threats, but also wonder-
ful opportunities. The threats to international security from the malevolent use of 
nuclear and radiological material are real, but, as I indicated, the ﬁrst steps are be-
ing taken in the process of raising barriers by strengthening the non-proliferation 
regime and reinforcing physical security. This, in turn, will enable us to preserve 
the nuclear power option, which is essential for energy security and for protecting 
the environment.
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First, perhaps a word about the International Energy Agency; some of you 
may not know what it is. We are the energy arm of the OECD. We have a 
twenty-six member government: U.S., Canada, Mexico and the Americas, all 
European countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Korea. We provide 
energy advice to our member countries and elsewhere. I am going to share 
with you the results of our publication, “World Energy Outlook 2004.” What 
I am going to cover is that, on the basis of our projections up to 2030, half 
the world energy system will develop, and what do we see? What are the major 
challenges for the world and for Europe, in particular? I would like to discuss 
them, and, unless I specify otherwise, I assume that the major policies of the 
world governments do not change after mid-2004. That means, on the basis of 
current policies, what picture will we end up with, and what challenges does 
this picture show? 
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First of all, let me tell you at the outset what we see as the four major challenges 
and what we think we have to face in the next twenty or twenty-ﬁve years to 
come. We call them the Strategic Challenges.
The ﬁrst one is the security of energy supply. It is at the top of the agenda be-
cause we believe that if we do not change our policies, almost 99% of the world’s 
nations will be relying on a very small number of countries’ supplies of oil and 
gas for their economic survival. If I can name them, on the oil side, we have Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and UAE, and on the gas side, we have Russia. So, 
leaving aside the political stability in those countries, we think that any system 
when the large number of the elements’ survival depends on the behavior of very 
few elements, we cannot call this a sustainable energy system, so this is the ﬁrst 
challenge we think we are going to face.
The second one is environmental damage, i.e. the implications of the cur-
rent energy trends on the environment. We do take them seriously, both on 
the global warming level, as well as the local pollution in the developing coun-
tries.
The third challenge which I take very seriously is an uneven access of the 
world’s population to modern energy. Today, according to our analysis, 1.6 billion 
people, one fourth of the world population, has no access to electricity. In Europe 
in the past year, we have experienced blackouts for about twenty-four or twenty-six 
hours in some countries. It even happened in the U.S. This was a major problem 
for the governments and for the public. However, I would like to remind you that 
today, 1.6 billion people in the world, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, live in a permanent blackout. We think this is an important issue, not only 
economically, but also ethically, and in terms of long-term security concerns of the 
rich countries. 
The fourth challenge is the issue of investments in energy-supply infrastruc-
ture. Whether or not the energy investments will be coming in a timely manner is 
a key issue, and I believe (if I can make a footnote here) the high oil prices we are 
experiencing today are not only, and even, perhaps, not mainly, a result of high oil 
demand, but mainly because the supply could not meet that demand. We do not 
have the supply coming at the right time in the right place, and, as a result of that, 
we have high oil prices. We were surprised with the high oil demand. However, in 
the past, we have had higher oil demand growth, and we did not have such high 
prices, as the supply was there.
So these are my four major challenges, and now let me tell you how we think 
that the world energy mix, the world energy fuels, can develop in the next two or 
three years if we do not change our policies.
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Hydropower will grow very slowly in the future, mainly in the developing countries 
and also in countries in which we have already exploited our hydro-power resources.
Nuclear production is a very critical point here, and I will come back to 
that later. According to our analysis, the nuclear production today will be equal 
to 2030, more or less, but in many OECD countries, nuclear power plants are 
going to retire, and in some of them (for example, in Germany) are going to be 
phased out. In Asia, however, in developing countries and in Japan and Korea, we 
expect new capacity to come under stream, and, more or less, nuclear production 
is going to be equal to what it is today. However, this is important, in a growing 
energy-demand context, nuclear is going to lose market share.
Renewables. I am not a renewable fan, but I do believe that renewables can 
make, at marginal levels, some contribution to the world energy mix, especially 
wind and biomass can be good contributors to the diversiﬁcation of the energy 
mix, and we do expect that the wind, for example, in Europe will be an important 
source of power in the future, with some limitations.
Coal. Nobody likes coal. It is dirty, but it is in the OECD. They do not like 
it. In China and India (as two major users, we have to look at those countries 
even if we are thinking about our own energy supply), the electricity demand 
growth is very high. Let me give you an example. The Chinese electricity power 
plant system grows every year by as much as one Switzerland and every two years 
as one UK. And, of course, China goes for coal, which is a domestic resource that 
is cheap and dirty. We cannot accuse China for using dirty coal which brings a 
lot of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere, as it is not their current man occupa-
tion, which is understandable, because, as we all know, the climate change issue 
is a historical issue. And it was the OECD countries which have emitted carbon 
into the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution, and we cannot now ask de-
veloping countries to use more expensive resources during their developmental 
phase, which is an important aspect of their economic growth. 
The fourth one is gas. It is very important; it is the favorite choice of fuel for 
many countries, especially for power plants. I can tell you that in Europe,of all ten 
of the power plants scheduled to be built or purchased between now and 2015, 
seven are gas-ﬁred power plants. Gas use is expected to surpass that of coal, of 
course with serious implications for security of supply.
Finally, oil may be the single most important fuel and is mainly driven by the 
transportation sector.
The previous chart showed how the demands will develop. Now the question 
is, “Who will produce this energy demand? Where will the energy supply come 
from?” If you look at the past thirty years, you see that OECD countries with 
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1. World Primary Energy Demand
2. Increase in World Primary Energy Production by Region
Fossil fuels account for almost 90% of the growth in energy demand  between now and 2030.
Almost all the increase in production to 2030 occurs outside the OECD.
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3. Energy Investment Requirements 2003–2030
4. Growth in World Energy Demand and CO2 Emissions
Power sector absorbs 62% of global energy investment in the period 2003–2030.
Average carbon content of primary energy increases slightly  through 2030 – in contrast to past trends.
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a stable economic and political framework contributed about one third of the 
growth in the energy production-oil, gas, coal, and so on. If you look at the next 
thirty years, we expect that almost all the growth in the world energy production 
will come from none of the OECD countries. The geology/geography of course 
has some geopolitical implications from investment to the trade, from trade to 
the security of supply, from security of supply to the foreign policy dimensions. 
So we think this is an important change in terms of the world international en-
ergy politics in the future as a result of this.
I wanted to bring to your attention one more issue: energy investments. We 
did calculate that to ﬁnance this world energy system, all the production, trans-
portation of energy, reﬁneries, power plants, distribution networks, and so on, 
we need sixteen trillion dollars worldwide. It is a huge amount of money between 
now and 2030. If I say it on a yearly basis, it is perhaps more understandable. It 
is about ﬁve-hundred-ﬁfty million dollars, which is about equal to the current 
budget deﬁcit of the US, every year that we have to ﬁnd in order to keep our 
energy system up and running.
I want to mention two things here, however. One is that I mentioned that 
most of the demands and production will come from developing countries, but 
North America, and Europe, and the Paciﬁc still need a lot of investment even 
though the demand is not growing. What is the reason? The reason is the fol-
lowing: investments have two major drivers. One is to meet the increase in the 
demand. Second, perhaps more importantly for the OECD countries, especially 
for Europe and North America, our energy system is aging. It is getting old. In 
North America, in the US, about 60% of the investments will go to replace the 
existing infrastructure in the next ﬁfteen years or so. These are the power plants. 
Power plants, like people, have a life span; it’s about sixty years. You have the re-
ﬁneries. You have the oil ﬁelds that are declining. We need to understand that, in 
addition to the amount of money, which is a challenge, we need to see that this is 
another driver of the energy system.
Energy investments have a lot of challenges, and I will cover only one of them 
speciﬁcally in the context of security of supply in a minute. However, let me 
mention another challenge that we think is crucial: the increase in CO2 emissions 
worldwide. We expect that between now and 2030, world CO2 emissions will in-
crease about 60% with the current policies in place, and I wanted to bring a very 
important factor to your attention: a contrast between the past and the future in 
terms of CO2 emissions.
In the past thirty years, the world energy demand has increased by about 2%. 
In the light blue on the Chart 4 you can see that the CO2 emissions in the past 
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thirty years increased less than the energy demand, but if you look at the future, 
when we compare the energy demand and the CO2 growth, CO2 will grow higher 
than the energy. This is a contrast to the past. This means that any energy we use 
in the world will have more carbon content in the future compared to what it had 
in the past, despite the eﬃciency improvements and despite the technology. What 
is the reason here? The reason is what I mentioned in the beginning. It is the nega-
tive consequence of nuclear declining share in the world energy mix. Nuclear is 
replaced by gas or coal and by other fuels, which have CO2 emissions, which is a 
very important point to highlight. This is another point in terms of highlighting 
nuclear’s possible role in ﬁghting climate change.
The ﬁfth chart ilustrates an energy poverty issue. This is the world energy 
power depiction. Today 1.6 billion people have no access to electricity. This is 
a shame, if I may say so. If we do not change our policies, and if we do not in-
tervene in the subject, despite the technological growth, worldwide innovation, 
economic growth, and the slowdown of population growth, by 2030, there will 
still be 1.4 billion people without access to electricity. This is not acceptable both 
morally and economically, and I do believe that we have to convince the OECD 
governments to intervene here. One reason for this, for the sake of simplicity, if 
we leave the ethical arguments aside, is for the long-term security interests. It is 
important to eradicate poverty in the developing countries, and one of the points 
here is that energy can increase economic growth.
Let me tell you a couple of things about oil. There is an issue about whether 
we are running out of oil. People who say nowadays that we are running out of 
oil make a statement. They say that, in the last ten years, the amount of oil that 
we have found (new discoveries) is about half of what we used. That means we 
used more oil than we have found. First of all, is that true? The answer is yes. We 
found less oil than we used; this is true. But why is this the case? Is it because 
of a lack of reserves? Are they running out of oil? No. Chart number six has the 
answer.
If you can concentrate on the left side, you see the undiscovered oil and gas 
resources in the world, and if you just concentrate on the dark and light blue 
ones, they are the OECD North America (the US and Canada) and Europe. In 
terms of the world oil resources, about 20% of the resources are there. But on 
the right hand side, you see the number of wells drilled worldwide in the last ten 
years, world activities, where the investment went in order to ﬁnd oil, and it is 
mainly in those two regions-OECD North America and OECD Europe. In fact, 
normally, the exploration activities investment needs to go to the Middle East 
where the oil is and where the oil is cheap, but it did not go there. The very reason 
79BIROL: WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK AND CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE
5. Electricity Deprivation
6. Undiscovered Oil & Gas Resources & Expolaration Wells Drilled, 1995–2003
In 2030, if no major new policies are implemented, 
there will still be 1.4 billion people without electricity. 
Discoveries have fallen in recent year, mainly because exploration  has shifted to less prospective regions.
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7. Oil Flows & Major Chokepoints: The “Dire Straits” 
8. Contribution of Oil & Gas Sectors to GDP, 2002
The risk of an oil-supply disruption will grow as trade & 
ﬂows through key maritime & pipeline chokepoints expand.
Importance of oil & gas sector in the Russian economy has grown 
sharply in recent years, approaching that of some OPEC countries.
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why we could not ﬁnd more oil is not lack of oil, but lack of investment going to 
the areas where the oil is located.
This brings me to the issue of access to oil reserves worldwide. Today, about 
two thirds of the world’s oil reserves are closed to foreign direct investment in 
terms of the upstream sector. The key examples are Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and 
some other Middle East countries. From our point of view, the major question 
is not availability of oil, but whether oil and global capital can meet and produce 
oil at an aﬀordable price for the rest of the world. This is a key question, and we 
will push this throughout our meetings.  
However, I want to bring to your attention another issue that the Interna-
tional Energy Agency, with the publication of the new “World Energy Outlook,” 
is going to push: the reserves data transparency. You may have heard that some 
major international oil companies have downgraded their reserves estimates sig-
niﬁcantly. You may have also heard that there are some doubts about the level of 
oil reserves in some key oil-producing countries. What we want to do is start a 
new international oil initiative, together with the major international organiza-
tions and our own governments. We need a new reserves data reporting system 
which uses common and comprehensive deﬁnitions, in terms of reserves, since we 
believe that oil is a very important strategic good for every world citizen, and it is 
our right to know how much oil is where and the level of that oil.
We live in a dangerous world, and energy is not immune to this danger. After 
the 11th of September, we felt it even more strongly. One of the issues, as I men-
tioned at the beginning, is that oil will be traded more and more. That means the 
so-called chokepoints will be of more importance. We call them “dire straits” in 
our book. There are ﬁve major dire straits on the chart number 7, and I would like 
to highlight two of them for the sake of example here. One of them is the Malaka 
straight which is important for Southeast Asia, and the other is the Hormuz in 
the Middle East. 
Today, we have about twenty-six million barrels of oil passing through these 
two major checkpoints everyday. As a result of increasing trade (Asia is grow-
ing; the domestic production in the major consumer countries is declining), we 
expect that this trade will be more than doubled to more than ﬁfty million bar-
rels per day in 2030. This again highlights the fact that, in the case of a supply 
disruption in one of these two checkpoints (it may be as a result of an accident, 
or of a terrorist attack, or of piracy), the implications for the world economy and 
especially the surrounding countries will be substantial.  
Finally, in terms of oil, I want to address high oil prices. Are they good or 
bad, and if they are bad, how bad are they? In the year 2004, we are experiencing 
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very high oil prices of about thirty-eight dollars, on average. If the price stays at 
this level for the next twenty-ﬁve years to come, what are the implications for the 
oil markets? First of all, oil demand will go down substantially, more than ﬁfty 
million barrels per day compared to the reference scenario. The reference sce-
nario shows predictions if the process were –normal—normal prices verus high 
prices—normal means about twenty-ﬁve dollars, on average. Second, the OPEC 
production will be much less because the OPEC production will shift to those 
areas which are proﬁtable at higher prices and because, since the world demand 
will be much less, OPEC will have to produce less oil. Third, which is a surprising 
result, OPEC revenues in cumulative terms will be less in a high-price environ-
ment compared to a medium-price environment. That means that if the OPEC 
governments had a long-term view of their economic development process, they 
should have gone for a medium-price trajectory, rather than pushing for the high 
prices because, in the long term, they will lose money. 
This brings me to a couple of remarks on Europe. When I talk about Europe, 
I mean the European Union with twenty-ﬁve member countries, including the 
Czech Republic. We expect that Europe will have to import more and more en-
ergy from other countries—oil, gas, and coal. Just a remark on gas and a wake-up 
call for the governments here. About 80% of the European gas by 2030 will come 
from outside of Europe, increasingly from Russia. We think that this is not good 
news because of the security of supply concerns. There are two reasons why gas 
imports are going to increase. One is that their own production in Europe is go-
ing to decrease in the UK, in Denmark, in the Netherlands, and so on. Second, 
the demand is increasing because of normal gas demand, but also because, by 
2015, about half of the coal power plants in Europe are going to retire, and the 
choice of fuel in most countries is gas. 
 We think that this is an important point, and Germany’s policy on the 
phase-out of nuclear contributes to this picture. We think that this is not good 
news, and I do not agree that Russia has never failed to deliver. First of all, they 
did fail to deliver. It is an empirical fact. They did fail to deliver to some countries, 
and that is an important point to register. The second point is that it is not impor-
tant if they failed to deliver or not; that is not the main point. The fact that they 
have the power to not deliver is an important point in terms of the international 
diplomacy and international negotiations context. 
Third is the issue of prices. The chart number 8 shows that the Russian econo-
my is increasingly reliant on oil and gas exports and their revenues. Their reliance 
on the energy revenues is increasing in such a way that is it approaching that of 
some OPEC member countries such as Algeria and Iran shown here. Why is this 
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important? It is important because when we look at the Middle East countries, 
when they push the prices up, they are not doing it because they have bad intentions 
or are bad people, but because their economies are relying on the prices of oil and 
gas. This picture, the increasing reliance of Russia on oil and gas prices, may in 
the future turn into a threat, and the Russian government may want to keep the 
prices up.
I will not go to this point, but just to mention it, up to now, what I have told 
you has been under the current policies, but many governments have policies that 
are not legally enacted,  but are only under consideration, such as the eﬃciency 
policies in the European context or the one in the US, where there is a discussion 
on the strengthening and prolonging of the Coﬀee/Kauﬁ standards, also some 
renewable energy policies within the EU, or in Japan, there are some discussions 
on the eﬃciency policies. If these policies were to be introduced tomorrow, how 
would they change the pictures that I described to you in terms of energy mix, in 
terms of CO2 emissions, and how much they would cost? I will only tell you that 
the trends that I showed you which end up with unsustainable and alarming mes-
sages can be changed if the governments were to push some alternative policies. 
These trends are not unalterable; they can be changed, and our world alternative 
policies interview can show you those ﬁgures.
The projected trends describe a scenario if no policy changes occur, a refer-
ence scenario. It lays out some major global concerns, not only for energy and en-
vironment, but also in terms of general security concerns, namely in terms of the 
increasing vulnerability to supply disruptions in oil and gas. The second concern 
is the CO2 emissions, increasing in huge amounts worldwide. The third is that we 
need huge energy investments. We have the capital worldwide, but the question is 
whether we will be able to get this worldwide capital to the energy industry. This 
is a major question; there are many barriers there. The fourth major challenge is 
the energy poverty. We have to take this into account seriously if we want to give 
global answers to these global problems. We believe that if the governments were 
to take these challenges seriously, they really can change them, and the major 
policies in that context will be the policies that rely on increasing the eﬃciency 
of energy use, both in the OECD and the developing countries. We do believe 
that, in addition to those policies, there are countries, like the US and like the EU 
members, pushing the alternative technologies, such as the carbon sequestration 
and the advanced nuclear technologies, that can also help to change this picture. 
Finally, we tell all of our member governments that this picture that I have shown 
is not a sustainable one, both from an energy and from a social perspective, and 
they have to act quickly.
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Jan Ruml, Vice President of the Czech Senate, and Roger Robinson, PSSI Co-Founder
Plenary Hall of the Senate of the Czech Republic, Wallenstein Pallace
David Waller, IAEA Deputy Director General
Panel C: Anne Korin, David Waller, Kevin Rosner, Richard Perle and Robert Eagan
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Security of Energy 
Supplies – Policy Paper
Some Thoughts on the Concept and Key Related Issues
 1.  Introduction: Paper Focus and Dimensions of 
Security of Energy Supplies
Of the four main types of energy, which include:
(I)  solid fuels (hard and soft coal, coal products, wood, biomass) 
(II)  crude oil and reﬁned oil products
(III) natural gas
(IV) electricity
our focus will be on the last three. Although solid fuels are of overwhelming im-
portance (e.g., for countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, or the US), they 
occupy a minor role in international trade, which is decidedly dominated by oil 
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and gas. In addition, coal supplies are generally more reliable and signiﬁcantly less 
vulnerable to potential supply disruptions than oil, natural gas, or electricity.
Security of energy supplies has several dimensions, including:
1.  availability of “adequate” supplies of diﬀerent types of energy at a “reason-
able” (economically aﬀordable) price
2. Pricing of energy at its full economic cost (or as close to it as possible) along 
with active government policies to discourage energy waste and encourage 
energy conservation 
3. Ability and adequate capacity to deliver required amounts of diﬀerent types 
of energy to the point of demand / consumption at the exact time required 
by consumers
4. Adequate diversiﬁcation of energy supplies by type of energy and geographic 
source and avoidance of excessive reliance on certain types of energy, the sup-
plies of which are inherently unreliable 
5. Certainty that supplies of diﬀerent types of energy will not be interrupted to 
an unacceptable degree by extraordinary events, including those due to
(a) technical/equipment failure of transport/transmission system
(b) weather/climate related developments
(c) political or organized labor decisions
(d) terrorist attacks
6. Assurance that diﬀerent types of energy delivered to consumers are reasonably 
environmentally sound and safe (both in the physical/biological as well as in 
the visual sense), including
(a) extraction, processing, and generation
(b) transport and transmission
(c) consumption
2. Key Aspects of Energy Supply Security
2.1 Availability of “adequate” supplies of diﬀerent types of energy at a 
“reasonable” price
2.1.1 Price of energy and its availability
With the recent signiﬁcant upturn in economic activity in China and India, along 
with other dynamic Third World economies, the demand for energy has signiﬁcantly 
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increased, putting an upward price pressure on all major types of fuels (crude oil, 
natural gas, hard coal, and even nuclear fuel). Once again, concern is mounting 
about whether or not we are entering a prolonged period—or even a permanent 
state—of relatively high energy prices, as well as about the adequacy of long-term 
energy supplies.
The ﬁrst concern may well be correct, as the growth of demand is likely to 
outstrip the growth of supply for traditional fuels, particularly in the case of crude 
oil and hard coal, and, to a considerably lesser degree, for natural gas. We may 
be entering a period of relatively high real energy prices, albeit at a level at which 
energy is still aﬀordable to most consumers.
The related concern about the adequacy of long-term energy supplies is most 
likely unwarranted, provided that mankind is reasonably ﬂexible with respect 
to the mix of energy we choose to consume, substituting more aﬀordable types 
of energy for those which are becoming more expensive either because of their 
declining physical availability or rising cost of production.
2.1.2 Adequacy of long-term energy supplies
Several points should be made with respect to this issue. First, there is nuclear 
power, the potential of which we are currently utilizing only to a very limited 
degree. Second, renewable sources of energy will play a much larger role in the 
coming decades, including wind power, solar power, and hydropower, generated 
from movement of sea currents and by diﬀerences in sea temperature, etc. Third, 
nuclear power and renewables will permit the price of electricity to remain at a 
reasonable level. Electricity oﬀers an increasingly promising substitute for liquid 
fuels used in transportation (the energy mix in transportation can be dramatically 
shifted toward electricity and away from gasoline and diesel fuel). Fourth, there is 
also the huge potential of hydrogen as a fuel in transportation, if and when we are 
able to produce it at an attractive price (not to mention other alternatives such as 
LNG, alcohol/biomass, etc.).
But the ﬁfth and most important point that politicians and even economists 
frequently fail to understand is that the demand for energy can dramatically 
change if the price of energy rises over a critical level: energy is consumed only as 
an intermediate good, and what consumers ultimately care about is the consump-
tion of the ﬁnal good or service. For example, in the case of heat, the consumers’ 
objective is to be comfortably warm at home and at work. The production of heat 
is very complex, involving the consumption of fuel/energy (such as a hard fuel, 
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natural gas, or electricity), use of diﬀerent types of heating systems (with varying 
installation and operating costs, depending on their eﬃciency of conversion of 
fuel/energy into heat) and potentially also diﬀerent mixes of energy (e.g., in the 
case of some systems, which use both natural gas and electricity). In addition, one 
of the most important factors in heating is the design of houses and buildings 
and the amount and type of insulation used in them. Today’s houses are already 
much more energy eﬃcient than their predecessors thanks to better design and 
more insulation. Still, undoubtedly, a great deal of further progress would rapidly 
occur in these two areas were energy prices to rise suﬃciently to justify additional 
investments in house/building design and insulation. 
Similarly, in the case of automobiles, the consumers’ objective is to get com-
fortably and fast enough from one place to another (the primary objective), per-
haps with a demonstration of some ﬂair (a possible secondary objective). Suf-
ﬁciently high gasoline prices (the question is how high they have to be) will 
undoubtedly stimulate the downsizing of cars, a reduction in their weight (with 
more plastics and aluminum alloys used instead of steel), the installation of more 
eﬃcient engines, and the substitution of alternative for traditional fuels (e.g. elec-
tricity/hybrids, LPG, LNG, hydrogen, and alcohol for gasoline and diesel fuel). 
Finally, since all technologies have their limits, were energy prices to rise signiﬁ-
cantly in relative terms, we would also have to alter our energy-hungry behavior 
and lifestyles. This may well mean greater emphasis on public transportation, 
more car-pooling, a massive shift from road to rail transport, in the case of freight 
(piggybacking, which is a major issue in Europe with its highly fragmented and 
comparatively ineﬃcient rail systems).
2.1.3 Are we running out of oil?
The high priest of this theory is Dr. Colin Campbell, a retired oil industry geolo-
gist from Ireland. According to his view, the sharp decline in new oil discoveries 
during the last 20-25 years signiﬁes the beginning of the end of an era when oil 
was the dominant fuel for the global economy. He reckons that mankind has 
already consumed about 900 billion barrels of oil over the past 150 years and that 
we can reasonably extract and consume about the same amount in the future. 
However, since the current rate of annual oil consumption is already around 
30 billion barrels and likely to rise to around 44 billion barrels within the next 
twenty-ﬁve years or so, Campbell thinks that we already have a major oil short-
age crisis in the making. Using bell curves to project where we stand now and 
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where we are headed, Campbell predicts that oil production will reach a historical 
peak as early as in 2005 and then start falling, never to rise again. His doomsday 
scenario is that the global economy will be unable to respond fast enough to this 
development or shift to alternative forms of energy, bringing the economy to a 
screeching halt. At the extreme, he argues that an oil-induced global ﬁnancial 
crash is coming and we should be preparing for it.
The bulk of the oil industry establishment views Campbell as incorrect and 
sees a number of ﬂaws in his theory. There are widespread disagreements about 
the level of global oil reserves, with some “mainstream” estimates, such as those 
by the Exxon Mobil Corp., putting them at 14 trillion barrels—way above 
Campbell’s implied number. The high estimates count all forms of oil in the 
ground, including tar-soaked sands, oil shale, etc. The prevailing industry view is 
also that, at the right price, a large portion of such oil is recoverable. Campbell’s 
credibility has been damaged by his repeated shifts and revisions of his theory, 
such as moving the projected peak of global oil production from 1995 to 2005. 
However, his credibility got a signiﬁcant boost recently when the Washington-
based energy consultancy, PFC Energy, essentially endorsed his view, with one 
notable exception—PFC Energy puts the oil production peak at somewhere 
between 2010 and 2015. 
Some critics of Campbell’s work, such as energy consultant Michael Lynch 
from the US, see a number of ﬂaws in his work and argue that the decline in oil 
discoveries during the last 20-25 years is not an inexorable trend, but a conse-
quence of market forces. Lynch expects the pace of new discoveries to revive and 
dramatically increase when the oil industry has enough of a ﬁnancial incentive to 
ﬁgure out how to extract more oil from the ground. Lynch also points out that 
geopolitical constraints have prevented exploration of many oil-rich regions of 
the world, including Iraq and Russia, and that high oil prices will provide incen-
tives for these countries to open up their oil ﬁelds. Lynch, as well as the bulk of 
the oil industry establishment, is also generally more optimistic about the future 
availability of superior technologies, making it possible to extract or recover oil, 
which cannot be done with current technologies.
What should we make out of this debate? Here are some observations and an 
assessment by an economist with no speciﬁc oil industry agenda:
(I)  Campbell has a valid, albeit quite obvious point—at some point oil pro-
duction will reach a peak and then start declining, following the shape of a 
bell curve
(II)  in an industry, which has yet to achieve a deﬁnite consensus as to whether 
all hydrocarbons are of organic origin or if a signiﬁcant portion is not, any 
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deﬁnitive claim with respect to the level of global hydrocarbon reserves must 
be viewed with considerable skepticism (whether on the low or the high 
side)
(III) the pace of discovery of new hydrocarbon reserves depends on their physi-
cal distribution (mainly location, accessibility, and depth)—uneven geo-
graphic and geological distribution undoubtedly means an uneven pace of 
discovery; ﬁnancial incentives for the oil industry (price of oil, proﬁtability 
of the industry)— with the exception of the most recent developments, the 
real price of oil since the mid-1970s has not exactly moved in the desirable 
direction from the viewpoint of industry; developments in oil extraction 
and recovery technologies—which occurs in spurts; and the global political 
climate—which has gradually improved only in the last 10-15 years 
(IV) global oil production may well start declining, but it is unlikely to occur in 
the reasonably near future (e.g. within a decade), and the decline is likely 
(but not guaranteed) to be relatively slow and gradual 
V  the most troubling issue is what will happen to global oil demand dur-
ing this period, particularly in light of signiﬁcant long-term acceleration 
of economic growth in countries such as China and India with voracious 
appetites for energy consumption (following the classic economic take-oﬀ 
pattern observed in most developed market economies)—such develop-
ment could make things signiﬁcantly worse, even if oil production is de-
clining only slowly
(VI) on the positive side, oil demand will drop as higher future real oil prices 
will undoubtedly curtail oil consumption and lead to the use of more ef-
ﬁcient combustion engines and lighter, less oil-consuming vehicles 
(VII) high oil price will stimulate the use of other liquid substitutes for gasoline 
and diesel fuel, including synthetic gasoline/diesel fuel made from natural 
gas and coal, as well as alcohol and other liquid fuels made from biomass 
(VIII) a most profound impact on oil consumption will come from the avail-
ability of alternative forms of energy to power transport vehicles, including 
electricity, hydrogen, LNG, LPG, etc.
(IX) ﬁnally, oil consumption will also be aﬀected by improvements in the ef-
ﬁciency of the transport sector (in terms of unit fuel requirements per 
ton-km of transported freight or per person-km in the case of passenger 
transport), heat and cooling production, and electricity generation. 
The bottom line: rather than worrying too much about how much oil is still left 
in the ground and how quickly we may run out of it, we need to concern our-
selves with the adequate availability of substitutes and taking measures to stimu-
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late energy conservation and eﬃcient use of energy. Even though the market can 
be reasonably relied on to send adequate price signals and encourage correct oil 
substitution and conservation trends, it would be wise that mankind buy itself 
an insurance policy just in case the drop in oil production were to be relatively 
sudden and quite rapid. The insurance policy we have in mind is an ongoing 
government-subsidized development of alternative fuels to those based on crude 
oil, alternative combustion engine technologies, alternative transport means and 
technologies, etc. The cost of the insurance policy (the subsidy) should be covered 
by additional taxes on the consumption of oil products (in addition to those taxes 
which are used to ﬁnance the building of transport infrastructure or “abused” 
to ﬁnance the government spending not related to the transport sector or to the 
protection of the environment).
2.2 Pricing of energy at its full economic cost and active government 
policies to discourage energy waste and encourage energy 
conservation 
In many countries, energy is not priced at anywhere near its opportunity cost/
potential export price (Russia and most oil producing countries outside of the 
developed West are good examples), while other countries eﬀectively encourage 
excessive consumption of oil products by a policy of traditionally low taxation of 
motor fuels (the US is a prime example of this). If all forms of energy were realis-
tically priced on a global basis, and a greater consensus were achieved with respect 
to the optimal level of taxation (combination of excise and sales/VAT taxes) of 
diﬀerent types of energy, above all in the developed West, this would provide an 
additional important incentive to discourage energy waste and would encour-
age energy conservation on a global basis. Such steps would at least temporarily 
reduce the level of global energy consumption (mostly by reducing unit energy/
GDP consumption requirements) and certainly lessen its future growth. 
2.3 Ability and adequate capacity to deliver required amounts of diﬀerent 
types energy to the point of demand/consumption at the exact time 
required by consumers
In general, transport and transmission capacities for all types of fuels/energy have 
kept pace with the growth of demand, and it has been relatively rare, up until 
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now, to encounter transport bottlenecks, with the notable exception of electricity 
in some countries/regions. With adequate ﬁnancial incentives, energy companies 
and governments are likely to continue adding to these capacities in order to 
assure that the transport infrastructure required to supply energy to consumers 
is in place. One way of assuring that the cost of this eﬀort not get out of hand 
and make it necessary to build transport or transmission capacity only for peak 
demand periods is to increase the emphasis on stockpiling and demand manage-
ment. The stockpiling of crude oil and reﬁned oil products is not an overly costly 
or complex matter if it does not involve product price risk—rather, it is a mat-
ter of simple economics. (Holding an equivalent of, say, three months’ demand 
equivalent for a readily saleable commodity incurs the annual cost of deprecia-
tion of the storage facility plus carrying costs, which is the value of annual con-
sumption divided by four and multiplied by the combined per unit interest cost 
and storage service proﬁt margin for the stockpiler). Gas storage capacities have 
been increasing throughout Europe, but the problem remains with their compo-
sition—not enough of that storage is of the fast recovery type (salt caverns, old 
underground mines) because of the cost of securing or constructing the storage 
which would allow maximum ﬂexibility. 
At present, electricity cannot be stored except by means of pumped storage 
hydropower generation plants, which are typically extremely expensive to build. 
Consequently, the bulk of generation capacities must operate in line with daily 
load curves, which, in most countries, show large daily swings in demand, with 
the peak load from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., medium load from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., and 
low load from 11 p.m. through 7 a.m. This pattern of demand drives up the 
cost of generating electricity dramatically as a substantial portion of generation 
capacities operate only 8 to 16 hours a day, instead of the ideal target of 24 hours 
(in a pure baseload fashion). The problem is further compounded by the season-
ality of demand, particularly in countries with a single seasonal peak in winter 
(as opposed to double seasonal peak—heating peak in winter and air-condition-
ing peak in summer, characteristic, e.g., for most of the US and increasingly the 
Mediterranean region). 
To a limited degree, it is possible to store products or services produced by 
means of electricity (primarily hot water, potentially heat stored by means other 
than hot water, cooling capacity stored by means of ice, etc.) and thus eﬀectively 
to store electricity in a transformed form. However, it is likely that large-scale 
higher-voltage battery technology will prove technically feasible and economi-
cally viable in a horizon of around 20-25 years (e.g., Britain is currently at the 
forefront of development of this technology). Such technology would make it 
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possible for a battery the size of an average family house to store enough electric-
ity to supply a town of about 40 thousand inhabitants for around 6 hours or 
so. If proven technically viable and cost-eﬃcient, the giant battery technology 
would revolutionize power generation, as it would largely eliminate the need for 
peak load generation, allow virtually all electricity to be produced in a base-load 
fashion (with a portion of it stored for peak demand periods), signiﬁcantly im-
prove the rates of utilization of generation equipment, and consequently sharply 
cut non-fuel generation costs. The additional positive impact of the possibility 
to store electricity, at least on a short-term basis, on improving the security of its 
supply is obvious. 
2.4 Adequate diversiﬁcation of energy supplies by type of energy and 
geographic source and avoidance of excessive reliance on the types 
of energy, the supplies of which are inherently unreliable
Adequate diversiﬁcation of energy supplies by type—particularly for countries 
dependent mostly on imported energy—is something that makes obvious sense. 
The proposition is less obvious for countries which are largely self-suﬃcient in en-
ergy or have a large indigenous supply of a speciﬁc type of fuel/energy. While, in 
the case of Norway, it has recently proven rather problematic to be almost totally 
dependent on hydropower (when a major drought occurred in 2003), the heavy 
dependence of a country like Poland on its hard coal does not necessarily entail 
an added risk in its energy supplies.
Turning next to geographic diversiﬁcation of energy supplies, in the case of 
crude oil, it is not that critical whether all of a country’s supply essentially comes 
from a single source (such as in the case of the Czech Republic) because of a 
signiﬁcant degree of substitutability of diﬀerent types of crude oil. The more 
critical issue is whether there are alternative routes to deliver the oil (particularly 
in countries which rely mostly or totally on pipeline transport) in the event of a 
breakdown/blockage of a particular pipeline route. It is also important that the 
country’s reﬁnery capacity be conﬁgured in a reasonably ﬂexible manner and not 
depend solely on a very speciﬁc type of crude oil for which substitutes are scarce 
and diﬃcult to procure.
Much emphasis has been made in the past about the danger of reliance on a 
single source of natural gas and the need for the diversiﬁcation of supply. Never 
mind that the former USSR and nowadays Russia (Gazprom) have never failed to 
deliver the gas they were contractually obligated to deliver, with the exception of 
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a few relatively minor supply interruptions/shortcomings caused by unauthorized 
withdrawal of gas intended for other customers by the Ukraine. In practical terms, 
a number of EU countries—notably the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia—totally rely on physical deliveries of Russian gas, a portion of which is 
swapped for Norwegian gas in order to cut transport costs. It has proven suﬃcient 
to show that, if need be, the Norwegians will be able to deliver their gas physically, 
or that there will be other suppliers who will make alternative gas available, in the 
case of a Russian gas supply interruption/shortfall.
Nevertheless, given that natural gas is not supplied on nearly as competi-
tive a basis as crude oil, whenever economically feasible, it makes sense for most 
countries to seek multiple competing supply sources of natural gas. Securing ad-
ditional supplies of natural gas from Central Asia through a new pipeline transit-
ing Turkey and the Balkan region (thus totally avoiding transit through Russia), 
in addition to core supplies coming from Russia and Norway, makes a lot of sense 
for those countries which would be within the reach of the new pipeline (the 
Balkan region including Greece, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, Austria, 
Italy, and even Germany).
Heavy reliance on unpredictable sources of energy, which are inherently un-
reliable, is an irresponsible energy strategy for any country. Unreliable sources 
of energy include hydropower (given the risk of drought), windpower (possible 
lack of wind), and solar (possible lack of sunshine). But the risk is very diﬀerent 
depending on the geographic location and climatic/weather history at the spe-
ciﬁc location. As we have regularly seen in continental Europe, periodic dramatic 
shortfalls in snowfall and precipitation imply a much higher risk for hydropower 
dependence within the Alpine region than, say, in a country such as Norway. 
Similarly, windpower generation on the Baltic coast is much less vulnerable to 
climatic and weather shifts than inland windpower generation. But the general 
point to be made is that electricity generation based on most renewable energy 
sources entails a considerably higher risk in terms of reliability and predictability. 
Thus excessive reliance on this type of generation can potentially backﬁre and 
dramatically increase the risk of a major shortfall in electricity supplies.
2.5 Certainty that supplies of diﬀerent types of energy will not be interrupted 
to an unacceptable degree by extraordinary events of any type
Such interruptions could arise because of technical/equipment breakdown of the 
transport/transmission system, weather/climate related developments, political 
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or organized labor decisions, or terrorist attacks. The avoidance of energy sup-
ply disruptions due to technical/equipment breakdown of transport/transmission 
system can be assured by regular monitoring of the technical state of such systems 
and performing proper and timely repair and maintenance work. This generally 
appears to be the case, and it would be diﬃcult, e.g., to identify major problem 
areas of technical nature in the energy transports system within the EU region. 
However, one can readily ﬁnd problems in other parts of the world, such in as 
the US (with electricity transmission and distribution networks), Russia (e.g., 
with oil pipelines), and most developing countries (across the board). In addition 
to diversiﬁcation of energy supplies (by type of fuel/energy and in a geographi-
cal sense) and diversiﬁcation of supply routes (alternative pipeline use, multiple 
power transmission lines, etc.), diversiﬁcation of modes of transport (if viable 
technically and economically) also makes sense.
Weather and climate-related developments can also disrupt energy supplies 
and are diﬃcult to anticipate and plan for. But it is obvious that careful planning 
and situating of energy transport infrastructure can limit such disruptions by 
avoiding locating pipelines and power transmission lines in ﬂood-prone areas, 
mud/rockslide and avalanche-prone areas, and by taking special care in construc-
tion of energy transport networks in earthquake-prone regions or those with dif-
ﬁcult geology (such as shifting sands). While numerous errors have been made 
(such as in the Russian case, when many oil pipelines in the south were buried 
in shifting sands), more recently we have seen that people have learned from past 
errors. 
Political and organized labor decisions could potentially threaten the security 
of energy supplies, although such threats are generally heavily discounted. The 
much touted threat in the Soviet era (at one point) that the communist political 
leadership could use an energy supply weapon (such as denial of oil or gas deliver-
ies at a critical time) to extract political and other concessions from some of its cus-
tomers has never visibly materialized. Even the Soviet communist leaders realized 
the foolishness and the extremely high long-term economic cost of using the deni-
al of energy supplies as a political weapon in relations with countries signiﬁcantly 
dependent on Russian oil and gas. Any supplier country resorting to such a step as 
blackmailing would lose its credibility as a reliable supplier and would never again 
be trusted by its customers. Not only would it be foolish to use such a weapon, 
but, in the absence of an exclusive or near-exclusive monopoly supply position, 
and, given a variety of measures implemented by oil and gas consuming countries 
to prevent the exercise of such a weapon against a speciﬁcally targeted country, the 
energy supply weapon would have been an ineﬀective tool for political blackmail. 
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It is also expected that governments would not tolerate the disruptions of energy 
supplies by organized labor; nor has the quite disciplined organized labor force 
shown an inclination up to now to explore its use for obvious reasons.
In light of recent global political developments and the emergence of large-
scale global terrorism by extremists on the fringes of Muslim society, the threat 
of terrorist attacks aiming to disrupt energy supplies is an issue which deserves 
a great deal more attention than in the past. This topic is covered extensively in 
Section 3 below, dealing with the upcoming emergence of rational calculating 
terrorists. This section focuses primarily on potential threats to the security of 
high-voltage electricity transmission networks, which we identify as most vulner-
able and prone to attack by the new breed of rational calculating terrorists, whom 
we expect to emerge in the coming years.
2.6 Assurance that diﬀerent types of energy delivered to consumers are 
reasonably environmentally sound and safe
This is probably something that is either not taken into account in typical reviews 
of security of energy supplies or typically considered of distinctly secondary im-
portance. The focus should not be just on the physical/biological impact, but on 
the visual impact as well. We should also be looking at all stages of the process of 
energy supply and consumption—fuel extraction/processing and electricity gen-
eration, fuel transport/power transmission, and fuel consumption itself. We can 
hardly consider a particular supply of energy as secure—at least on a longer term 
basis—if it involves an environmentally reckless method of fuel production, leak-
ing pipelines, polluting reﬁneries, health hazards from power generation (nuclear 
generation, air pollution from coal-ﬁred plants) or from transmission lines, or 
similar situations.
Pro-environment political movements and populations at large are showing a 
declining tolerance of such practices and an increased willingness to abandon par-
ticular types of energy supplied at a cost of major risk to the environment and/or hu-
man life (such as nuclear generation, environmentally-damaging hydropower gener-
ation, oil and gas extraction in environmentally sensitive areas, construction of new 
pipelines with potential adverse environmental impact, etc.). What may have been 
tolerable in the past is unlikely to be tolerable in the future; hence, marginal sources 
of energy supplies and modes of transportation/transmission (in terms of economic 
beneﬁt relative to potential environmental and human health cost) are vulnerable to 
political actions to shut them down and, thus, should be viewed as unreliable.
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Even if safe and sound in the physical and biological sense, populations in most 
countries are also increasingly sensitive to the visual impact of energy installations 
and energy transport networks. For example, despite signiﬁcant domestic power 
shortages, the population of Croatia sensibly blocked the government plans for the 
construction of state-of-the-art coal-ﬁred power generation facilities in coastal areas 
(in order to utilize imported coal), as this would have signiﬁcantly impaired the visu-
al enjoyment of the Mediterranean coast by tourists and devalued the most valuable 
national asset and resource which Croatia has. The limitations imposed on wind-
power generation in the immediate vicinity of the Baltic coast and throughout the 
Alpine region, or on the construction of high-voltage transmission lines through the 
Alps, also make a lot of sense. Even in the US, the large-scale visual blight of Third-
World-like power distribution system, based on wooden poles and above-ground 
hanging cables both in urban and rural neighborhoods, is increasingly questioned 
(also on safety and reliability grounds). The US oﬀers a prime example of a country 
with massive hidden underinvestment debt in its power transmission and distribu-
tion network, which it will have to start repaying in the not too distant future.
3. Upcoming Emergence of Rational Calculating 
Terrorists
3.1 Potential terrorist targets
The global political consensus is that terrorist activity worldwide is likely to re-
main at least at the current level and quite possibly increase signiﬁcantly. Aside 
from pure civilian targets and national symbols (World Trade Towers, Eiﬀel Tow-
er, etc.), the four main targets for terrorists are likely to be:
(I)  ﬁnancial institutions (to exact maximum economic damage from the dis-
ruption of ﬁnancial markets by creating distrust/uncertainty in the bank-
ing sector and cause equity values to drop as stock markets decline) 
II  energy and water supplies (to maximize potential economic disruption and 
disrupt as many lives as possible)
III key symbols of political power (parliaments, presidential/prime minister 
palaces and residences, key government and high court buildings, etc.)
IV key symbols of military power (defense and interior ministries, military bases).
Our expectation is that the new generation of terrorists will be increasingly 
sophisticated and calculating and will opt for new forms of terror selected on the 
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basis of cost-beneﬁt analysis from the terrorists’ viewpoint. It is highly likely that, over 
time, blind, pure-hate terrorism (e.g. the recent terrorist attack on the Beslan School 
in North Ossetia) will decline. Such terror creates few friends—even within the Mus-
lim world—and generates no sympathies for terrorist causes. Instead, terrorists are 
increasingly likely to opt for attacks which create massive economic pain and disrupt 
human life at a critical time, while hoping to create enough political pressure for pol-
icy changes favorable to their causes. The recent terrorist attack in Spain proved that, 
with the right timing, you can even inﬂuence the outcome of national elections. 
Focusing on item (ii) and the region of Europe, terrorists would, in principle, 
attack the following facilities:
(a) trunk oil pipelines and reﬁneries/storage capacities
(b) trunk gas pipelines
(c) LNG ships and LNG storage capacities
(d) individual oil and gas production facilities (sea-based production platforms)
(e) high-voltage transmission lines, dispatch centers, and critical substations
(f ) nuclear power plants
(g) hydropower plants
(h) thermal power plants
(i) potable water reservoirs.
3.2 Classic targets for “old-fashioned/emotional” terrorists
Out of the above nine categories, the “old-fashioned/emotional” terrorists, who are 
primarily interested in substantial loss of life and the “classic” form of terror, would 
be most inclined to attack the four targets listed below. However, the potential 
targets in this category are relatively well protected (except for the potable water 
supply), diﬃcult to attack, and unlikely to result in huge economic cost even if suc-
cessfully attacked, thus making them unattractive to rational calculating terrorists.
3.2.1 Nuclear power plants
Because of the extent of existing security measures and safety designs (typically 
involving protective concrete domes over nuclear reactors), these are very dif-
ﬁcult to attack and damage extensively without insider co-operation (which, 
in turn, is extremely diﬃcult to secure). A terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant 
would have a profound economic and social impact only if it were to lead to the 
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spread of nuclear material (even of relatively low radioactivity) outside of the plant 
facility. The loss of power generation capacity would not be signiﬁcant enough to 
have a major economic impact. The cost-beneﬁt analysis would suggest that nuclear 
power plants are not an attractive target for a rational calculating terrorist given that 
too much eﬀort would be required, the attack would be unlikely to result in enough 
of an economic impact, and that the potential population health threat is unlikely 
to generate sympathy for a terrorist cause. 
3.2.2 Hydropower plants
These are also subject to a fair amount of security monitoring, very diﬃcult to 
attack and damage extensively without insider co-operation. The loss of generat-
ing capacity would also have very limited impact in most cases. The attack would 
have a major economic and social impact only if it resulted in the destruction of or 
major damage to the body of the dam (diﬃcult to achieve) and caused consequent 
large-scale damage to the region below the dam. The cost-beneﬁt analysis indicates 
that hydropower plants are also not attractive targets for a rational calculating ter-
rorist—the potential massive loss of life and destruction of property would hardly 
generate sympathy for terrorists. 
3.2.3 LNG ships and storage facilities
This is another category of tightly guarded energy facilities, relatively diﬃcult to 
attack. The loss of a LNG ship or speciﬁc LNG storage facility is unlikely to have a 
profound economic and social impact. As in the case of hydropower plants or pota-
ble water reservoirs, these facilities would attract “old-fashioned” terrorists probably 
mostly interested in maximum collateral damage (particularly in the case of storage 
capacities located near population centers). Based on cost-beneﬁt analysis, they are 
unattractive targets as well, for the same reasons as in the previous two cases.
3.2.4 Drinkable water reservoirs
The poisoning of the municipal water supply is something that is technically not 
that diﬃcult to do (at least in theory). However, this type of terrorism is in line 
with the use of a radiological device or biological/chemical weapons and would 
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have no appeal to a rational calculating terrorist because of the negative popula-
tion response which would be expected.
3.3 Unattractive terrorist targets
Two other types of potential terrorist targets are unattractive because of the lim-
ited economic impact their complete destruction or substantial damage would 
have. Thus we view them as relatively unattractive to either type of terrorist.
3.3.1 Individual oil and gas production facilities
Practically, it is impossible to blow up an entire oil or gas ﬁeld; terrorist attacks 
against individual oil or gas wells would not have the desired eﬀect. In particular, 
they would typically have only a negligible eﬀect on the overall supply of a speciﬁc 
type of fuel (not only on a global scale, but even on regional scales). Some attacks 
could obviously be more worrisome—e.g., against natural gas wells producing 
large quantities of sour gas, but in this case it would be a type of terrorism more 
in line with what “old fashioned’ terrorists are aiming to do and more properly 
belong to the group listed in Section 3.2.
3.3.2 Thermal power plants
These are also unattractive targets, given the diﬃculty of causing serious damage 
to this type of generation facility. Even the full destruction of a couple of blocks 
in a major power plant (which is rather diﬃcult to achieve) would have very lim-
ited economic and social impact.
3.4 Rational calculating terrorist and his/her likely targets
A rational calculating terrorist strives to inﬂict maximum economic damage (so 
that as many people as possible feel the economic impact and experience a sig-
niﬁcant disruption in their lifestyle), tries to limit the loss of life (such loss typi-
cally creates an anti-terrorist backlash, and it substantially increases the risk for 
the terrorist to be hunted down and caught), and tries to convey a clear political 
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message to achieve his/her goals (hopefully changing voter attitudes, outcomes of 
elections, foreign policies of individual governments, etc.). In the case of energy 
supplies, he/she will be increasingly focusing terrorist activities on energy trans-
port/transmission infrastructure, given the relative ease with which it can be at-
tacked, the much decreased likelihood of his/her being detected and caught in the 
act or afterwards, and the eﬀectiveness of “energy supply denial” as an economic 
and political weapon. 
The three key types of terrorist targets in this case would be:
I  trunk oil pipelines and reﬁneries/storage capacities
II  trunk gas pipelines
III high-voltage electricity transmission lines, national electricity dispatch cen-
ters, and critical power substations.
3.4.1  Trunk oil pipelines and reﬁneries/storage capacities
The act of destroying a portion of a critical oil pipeline or an entire reﬁnery/
storage capacity could have a signiﬁcant short-term, and possibly even longer-
term, economic impact (in the case of a reﬁnery or storage capacities). The 
resulting temporary shortages of reﬁned oil products—particularly at critical 
times of the year when demand is high—and sharply increased prices could 
have a signiﬁcant adverse local or regional economic impact. However, the use 
of such a terrorist weapon would have its limitations. One can blow up at most 
a portion of a pipeline (possibly up to several hundred meters in length), and 
this can probably be repaired fairly quickly. Since crude oil and oil products 
can be stored, and if stocks in storage are adequate, the economic impact of this 
type of terrorist attack may not be that signiﬁcant. The destruction of a reﬁnery 
(particularly in countries with a single national reﬁnery) would undoubtedly 
be more painful, but reﬁned products can be transported by road, rail, and 
product pipelines, which would reduce the economic impact of the damage to 
the assets in question.
3.4.2 Trunk gas pipelines
Natural gas can be transported in signiﬁcant quantities only by means of pipe-
lines (excluding the case of LNG, which requires the presence of a seaside LNG 
terminal and a storage facility). It can be stored in underground storage facilities, 
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but most of them are not of the fast recovery type (such as salt caverns or former 
underground mines). It would thus appear that an attack against a major trunk 
gas pipeline or a set of pipelines (e.g., either in Russia, Ukraine, or in key transit 
countries) could potentially inﬂict even more damage, particularly if the terror-
ists choose the right time—such as the peak of the winter heating season during 
a spell of unusually cold weather. However, once again, it is possible to blow up 
only a portion of a gas pipeline, and its repair could probably proceed at an even 
greater speed than in the case of a comparable oil pipeline attack. If gas storage 
capacities are adequate, a country or region may be able to survive the incident 
without profound economic impact. Naturally, potential terrorists could focus 
their attack on a major compressor station or a critical border transfer station, 
causing longer-term damage, as compressors are not as easily replaceable as gas 
pipe.
3.4.3 High-voltage electricity transmission lines, national electricity dispatch 
centers, and critical power substations
In our assessment, this will be a top priority target for rational calculating terrorists 
in the future for a host of reasons. First, the denial of electricity has a massive dis-
ruptive economic impact, and it will be felt by the population of an entire region 
or a country. The complete loss of power supply means there would be no light 
when it is dark (not only during the night!); computers would stop functioning 
(except for those with a back-up power supply)–nowadays almost everything is 
dependent on computers—the public transport system would largely shut down 
(including rail lines, with the exception of those relying on diesel-electric engines, 
subways, most airlines), and there would be no heat (most individual gas or oil-
based systems would not function, as they have electrical components) or air 
conditioning, no refrigeration, problems with the water supply (most pumps are 
electrical), etc. If a terrorist attack were to be timed at the seasonal peak of elec-
tricity demand—such as during the peak of the winter heating season or during 
a spell of extremely hot weather during the summer—the economic and broad 
social impact would be that much more profound. 
Second, due to the high density of power transmission lines and the virtual 
impossibility of monitoring all major power lines (even limiting our focus on 
400 kV lines or higher voltage in a few countries) and the ease with which 
a supporting pylon can be brought down, the risk to a terrorist of being de-
tected or caught is very low. Compared to alternative terrorist targets in the 
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energy sector—be they oil or gas pipelines or energy production/generation 
capacities—bringing down a 400 kV power transmission line is an easy task 
which does not require a great deal of skill or experience. Obviously, attacking 
a national power dispatch center or a major substation—critical for a national/
regional power supply system—would be considerably more ambitious, techni-
cally demanding, and risky (particularly as the national dispatch systems tend to 
be well-guarded nowadays). The general vulnerability of these systems to a ter-
rorist attack has already been exposed by the activities of the “darkers” (vandals 
who enjoy the visual thrill of shorting a high-voltage line) or by the recent (late 
summer 2003) Italian blackout experience, presumably as a consequence of the 
fall of a single tree in the Italian Alps.
While in principle it would be relatively diﬃcult to cause a multi-day collapse 
of a power supply system in countries with extensive circularity of their power 
transmission networks (i.e., countries in which most key points of large-scale 
power consumption can be supplied from two or more directions), a well-coor-
dinated simultaneous attack of a group of terrorists on several critical transmis-
sion lines could indeed plunge an entire country into darkness for several days. 
Typically, the countries most vulnerable to such an attack are those which are 
relatively isolated and with diﬃcult geography (e.g., Croatia, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal), those that are signiﬁcantly dependent on imported electricity (e.g., 
the Netherlands and Italy again), and those with inadequate cross-border trans-
mission capacity relative to the overall size of their domestic electricity markets 
(surprisingly, Poland falls into this category). 
The above problem can be seriously compounded when a country ignores 
its potential transmission system vulnerability on a long-term basis (there are 
quite a few countries in Europe which fall into this category), lacks adequate 
economic incentives to make investment into high-voltage transmission which 
would mostly or heavily beneﬁt its neighbors (Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Bulgaria ﬁt into this category), or engages in “obstructionist” behavior with 
respect to construction of an adequate pan-European transmission network for 
“environmental” or other reasons (e.g., Austria). The potential for more vul-
nerability is also created when some of the major European power generators 
try to slow down the construction of a pan-European electricity transmission 
network (something along the lines of pan-European gas supply network) in 
order to prevent large-scale cross-border electricity exchanges so that they can 
preserve the value of their less competitive generation assets (elements of such 
behavior are visible particularly in Germany, France, Spain, and more recently 
also in Italy).
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The ultimate nightmare scenario we envision in the coming years is that sophis-
ticated rational calculating terrorists will simultaneously blow up segments of 
the 400 kV transmission network at several critical locations in a country such 
as Italy so as to achieve a maximum multi-day disruption in power supplies or 
a complete blackout on a national basis. In order to maximize the economic 
impact of such a terrorist attack, and, given the speed with which such an attack 
could probably be implemented (obviously with some advance planning), ter-
rorists could time the attack to occur during the period of peak winter demand 
(during an unusually cold spell) or peak summer demand (during an extreme 
heat wave). While the population could reasonably handle a one-day total power 
supply interruption, if such an interruption were to last for several days (say 3-
7), we would not be surprised if it brought about massive population protests 
in the streets all over the country. Such protests could, in turn, trigger cabinet 
resignations, possibly the fall of an entire government, and a call for early general 
elections. Undoubtedly, some opposition politicians would seize the opportu-
nity and advocate changes in policy, which would address at least some terrorist 
grievances—particularly if these have at least some degree of legitimacy (such as 
a call for an independent Palestinian state, for no limitations on religious expres-
sion in public, etc.).
3.4.4 Proper response to potential attacks on power transmission infrastructure 
In our assessment, in the coming years, more rational and calculating terrorists 
will emerge, particularly in Europe, who will primarily focus their activities on 
causing massive economic damage with widespread impact by attacking ﬁnan-
cial institutions and energy transport and transmission infrastructure. Within 
the latter category, we deﬁnitely see the power transmission sector as the most 
likely target of coordinated and well-planned attacks. As such attacks will be ex-
tremely diﬃcult to prevent for the reasons already outlined, the proper response 
of European countries should be to:
I  signiﬁcantly improve the monitoring and security of high-voltage trans-
mission network (particularly the 400 kV lines and those of even higher 
voltage, particularly in Russia and Ukraine)
II  dramatically step up the construction of cross-border interconnectors in 
order to improve the potential for cross-border power supply assistance in 
the event of a domestic power supply disruption
III encourage countries to strengthen the security of their power supply by in-
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creasing the circularity of their power supply system, even if this means 
relying on a neighboring country (example: the construction of an un-
dersea cable interconnector between Croatia and central Italy)
IV increase co-operation between countries more vulnerable to the disrup-
tion in power supply (such as Italy and most of the Balkan area) and 
those with more secure power supply system and short-term stand-by 
generation capacity (such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia), or those 
with long-term large-scale excess generating capacity and the potential 
ability to contribute in a major way during a power supply crisis (poten-
tially Ukraine and Russia).
4. Creating Our Own Vulnerability in Power Supplies
It is important to note that when it comes to vulnerabilities in power supplies, a 
great deal of that vulnerability is self-generated by irresponsible behavior, some-
times on a national scale. Here are a few worrisome recent examples from Eu-
rope:
1. Excessive reliance on a single type of generation
2. Excessive reliance on relatively unreliable sources of electricity and deceptive 
practices to justify their use 
3. Obsession with the low cost of power at the risk of declining security of supply
4. Absence of a pan-European electricity transmission network (unlike in the 
case of natural gas)
5. Irrationality of design of transmission and distribution networks
6. Giving priority to protectionism over the security of the power supply. 
4.1 Excessive reliance on a single type of generation 
A good example of such behavior is Norway, which relies almost exclusively 
on hydropower to generate all of its electricity. Although Norway produces 
vast amounts of natural gas, its own gas-ﬁred generation capacity is negligible, 
and, unlike neighboring Sweden, it does not have any nuclear power plants. 
When Norway experienced extreme periods of drought (such as in 2003), 
its power supply situation reached a critical stage. Moreover, because of its 
relative physical isolation, it was unable to secure suﬃcient assistance from its 
Nordic neighbors.
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4.2 Excessive reliance on relatively unreliable sources of electricity and 
deceptive practices to justify their use
While many of the arguments in favor of renewables are certainly legitimate, 
some renewables—notably windpower and solar power—are inherently un-
reliable sources of electricity at most locations. Windpower definitely works 
in the right locations—such as directly on the Baltic Sea or on the Atlantic 
coast—or if installed on sea platforms (but these are expensive to build). 
The effectiveness of windpower goes down significantly if located inland 
(in order not to ruin the visual appearance of lands immediately adjacent to 
the sea and thus of significant recreational value). Seduced by the high and 
heavily subsidized prices offered for electricity generated from wind, many 
generators have gone overboard with the construction of windpower genera-
tors all over the countryside; Germany is a good illustration of this extreme. 
Marginal windpower generation capacities have very low effectiveness, and 
the resultant visual blight, noise, and other adverse environmental side ef-
fects have been given little weight in cost-benefit calculations. Unreliable 
historical data on wind occurrence and speed have been used to justify the 
rather extreme growth of this segment of generation at locations in which it 
does not make long-term economic sense. 
What the public has not been told is that wind generation in most loca-
tions is rather unreliable, that recent weather and climatic changes make 
economic calculations even more difficult, and that for every MW of wind-
power generating capacity, there has to be adequate back-up power, typically 
in the form of rather expensive gas-fired generation. (What drives up the cost 
of the back-up gas-fired generation capacity is the fact that its utilization rate 
will be relatively low—implying high unit capital cost, and the cost of the 
fuel will be high because of the unpredictable pattern of gas offtake—natu-
ral gas suppliers do not exactly welcome customers who cannot say when 
and how much gas they are likely to consume.) Since the assurance of ad-
equate back-up generation capacity is not the responsibility of windpower 
generators and, given the persistent mis-pricing of this standby capacity (the 
price offered is typically too low), we have recently witnessed occasional 
major power shortages in countries such as Germany and Austria, which can 
be squarely attributed to the failure of windpower generation capacities to 
deliver the expected amount of electricity. With inadequate back-up gen-
eration capacities, both countries have attempted to alleviate the shortages 
through short-term electricity imports from neighboring countries, and, in 
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order to secure adequate transmission capacities for crisis situations, they 
significantly curtailed cross-border transmission capacities available for all-
time use for the purpose of transmission of baseload electricity. Not only is 
such a practice uncompetitive, as it unilaterally restricts cross-border base-
load electricity trade, but, in essence, it exports the German and Austrian 
problem into neighboring countries such as the Czech Republic. In effect, 
instead of penalizing the reckless behavior caused by domestic windpower 
generation, it actually rewards it and imposes a significant portion of the 
economic cost on neighboring countries. 
4.3 Obsession with low cost of power at the risk of declining security of 
supply
This is perceived to be a particularly American phenomenon—as the American 
consumption culture is based on the obsession with low gasoline prices (result-
ing in low mileage performance of automobiles and widespread use of gas-guz-
zling SUVs), it is equally obsessed with the low cost of electricity. Americans 
take the low cost of electricity for granted, and US generators have largely 
given up on trying to charge the consumer the true cost of electricity at the 
time of peak demand, making the entire US electricity system increasingly 
vulnerable, particularly during the summer electricity demand peak due to air 
conditioning. The American obsession with the low cost of electricity is also 
illustrated by the country’s essentially Third World-like system of electricity 
distribution, relying mostly on wooden poles and multiple layers of hanging 
cables that are vulnerable to breakdowns, not to mention a signiﬁcant visual 
blight even in very expensive residential neighborhoods (including what is be-
ing done to the trees located below power lines). 
While Europe (including Eastern Europe) is generally inclined to bury its 
power lines in cables underground whenever practical, it too is increasingly 
obsessed with the idea of cheap electricity (the UK and Scandinavia being 
good examples), even with the rising risk of generation capacity failures and 
inadequate back-up at a time of potential crisis. The pressure for cheap elec-
tricity, the seeming willingness to tolerate a greater degree of risk to power 
supplies, and the growing interdependence of European economies—even in 
the area of electricity supplies—as integration advances, suggest the increas-
ing likelihood of major power supply failures and blackouts, possibly aﬀecting 
more than one country and lasting more than a few hours or a day. 
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4.4 Absence of pan-European electricity transmission network
High-voltage transmission lines throughout most of Europe have been mostly 
built for the needs of each country and not in response to market incentives 
(potential transmission fees collectable), in order to make it possible to transmit 
electricity throughout Europe from regions of potential surplus to regions of 
potential deﬁcit. In fact, in many countries, there is signiﬁcant opposition to 
the construction of transmission lines, which would mostly serve for transit 
purposes (even if such a service were fairly ﬁnancially compensated and proﬁt-
able for the transit country). For environmental reasons and because of political 
opposition, it is impossible to build any transmission lines exceeding the cur-
rent 400 kV standard. Hence, larger amounts of electricity can only be moved 
by doubling the lines, increasing the number of strands carried (and the height 
of pylons), and increasing the diameter of the strands (hence also their weight). 
There are serious limits to transmission capacity increases if we rely only on 
these options. 
Ironically, the only region of Europe where transmission is more eﬃcient 
and the transmission network has been laid out in preparation of a pan-Euro-
pean transmission network is Russia, Ukraine, and portions Poland, Hungary, 
Romania (transit only) and Bulgaria, which have segments of 750 kV lines, 
originally built in the communist era as a part of single common CMEA trans-
mission network and power supply system. What this means is that with rela-
tively modest additional investments in transmission, in the case of any power 
supply crisis or emergency, signiﬁcant portions of Central and Eastern Europe 
could be potentially aided by electricity supplies from Ukraine and ultimately 
Russia as well. Using their own transmission networks, these countries can, in 
turn, also oﬀer potential help to countries farther west or south such as Ger-
many, Austria, and ultimately Italy as well. Regrettably, the EU has yet to show 
any interest in taking advantage of this potential—one of the few areas where 
accession countries in co-operation with Ukraine and Russia could actually as-
sist the core EU region in case of an electricity supply crisis. 
4.5 Irrationality of design of transmission and distribution networks
To elaborate on the above point, it is suﬃcient to look at the map of European elec-
tricity transmission and distribution networks. They were designed for the needs of 
individual countries and as yet are showing little response to European economic 
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integration. The cases where one system/network actually supplies power in a 
diﬀerent country are incredibly rare and of minor importance. This will have to 
gradually change—both in order to cut costs and improve the security of electric-
ity supply. Over time, borders should become irrelevant and electricity should 
be transmitted and distributed in a fashion which minimizes transmission and 
distribution losses and improves the security of supply whenever possible.
4.6 Protectionism given priority over security of power supply
The main agenda of major power generators in Europe are both to maximize proﬁts 
and protect asset values (which is much more problematic)—particularly in the 
case of generators with signiﬁcant holdings of marginal/high-cost generation as-
sets, which are vulnerable to competition from cheap electricity. Those generators, 
which are particularly vulnerable to competition from cheaper imported electricity, 
have strong incentives either to use their own power or business and political clout 
to delay the construction of transmission lines which would potentially increase 
electricity supplies from other lower-cost generators or, at least, to try to inﬂuence 
the process with the same aim. Additional cross-border interconnectors and new 
transmission lines bring unwelcome competition, reduce electricity prices (unde-
sirable from their viewpoint), and improve the security of supply (desirable, but 
not enough to compensate for the potential loss from more supply competition). 
The latest trick employed by the vulnerable generators is to increase reliance on 
expensive and unreliable windpower (under the cloak of doing something that is 
environmentally friendly) and then increase their demand for standby transmission 
capacity at cross-border points because of increased risk of unpredictable ﬂuctua-
tions in local production and the need to oﬀset it by increased electricity imports. 
This works wonderfully to eﬀectively reduce the cross-border transmission capacity 
normally used for imports of baseload electricity; it reduces eﬀective electricity sup-
plies in the home market, stiﬂes competition, and drives up electricity prices, but 
preserves asset values and protects proﬁtability of these generators. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
These are not meant to be exhaustive or all-encompassing, as the scope of this 
paper and the absence of a larger team of energy experts contributing to it do not 
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permit it to go into as much depth as the topic would probably warrant. Here are 
some of the author’s thoughts on policy implications:
5.1 For Europe at large
The main point we would like to make is that much greater energy co-operation 
and integration should take place within the EU, particularly now with the addi-
tion of eight accession countries from Central/Eastern Europe. It is worth noting 
that throughout the core EU region and in Brussels, these countries are generally 
considered an additional burden on the core EU region in the sense that they 
will consume more resources allocated through Brussels than they will contribute 
to it. This is a correct view on the whole, but ironically, in the energy sector, the 
core EU region stands to gain more from pan-European energy co-operation 
and integration than do the accession countries. This is a simple reﬂection of 
geography and the location of the energy sources supplying Europe. With the 
exception of Norwegian and British oil and gas from the North Sea and relatively 
limited indigenous energy production (Dutch gas; German, Polish, and Czech 
coal; Romanian oil) or primary electricity (hydro or nuclear), most of the energy 
consumed in Europe is imported from the East (Russia), the Southeast (middle 
East, Australia), and, to a lesser degree, the South (North Africa, Central Africa, 
and South Africa). And, with the exception of Norwegian gas (in the case of the 
Czech Republic and Poland), accession countries do not get any of their energy 
supplies through the core EU region plus Norway. 
On the other hand, the core EU region receives all of its natural gas supplies 
from Russia through EU accession countries (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Po-
land and through Balkan countries in the case of Greece) and Ukraine. Before 
their delivery in Western Europe, Russian crude oil and reﬁned oil products ﬂow 
through pipelines, oil terminals, and reﬁneries in the Baltic Republics, Belarus 
and Ukraine (outside of EU), Poland (supplies for the former East Germany), 
and Slovakia (a portion of supplies for Austria). In the case of electricity, sig-
niﬁcant ﬂows go from the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria to the 
markets in Germany, Austria, Greece, and indirectly also to Italy. In the future, 
once Ukraine and Russia are synchronously connected to the UCTE transmis-
sion network (probably sometimes around 2010-12), the ﬂow of electricity from 
the East to the West is likely to become much more dramatic, and this region 
could play an even a greater role than that played by France—currently the largest 
net exporter of electricity in Europe by a wide margin.
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We see the entire enlarged EU region as being, so to speak, “in the same boat”—
highly dependent on imported energy, vulnerable to high energy prices (due to 
a combination of relatively slow increase in supplies and sustained rapidly rising 
demand in China and the rest of Asia), and vulnerable to potential supply dis-
ruptions due to a combination of the slow pace of the development of alterna-
tive energy transport routes and networks and due to the dramatically increased 
likelihood of terrorist attacks aimed at temporarily crippling critical transport 
routes/networks and at inﬂicting the maximum economic damage on a given 
country or a group of countries targeted by the terrorists for political reasons. 
Among the policy recommendations to counter these likely developments, we 
would list in particular: 
I  energy consumption in general: while Europe in general is already far more 
conscientious than the US in terms of energy conservation (facing high 
gasoline prices, the Europeans drive smaller and more economical cars, 
rely more on public transportation, live in smaller and better insulated 
houses and generally work in more energy eﬃcient buildings), there are 
areas of signiﬁcant potential energy consumption improvement in Europe 
through:
(a) massive switch from truck transport back to rail transport using the 
piggybacking technology widely in use in the US (but that will require 
the uniﬁcation of individual national rail networks and the creation of 
a pan-European rail freight network system)
(b) improved highway networks and a system of circular by-passes of ma-
jor municipal areas (the energy eﬃciency of automobiles sharply drops, 
and emissions soar with chronic congestion and stop-and-go traﬃc) 
II  electricity transmission: while Europe has a highly competitive oil mar-
ket with very similar reﬁned product prices throughout Europe and a 
relatively competitive gas market, where price diﬀerentials are largely ex-
plainable by additional transport cost or price-discriminating behavior of 
the price-setting semi-monopolies (Russia’s Gazprom), the electricity sec-
tor is highly fragmented, characterized by major transport barriers, and, 
hence, is the least competitive of the three; since we can never equalize 
fuel costs throughout Europe, the only way toward a single European 
electricity market, toward persistent pressure for absolute electricity price 
equalization, and toward general enhancement of safety and reliability of 
European electricity supplies is through massive additional investment in 
the high-voltage (400 kV) transmission system, with particular focus on 
cross-border transmission links and an aim to:
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(a) increase the security of power supply in relatively isolated countries 
with diﬃcult geography (e.g. Croatia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)
(b) enhance the circularity of the national power supply systems and re-
duce the likelihood of a power supply failure by external loops when-
ever practical (e.g., through undersea cable links such as that between 
Southern Italy and Greece and potentially between Central Italy and 
Croatia)
(c) improve the security of the power supply in countries vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks 
(d) take full advantage of excess power supplies and generation capacities 
(as well as the relatively high standard of reliability and ample trans-
mission capacity) available in some new EU members countries, nota-
bly the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia
(e) connect Ukraine and Russia to the UCTE transmission network in a 
synchronous fashion (so that electricity can ﬂow to EU countries with-
out having to go through relatively expensive HVDC back-to-back 
station interfaces) at the earliest possible time and thus enhance EU 
energy supply co-operation with these two countries in a signiﬁcant 
way and secure potential additional electricity supplies to the EU re-
gion at a time of potential crisis (this added potential baseload electric-
ity ﬂow could also be used to stimulate electricity supply competition 
and put some limits on expected major electricity price increases facing 
EU consumers during the next 6-8 years)
III electricity generation: plenty of problems exists in this sector, which need 
to be corrected in the longer run, including:
(a) lack/slow progress in creating a single electricity market to make it pos-
sible to generate electricity at widely diﬀerent costs throughout Europe 
(which immediately implies waste in the absence of major transmis-
sion cost barriers)
(b) plant location is not rational in relation to the pan-European market
(c) some countries are embarking on a risky policy of excessive reliance 
on renewables (particularly in the case of relatively unreliable wind-
power), with unrealistic cost calculations and deliberate understate-
ments of the indirect costs of such strategies (including the back-up 
generation capacity cost, environmental cost, and potential export of 
domestic generation problems to neighboring countries, etc.)
(d) some generators deliberately aim at or engage in curtailing cross-border 
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electricity exchanges by a variety of means (such as by demanding certi-
ﬁcations that imported power is produced in a “clean” fashion), solely in 
an eﬀort to protect values of their marginal (i.e., high-cost) generation 
assets
(e) Europe lacks a clear common position on nuclear power, leading to 
strange inconsistencies (such as when the brand new and relatively safe 
Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic gets incredible 
scrutiny, while some rather aged and truly accident-prone German 
nuclear power plants conveniently fall under the radar screen of the 
critics, or when some Austrians usurp the right to dictate what genera-
tion technology and mix neighboring countries should use, without 
being willing to compensate the neighbors in any way for the added 
cost of electricity generation, etc.)
IV natural gas transport and storage: this sector in general is in relatively good 
shape, but the persistent high price of natural gas (due to its linkage to fuel 
oil prices) puts some limits on its utility as a fuel in electricity generation 
and potentially (in a liqueﬁed form) as a substitute for gasoline and diesel 
fuel; in order to make natural gas more competitive, European countries 
should strive to increase the number of alternative suppliers and hence gas-
on-gas price competition, including: 
(a) additional gas supplies from Russia secured through gas savings in do-
mestic Russian use (due to more realistic pricing of gas to Russian 
consumers and the curtailment of the huge waste of gas by the Russian 
electricity sector, which currently burns massive amounts of it ineﬃ-
ciently under boilers) 
(b) gas from Turkmenistan and Central Asia via a new pipeline through 
Turkey and the Balkan region
(c) a pipeline from the Middle East (potentially from Qatar) through Tur-
key (this one coming further down the road)
(d) additional undersea pipelines from Libya and Algeria to Italy and 
Spain
(e) new LNG projects (in Northern Russia, the Middle East, Africa, etc.)
V  oil transport: oil pipelines are, in general, a more economical and ecologi-
cally sounder mode of transportation of crude oil (and reﬁned oil products) 
than sea or rail transport, and the following steps should be taken:
(a) the existing Russian/Ukrainian oil pipeline network into Europe 
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(mainly Druzhba) should be utilized to its maximum potential to ex-
port Russian crude oil to European markets and be connected to reﬁn-
eries in Western Europe whenever possible (aside from Leuna, connec-
tion to the Swechat, and potentially also Ingolstadt, reﬁneries is only 
the beginning)
(b) Europe should take a greater role in helping to bring Russian and Cas-
pian oil to European markets through new pipelines going through the 
Ukraine (Odessa-Brody), Romania, and/or Bulgaria, which will either 
boost the capacity for crude oil delivery to ﬁnal European reﬁnery des-
tinations or at least help to avoid the Bosporus oil transport bottleneck 
 
5.2 For the Czech Republic and Slovakia
The Czech Republic and Slovakia are not major energy producers—neither 
country produces crude oil or natural gas in amounts worth mentioning, the 
Czechs mine a good deal of soft coal (some of which is eﬀectively transported in 
a transformed form as electricity), and both countries have sizeable generation of 
nuclear power. The Czech Republic is the second largest net exporter of electric-
ity in Europe after France, but, in absolute terms, the 15 TWh or so exported 
annually on net basis does not make that much of a diﬀerence in the framework 
of the entire European electricity market. Slovakia is at least temporarily also a 
net exporter of electricity, but to a much smaller degree (under 5 TWh annually 
on net basis).
Nevertheless, the two countries play a major role in European natural gas 
supplies and security by being key transit countries for key natural gas ﬂows. The 
bulk of Russian natural gas exports currently goes through Slovakia, with the 
notable exception of the ﬂows through the new pipeline crossing Poland. The 
Czech Republic serves as a transit route for roughly one half of the Russian gas 
going through Slovakia and destined for markets west of the Czech Republic; the 
other half of gas transiting Slovakia is destined for markets south and southwest 
of Slovakia/Czech Republic. 
Oil pipelines going through the two countries currently serve exclusively local 
markets, but a change can be expected in the not too distant future. By the end 
of 2005, the Slovak oil pipeline company, Transpetrol, (with Russian Yukos as a 
strategic investor) will start delivering crude oil from the Druzhba pipeline to the 
OMV reﬁnery at Swechat (initially at a pace of around 2 mmt annually, but ulti-
mately at as much as 5 mmt annually). The logical step for the Czech government, 
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which owns 100% of the Czech oil pipeline company MERO, would be to follow 
the Slovak example and explore the potential of reversing the IKL pipeline from 
Kralupy to Ingolstadt in Bavaria and use the unutilized excess transport capacity 
of the Druzhba oil pipeline (well in excess of 5 mmt annually) to transport addi-
tional Russian, or even Caspian, crude oil to the German market. Both countries 
have already concluded that the planned reversal of the Adria pipeline (another 
former alternative to get crude oil from the Mediterranean to Hungary, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic) to become a pipeline for exports of Russian crude oil 
will have no impact on oil supply security, as it has not been used at all for well 
over a decade. With the likelihood that the planned Odessa-Brody pipeline in 
Ukraine, which connects with the southern branch of Druzhba pipeline, will 
make it possible for the Visegrad countries to gain access to supplies of Caspian 
oil in the not too distant future, the strategic value of the IKL pipeline as an oil 
supply route alternative for the Czech Republic will further decline.
In the case of electric power, the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be ex-
pected to play a growing role in the pan-European electricity market. The Czech 
Republic is likely to remain a longer-term structural net electricity exporter 
(as would Slovakia if the two remaining blocs at the Mochovce nuclear power 
plant are completed). The two countries have a unique geographic position 
in Europe, similar to that of Austria and Switzerland, and a highly developed 
electricity transmission network including cross-border transmission capacities 
(compared to, say, Poland). Aside from exporting their own electricity, the two 
countries can also play a role as potential transit routes for electricity from Po-
land (and ultimately even Scandinavia) and Ukraine/Russia. Given that virtu-
ally all countries south of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are power deﬁcient 
or generate electricity at relatively high cost (given the absence of an indigenous 
fuel base), these are attractive markets characterized by high prices relative to 
most of Europe.
Among energy policy recommendations for the two countries, we would list 
the following:
I  electricity transmission: in order to enhance its role as an important region 
for electricity supplies to the south and west in general as well a source 
of signiﬁcant generation reserve for the rest of EU in the event of a sup-
ply disruption/crisis, both national transmission system operators (CEPS 
and SEPS) should further develop cross-border transmission capacities and 
connections with 400 kV transmission networks of neighboring countries, 
notably: 
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(a) between Slovakia and Hungary (where demand for capacity already 
exceeds supply by a wide margin)
(b) between Slovakia and Austria (a project blocked by the anti-nuclear 
lobby in Austria, but strongly supported by the EU as part of the pan-
European electricity transmission grid integration)
(c) between the Czech Republic and Austria (at the end of this decade, 
the transmission situation between Austria and Italy will dramatically 
improve, but the Czechs will not be able to take full advantage of the 
potential of supplying electricity to Italy without connecting either 
Southern or Western Bohemia with the Austrian high voltage grid)
(d) between the Czech Republic and Poland (by connecting the huge 
Turow power plant on the Polish-Czech border to the Czech grid) 
II  electricity generation: nothing particularly dramatic needs to be done in 
this area:
(e) ČEZ and SE companies made sensible long-term decisions to com-
plete the Temelin nuclear power plant (in the Czech Republic) and 
build the Mochovce plant (in Slovakia), and it would make sense to 
complete the two remaining blocs at Mochovce, given the prospect of 
a signiﬁcant increase in European electricity prices during the remain-
der of this decade
(f ) the Czechs should not fall for the windpower generation alternative 
(currently in vogue in Germany and Austria), given its lack of reliabil-
ity, adverse environmental and visual impact, and dubious economics, 
and the Czechs should fulﬁll their commitment to renewables mostly 
by focusing on the use of biomass (wood, suitable agricultural crops, 
agricultural waste, etc.)
(g)  the Czechs should also proceed cautiously with the construction of the 
next generation of coal-ﬁred plants, utilize the existing resources more 
eﬃciently (including huge amounts of hard coal processing sludge 
available in the Ostrava-Karvina region), and build new plants dimen-
sioned for the European and not just the local market (based on blocs 
of at least 350 MW each to achieve maximum operating eﬃciency)
III natural gas transport and storage: SPP and Transgas (E.ON/Ruhrgas   
and RWE) should: 
(h) actively support the long-term development of the gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan through Turkey to the Balkan region and its connection 
to the existing Slovak and Czech gas pipeline network, in the interest 
of greater gas supply competition and diversiﬁcation
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(i) further develop economically viable gas storage capacities on the ter-
ritories of the two countries in order to increase security of gas (and in-
directly also electricity) supplies both within the region and for neigh-
boring countries
(j) oil transport: the Czech government should negotiate with the gov-
ernment of Bavaria to reverse the IKL pipeline and permit its use for 
export of Russian/Caspian crude oil to the Ingolstadt reﬁnery (the 
Czechs sunk a great deal of money into this project and they are get-
ting minimal return on it; the pipeline is rapidly deteriorating as it is 
sitting full of stagnant crude oil with a fairly high content of corrosive 
saline water, and its strategic value will be impaired signiﬁcantly fur-
ther if the Odessa-Brody pipeline is built and the Caspian crude oil 
starts ﬂowing through the Druzhba pipeline).
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Prague, October 21, 2004
Prague Principles 
for Energy Security
 World energy demand is growing at a rapid rate, and international coopera-
tion to ﬁnd economic, secure and sustainable energy sources is of vital impor-
tance for both industrial and developing nations. Energy demand will likely 
double within the next twenty years. All energy resources are important. Oil, 
coal, natural gas, nuclear power and renewable resources are required; but each 
poses a diﬀerent set of challenges. 
  The Czech Republic, EU, Japan, the United States and other nations can best 
achieve energy and security objectives through diversiﬁcation of energy fuels 
and the sources of those fuels. Particular attention should be given to the rising 
dependency of EU countries on imports. 
  Oil demand is rising rapidly, especially in China and other industrializing 
countries. Current challenges confronting the oil market are manageable, but 
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concerted eﬀorts are required to expand world oil production and protect 
against the growing threat of terrorism. The importance of political and eco-
nomic stability in key producer countries is noted and encouraged. 
  Nuclear power is an important source of energy and could contribute further 
to alleviating energy security and environmental problems. New technology, 
especially recycling nuclear fuels, can help extend uranium reserves and pro-
vide solutions to long-term storage. Nuclear energy can only be successful 
within a framework of robust controls to enhance non-proliferation objec-
tives. Concern is expressed over the nuclear weapons potential of North Korea 
and Iran. In this regard, the growing importance of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency is noted. 
  Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, has abundant coal resources. 
Development of new technologies to burn coal more cleanly and to sequester 
CO2 is essential to expand coal use which can be an indigenous resource of 
vital importance to diversiﬁcation of the world’s energy base. 
  Natural gas is a clean fuel and is gaining increasing prominence, especially in Eu-
rope. Care must be given, however, not to become overly dependent on any one 
source of supply. Concern was especially expressed over growing reliance of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe on gas supplies from Russia. Diversiﬁcation of sources is 
required to eliminate the possibility of undue political leverage being exercised. 
 An unprecedented eﬀort is required to ensure adequate transparency of invest-
ment in producer countries and the protection of infrastructure and trans-
portation corridors. A key challenge is the need for energy capital acquisition, 
which requires long-term energy markets and deregulation of the markets. 
  Leadership at the highest level of government is required to ensure that energy 
security is achieved at reasonable economic cost. A high priority is that emerg-
ing energy strategies be sustainable and compatible with environmental and 
global security objectives. Energy conservation and eﬃciency shall be an inte-
gral component of these strategies. International cooperation on this matter is 
of highest importance.
Alexandr Vondra, Conference Chairman and PASS Coordinator
William Martin, Fmr. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy
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Executive Summary
The Conference was commenced by Pavel Bém. Following the introductory re-
marks of Oldřich Černý, Martin Jahn greeted Conference participants by provid-
ing a vivid account of geopolitical and energy security concerns of the Czech 
Republic.
 
Opening Remarks    Alexandr Vondra
In his opening remarks, Alexandr Vondra highlighted three issues the Confer-
ence might focus on in its deliberations. He ﬁrst underscored the question of af-
fordability of energy from political, economic and environmental points of view: 
taking into account instability in some energy exporting states, the eﬀect of high 
energy prices on economic growth, and the increasing environmental pollution 
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due to rising energy demand; all of which has placed us in a dilemma of choos-
ing between boosting supply or controlling demand to meet our ever increasing 
energy needs. As a second theme, he listed the integration and consolidation of 
the EU’s energy market and the challenge this process poses to national energy 
producers and suppliers in Central and Eastern Europe, many of which have 
ambitions to become regional players in the market, including ČEZ-the domi-
nant Czech electricity company. Finally, he emphasized the question of security 
of energy supply, especially in the context of the possible political and economic 
leverages key energy suppliers like Russia and some Middle East countries might 
have over their customers, identifying diversiﬁcation of energy supply and trans-
parency in oil revenues as the main issues in this regard. 
Panel A 
Producers’ Perspectives
Chair    Heinz Rothermund 
Heinz Rothermund opened the Panel’s discussions with a series of fundamental 
questions. Referring to the example of South Korea, which in 30 years increased 
its oil consumption from two barrels per year per person to 17, he expressed con-
cern about China following the same pattern of consumption in the future. He 
stressed that China had already doubled its oil consumption in ten years and has 
become the second largest consumer of oil following the United States - totaling 
nine percent of the world oil demand. With this as a backdrop, he raised two 
questions of whether the world would be able to achieve a soft landing in such 
circumstances, and whether energy market liberalization would create investment 
incentives for the long-term energy projects that are required to meet the chal-
lenges of ever increasing energy demands. 
In addressing some of these challenges, Hisham Khatib underscored that fos-
sil fuels-oil, natural gas and coal-were the only source of energy which were suf-
ﬁciently abundant to sustain the world economy growth for decades to come, 
adding that renewables had an uncertain future since there were disbursed, inter-
mittent, ineﬃcient, and not tradable. In this regard, he suggested nuclear power 
as an alternative to fossil fuels. He further pointed out that the 37 percent share of 
oil in total world energy consumption would remain the same in the year 2030, 
and that OPEC would supply more that half of the world’s oil production at that 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
124 ENERGY & SECURITY
time. Regarding the question of the environmental sustainability of energy use, 
he emphasized that there would be no substantial improvement in the foresee-
able future because of the inertia in the energy sectors of most developing coun-
tries not party to the Kyoto Protocol, which produce the bulk of greenhouse 
gases emissions. 
William Martin expressed optimism about meeting many energy challenges, 
providing four speciﬁc examples. He ﬁrst referred to the United States, which 
would seek to expand development of their oil and natural gas resources; increa-
sing the use of nuclear power; advancing new technologies, including hydrogen; 
and defending its energy interests by all means, including military ones, in what 
he deﬁned as the core of the US energy policy: ‘import and defend’. Regarding 
the second example – Europe, he underscored the need for diversiﬁcation of na-
tural gas supplies, saying that the 50 percent dependency on Russia for natural gas 
supplies should be reduced by providing more opportunities for other natural gas 
producing counties like Norway. Listing the Atoms for Peace concept as the third 
example, he pointed out that meeting the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol was 
hardly possible without nuclear power, noting that the reprocessing of nuclear 
waste might provide a solution for the long-term use of nuclear energy. For part 
of the fourth example, he refereed to North Korea, underscoring that if energy 
was really the issue at stake for continuing its nuclear program, then the country’s 
waste coal resources and abundant natural gas reserves in Sakhalin Island could 
be exploited and piped through the Korean Peninsula and well beyond. He states 
that such a solution could provide for political stability of the entire Peninsula 
and encourage regional economic integration through energy systems as well as 
securing an important regional energy source for Asia, especially China. 
Examining underlining reasons for the current high prices of oil, Robert 
Skinner noted that the world demand for oil would increase by about 2.7 mil-
lion b/d this year according to the IEA latest estimate, an increment not seen for 
nearly three decades. He pointed out that the increase in oil demand reﬂected 
the ﬁve percent jump in the world’s GDP, the greatest growth for the last 20 
years, pulled especially by China and the United States. With oil demand rising, 
the world encountered problems with supply caused by a number of factors, he 
provided: the continued disappointment with Iraq’s oil exports, unrest in Ven-
ezuela, and Nigeria’s reducing their oil outputs, declines in the oil production 
in the North Sea, the United States, Oman, and Indonesia; all of which resulted 
in a rapid and serious erosion of spare capacity and market’s perception of what 
capacity remained, pushing oil prices up. Against this background, he rejected 
claims that ‘OPEC sets the price’, that ‘it’s the entire fault of the speculators’, 
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and that ‘the oil price does not reﬂect the fundamentals’, as complete nonsense. 
Regarding the issue of Europe’s dependency on Russia for natural gas imports, 
he said that it was in mutual interest to keep natural gas ﬂowing, encouraging 
Europeans to continue importing natural gas from Russia. In this context, he 
rejected \ arguments that there was something like an ‘oil weapon’, that ‘energy 
independence is the key to energy security’, and that ‘government intervention 
can assure security of supply’, pointing out that our preoccupation with energy 
supply was misplaced and too focused on the political rather than the real tech-




Responding to a question from the audience of whether the United States had a 
global energy policy, as their energy behavior might aﬀect the rest of the world, 
William Martin said that the US energy policy was domestically oriented, but 
included many international elements such as a project on clean coal technology. 
He then considered the issue of high energy consumption in the United States, 
underscoring the importance of having such a pricing system that would account 
for all externalities of energy use, whether they would be environmental damage 
or the military costs of protecting the Middle East, to be truly reﬂective in the 
price of oil or natural gas. In this regard, Robert Skinner suggested imposing an 
environmental tax on gasoline as a solution, but William Martin opposed that 
as not politically feasible. One participant raised a question about the prospect 
of energy consumption in 2030, noting the unevenness of energy consumption 
when 30 percent of the world’s population, predominantly from developed coun-
tries, consumed 90 percent of world energy. In addressing that question, Hisham 
Khatib stated that there was a rapid growth of energy consumption in the devel-
oping countries amounting to almost a ﬁve percent increase every year, while the 
energy consumption in the developed world rose only about one percent a year. 
As a result, the share of energy consumption would be almost equal at that time, 
he said. Robert Skinner, addressing a question of whether it was time to follow 
the US policy of building strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) and to use them 
during a temporary shortage of petrol to stabilize the market, said that it would 
be very dangerous to allow politicians to ﬁddle with the market on the price side 
using SPRs, as the value of SPRs would certainly decrease. In his opinion, SPRs 
should be left for a strategic disruption of gasoline supply and not as an instru-
ment of stabilizing the market in a temporary gasoline shortage. 
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Panel B
Consumers’ Perspectives
Chair    Magdaléna Vášáryová
 
Going back to the question of high oil prices, Giulia Bisconti underscored that 
the period of relatively high prices would continue for the next year. Given 
the rapid global economic growth, with spare capacity near the lowest point 
in the last 30 years and historically low inventories of both crude oil and oil 
products, she underscored that any supply disruption could push prices even 
higher. She went on to describe key elements of the US energy action plan for 
the next two decades, providing for the short term strategy with the objective to 
maximize US strategic reserves up to 700 million barrels; the midterm strategy 
determined by improving energy eﬃciency of power production and transporta-
tion infrastructure, diversifying energy sources and supply by expanding nuclear 
power, developing more domestic resources, using renewables, and integrating 
the North American supply system with Canada and Mexico; and the medium/
long term strategy based on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through 
technological solutions, encompassing the employment of carbon sequestration, 
nuclear fusion, hydrogen as an energy carrier, and renewables. Describing also 
the US international energy strategy, she emphasized the need for cooperation 
with other countries facing similar energy challenges on large-scale projects such 
as carbon sequestration or the hydrogen economy, and the necessity of prevent-
ing supply disruption by integrating and improving the connectivity of regional 
energy systems. 
Against the background of growing global energy demand and rising oil 
prices, Hiroshi Morimoto described the evolution of Japanese energy policy after 
the oil shocks in the 1970s. He provided for two major strategies pursued by the 
Japanese Government for the last 30 years: employing energy-saving technolo-
gies to improve energy eﬃciency and introducing alternative sources of energy to 
reduce dependency on oil. As a result of vigorous promotion of those goals, Japan 
became one of the world’s most energy-eﬃcient countries and their dependency 
on oil has decreased about 27 percent. Considering the need for reducing Japan’s 
dependency on oil even further while also mitigating global warming, he pledged 
for the continuing expansion of nuclear power and renewables, especially solar 
and wind power. As an additional countermeasure against global warning, he 
emphasized the importance of developing clean coal technology. 
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Patrick Hardouin, speaking about NATO’s role in energy and security, said that 
energy security posed a serious challenge for NATO and its members, especially 
with regard to stability of energy supply and protection of energy related infra-
structure against terrorist attacks. He emphasized, however, that NATO, as col-
lective defense organization, had no institutionalized energy security policy per 
se, except for the framework of economic cooperation, within which collabora-
tion could take place in the form of information sharing, expression of concerns, 
and discussion on energy security relevant matters. 
Adopting a consumers’ perspective on energy security, John Mitchell suggested 
that consumers were looking for very diﬃcult objectives to coincide: they wanted 
reliable supplies at reasonable prices, which would not threaten the political inde-
pendence of their countries, and they wanted to know that the supply of energy 
was acceptable from environmental, social, and ethical points of view. However, 
this could be sometimes contradictory, he said. There was always a trade-oﬀ, he 
emphasized, as someone had to trade oﬀ reliability against price, for instance. 
Describing the geography of energy resources and energy demand, he underscored 
that trade was inevitable and that the notion of energy dependence meaning import 
dependence was wrong. Trade was beneﬁcial, and when consumers wanted reliable 
and cheap supplies, then trade delivered lowest cost solutions to the world’s energy 
problems, he said, adding that import dependency was just part of life. Looking 
ahead at the expansion of energy supply, he pointed out that huge investments 
would be required in developing countries to provide for energy exports, but that 
there were only a few large private companies, mostly from Europe and North 
America, which could actually make such an investment. He noted that these 
companies were, however, under growing political, national, social, and ethical 
pressures by the OECD, the World Bank, human rights groups, and others, who 
either formed regulations about how foreign investments should be treated, or 
appealed to the consciousness of the consumers by stressing human rights and the 
social impact that energy investments projects bore on exports. Given the energy 
trends, he encouraged review of the acceptability from the ethical and social points 
of view of these missionary attempts to change the rest of the world. 
Discussion
 
During the subsequent discussion one participant raised the question of wheth-
er the protection of key energy infrastructure could become a new NATO agen-
da. Patrick Hardouin pointed out that there was a need for protecting speciﬁc 
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energy installations, but it was the primarily responsibility of governments to 
provide such protection rather than that of a collective defense organization 
like NATO. Responding to another question concerning possible mechanisms 
the US Department of Energy (DOE) might have developed to prevent energy 
supply disruption brought about by a terrorist attack, Giulia Bisconti said 
that the DOE collaborated very closely with all sectors of the US industry, 
especially in the area of intelligence sharing between the DOE and concerned 
companies. 
Welcoming Remarks    Václav Havel
 
In his welcoming remarks, Václav Havel warned of the dictatorship of energy, 
a situation under which now ever centralizing energy corporations would fall 
altogether in the hands of one person, who could then eﬃciently manipulate 
everything behind the scene. He proposed the mobilization of human energy and 
responsibility as a solution thereof. 
Keynote Speech: 
The World Energy Outlook and Challenges of Europe    Fatih Birol 
Fatih Birol presented the IEA world energy outlook for the year 2030, project-
ing the expansion of world energy demand about 60 percent in 25 years with 
1.6 billion people still without access to electricity. He argued that oil would 
remain the single most important energy source in the world energy mix of the 
year 2030, natural gas the second, and coal the third, leaving behind renewables, 
nuclear, and hydro power. In this respect, he noted that 99 percent of coun-
tries in the world would be dependent on a small number of states for oil and 
natural gas supplies, namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, and Russia; 
referring to security of energy supply as a major challenge in the years to come. 
Regarding the projected increase of the world energy demand, he underscored 
the need for securing supply routes, and the necessity for investment in energy 
supply infrastructure, claiming that the global energy system would require in-
vestments worth $16 trillion worldwide. He further underscored that about 85 
percent of energy production would come from non-OECD countries, and that 
CO2 emissions would increase about 60 percent due to the declining share of 
nuclear power in the world energy mix. Given the projected trends, he called 
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for increasing the eﬃciency of energy use in both OECD and in developing 
countries and pledged for the employment of advanced nuclear and coal seques-
tration technologies. 
Panel C
Energy Security: Assessment of Threats
Chair    Kevin Rosner 
Providing for the threat assessment of key energy installations, Robert Eagan talked 
about risks associated with operating a nuclear reactor and electrical distribution 
network in terms of risk equation, which he deﬁned as a consequence of failure in 
terms of threat and vulnerability of the system. Applying risk assessment method-
ology (RAM) on nuclear installations for the case of a terrorist attack resulting in 
deaths of people around the reactor, he said that nuclear reactors were very safe and 
the risk number was very low, indeed. However, he indicated that in the case of an 
electrical distribution network which was well spread out and where the safeguards 
were relatively modest in comparison to nuclear reactors, there was much higher 
risk of disruption and much higher risk of causing grave economic damage,. From 
an economic point of view, he pointed out that the electrical distribution network 
was remarkably vulnerable against a terrorist attack; as such an attack could ef-
fectively disable the electrical power grid for a long period of time with serious 
consequences on the population’s well-being. 
David Waller then presented a vivid description of the IAEA work related to 
the security of nuclear material, including the question of safeguards and measures 
against nuclear terrorism. Referring to the unprecedented pressure under which the 
non-proliferation regime was placed by the revelation of secret nuclear programs in 
Iraq, Libya, and North Korea; he said that the major challenge the IAEA was facing 
was to ﬁnd combinations of necessary political and economic incentives to promise 
real non-proliferation beneﬁts that facilitate the spread of nuclear power to those 
who wanted it. He stressed that nuclear power was essential for energy security and 
that it was the primary objective of the IAEA to keep the nuclear power option open 
and to assure its availability for countries that might wish to take advantage of it. He 
also underlined the contribution of nuclear power to environmental protection in 
avoiding greenhouse gas emissions, which are roughly equivalent to those produced 
by wind and solar power and well bellow the level produced by the fossil fuels. 
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Addressing the protection of key energy infrastructure, Anne Korin warned about 
new generation of oil shocks brought about by attacks on oil infrastructure and 
means of transportation by non-state actors, especially terrorists from Al-Qaeda. 
Enumerating a number of past terrorist attacks on tankers in the Middle East and 
pipelines in Iraq, Russia, and Columbia, she warned about the spread of such 
attacks to Saudi Arabia, which would have severe consequences on the security 
of oil supply, as Saudi Arabia is essentially the only country with suﬃcient spare 
capacity. As a solution to cope with such a situation, she proposed to decrease 
swiftly our dependency on oil for transportation by using electricity, generated 
from sources other than oil to power vehicles and preferring ﬂexible fuel vehicles 
that could run on the combination of gasoline and alcohol fuel produced from 
coal and biomass. 
In considering the question of terrorism vis-à-vis the protection of key energy 
installations, Richard Perle said that we could not be successful in deterring the 
threat of a terrorist attack against energy infrastructure, as such a threat could not 
be properly identiﬁed, there was no territory to protect which could be threat-
ened by retaliation, and we could not discourage action by threatening death to 
people who desired to die as martyrs. Instead of protecting individual vulnerable 
installations, which was, in eﬀect, an impossible task, he suggested that we should 
rather concentrate our eﬀorts on defeating terrorism as a movement, especially 
by ﬁghting against governments supporting terrorism to deprive terrorists of the 
sanctuary they need to operate. Addressing also the issue of the US contribution 
to energy and security, he emphasized that the role the United States played in 
carrying the burden of backing any international regime by providing the bulk of 
force and energy was absolutely essential and should not be diminished. In this 
regard, he considered scandalous that the United States alone maintained half 
of the world’s petroleum reserves and all sea lines of communication, calling for 
sharing the burden the United States bore more evenly. 
Discussion
 
Responding to a question about how to strengthen the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Israel, not party to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), David Waller 
proposed two possible ways: one through the creation of a nuclear free zone in 
the Middle East, another through the realignment whereby Israel, India and Pak-
istan (also not parties to the NPT) would declare themselves as nuclear weapon 
states and accede to the NPT. With regard to the creation of the nuclear free 
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Middle East, Richard Perle said that it would be unrealistic to expect that Israel 
would give up its nuclear weapons, and that lending legitimacy to such a con-
cept would only become an excuse for Israel’s adversaries to justify their eﬀorts to 
acquire their nuclear weapons. In that sense, he insisted that it would make the 
situations worse rather than better, making clear that regarding nuclear weapons, 
it made an enormous diﬀerence who possessed them and why. Regarding the 
question of securing sea lines of communication, Anne Korin noted that the 
United States oﬀered to provide assistance in patrolling waters around the straits 
of Malacca to prevent piracy but the assistance was rejected as an infringement 
of sovereignty by Malaysia and Indonesia, for that the US presence would be the 
ﬂashpoint for terrorists there. She also pointed out that one of the implications 
of the growing dependency of China on the Middle East for oil imports could be 
the fostering of political, economic, and military ties between China and Middle 
East countries, adding that one day the United States and China might clash in 
the Middle East, competing over the same pool of resources. In this regard, one 
participant noted that China might also consider building a blue water navy to 
maintain sea lines of communication. Kevin Rosner then addressed the ques-
tion of the growing monopolization of Russian natural gas exports from Central 
Asia, explaining that Russia imported cheap natural gas from Turkmenistan and 
re-exported it with a 300 percent charge to Europe, saying that Russia was also 
buying upstream capacities along its borders from the Baltic States to Romania 
which had an eﬀect on downstream capacities and supply markets in terms of 
supply direction and price control. Referring then to the issue of protecting key 
energy installations after Anne Korin had stated that NATO had certainly a role 
to play in this regard; he raised the question about how to be more eﬃcient in 
preventing terrorist actions in general. Anne Korin said that it was crucial to 
deprive terrorists of the money they need to survive, and one way to do it would 
be to reduce our oil consumption, in order to decrease revenues some of the oil 
rich countries used to support them. One participant responded that money was 
not an issue, as terrorism was a cheap business, although he admitted that it was 
important to follow the money to reveal terrorist networks. Richard Perle noted 
that to get a handle on the money was important, as the governmental money 
had fuelled an extremist outlook in a number of places, including madrassas in 
Pakistan, underscoring that the level of support that came from some govern-
ments was unacceptable. He reiterated that we had to focus on governments 
that oﬀered sanctuary for terrorists. If governments could not prevent their ter-
ritories from being used by terrorists, we should cooperate with allies to replace 
those governments, he said. Another participant then emphasized that the war 
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on terrorism could not be won only by military means and that we had to try 
to win the hearts and souls of the people in the Islamic world and to distinguish 
between extremist and moderate Muslims. Richard Perle responded by under-
scoring that there was a lot we could do with open minds but very little with 
people with whom there could be no dialogue. He said that we had to encourage 
the battle within the Muslim world between the people who represented decent 
and humane values and the relatively small, but unfortunately inﬂuential, num-
ber of fanatics for whom the establishment of a diﬀerent kind of order was an 
imperative. He concluded by saying that the most troubling part of the terrorist 
threat allied with people not open to any dialogue. 
Panel D
Integration and Consolidation: Resources and Infrastructure
Chair    Judy Dempsey
 
In her opening remarks, Judy Dempsey referred to an increasing share of gas 
imports from Russia to the EU and claimed that the European Commission had 
done little to promote open energy markets and diversiﬁcation of energy supply, 
especially in Eastern Europe. She stressed that there was still no energy charter 
between the European Commission and Russian, a circumstance that had an 
adverse eﬀect on energy markets and investment conﬁdence in Russian. Under-
lining the fact that 30 percent of Gazprom’s natural gas production exported to 
Europe brought 70 percent of Gazprom’s revenues, she argued that the European 
Commission had failed to be consistent. 
Enumerating the unique features of electricity-instantaneousness, low elas-
ticity, and the need for balance between production and consumption, Nobuya 
Minami outlined the basic requirements for generation and transmission systems 
to secure reliability of energy supply. He said that electricity did not necessarily 
follow traditional market beliefs such as that higher prices in the spot market 
during a tight supply-demand situation would prompt necessary investments. 
Due to the speciﬁc characteristics of electricity, he argued, an imbalance between 
supply and demand could lead to extensive blackouts in a short period of time 
and, therefore well-balanced investments in generation and transmission facilities 
were required to secure reliability of electricity supply in the mid-term. Concern-
ing liberation of electricity markets, he claimed that the separation of generation 
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facilities and transmission networks prevented a stable electricity supply in both 
the short and long terms, underscoring the need for a system composed of re-
sponsible vertically-integrated utilities that were directly connected to consumers. 
In this regard, he noted the Japanese Government’s commitment to maintain the 
scheme of responsible suppliers in vertical integration beyond the liberalization of 
the Japanese energy market. Finally, he underlined the need for nuclear energy to 
ensure a stable electricity supply in an environmentally compatible manner and 
called for creating such a system that would encourage the expansion of nuclear 
energy in liberalized markets. 
Vladimír Schmalz then described the structure of ČEZ and portrayed ČEZ’s 
transformation vision, encompassing the integration of ČEZ’s distribution com-
panies and subsequent division of ČEZ into power generation and power dis-
tribution utilities. Beyond the consolidation, he said, ČEZ sought to play an 
important role in the both regional and European markets, referring to the recent 
acquisition of power distribution companies in Bulgaria and ČEZ’s participation 
in various power generation and distribution related tenders in Slovakia, Poland, 
and Romania. 
Referring to an estimate of the European Commission that EU dependence 
on external energy sources would increase to 70 percent in the year 2030, Ivan 
Pilip warned about the EU’s decreasing self-suﬃciency in energy supply. He 
stressed the importance of diversiﬁcation of energy supply within the EU to re-
duce overdependence on external energy sources. In doing so, he underscored the 
need for substantial investments in new supply routes. He noted that the Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB) was active both inside and outside the EU in the 
Balkans, the Mediterranean, Ukraine, Belarus; and ﬁnanced a number of energy 
infrastructure projects from 1993 to 2000, including the gas pipelines between 
Norway and the European Union, and Tunisia, Algeria, and Italy, providing for 
€2.5 billon to these and other related projects. 
Discussion
 
In the following discussion, one participant voiced concerns about Russia’s im-
posing limitations on foreign investment to its energy sector and Gazprom’s using 
the liberalization of the EU energy market as a vehicle to further increase its share 
in the market. Given the close relations of the EU with most Middle East coun-
tries, reference was also made to the possibility of decreasing the EU’s dependency 
on Russia for natural gas and oil imports by investing in the Middle East energy 
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sector, especially in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Ivan Pilip underscored that the 
EIB was involved in a number of energy related projects in the Mediterranean, 
especially in Algeria and Tunisia, referring to Libya as a possible partner in the 
future. 
Keynote Speech: 
Energy Security: Global Challenges - Regional Perspectives    Jerzy Buzek 
Jerzy Buzek outlined three pillars of the EU energy future all of which were aimed 
to reduce the EU dependency on imported sources of energy in an environmen-
tally sustainable way: ﬁrst, building strategic reserves of key energy sources; sec-
ondly, providing for environmental protection, in particular through the reduc-
tion of CO2 emissions by increasing eﬃciency of both energy production and 
consumption and encouraging new technologies, especially clean coal technol-
ogy; and ﬁnally, promoting research in renewables, nuclear energy, and in the 
reduction of CO2 emissions. Concerning the diversiﬁcation of energy sources, 
he pointed out that the EU should prefer coal to oil and natural gas and take 
advantage of waste coal resources in the new EU member countries, and, in do-
ing so, it should realize its tremendous research potential and develop a clean coal 
technology that would allow exploiting fully these resources. In this regard, he 
called on Central European countries, especially the Visegrad Group, to develop 
a common energy policy based on the promotion of coal as a fuel and research in 
clean coal technology. 
Panel E
Environment and Sustainable Development
Chair    Karel Schwarzenberg 
Addressing the question of environmental sustainability of the energy use, 
Jacques Bouchard stated that due to the population growth and increasing ener-
gy demand in developing countries the world energy consumption would dou-
ble in the next 50 years and greenhouse gas emissions would rise accordingly. He 
emphasized that the expansion of nuclear energy oﬀered a solution to produce 
more energy with zero CO2 emissions, while keeping energy production costs 
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at an acceptable level for consumers. Taking into account the increasing safety 
and steadily decreasing cost of nuclear energy production, he further said that 
nuclear power might be a promising energy source for the production of hydro-
gen as a main fuel for transport. With regard to current high costs of building 
nuclear power generating assets, he highlighted the importance of designing the 
next generation of nuclear power plants with lower construction and production 
costs that would become competitive in liberalized markets. Addressing envi-
ronmental and public concerns about nuclear waste, he also explained beneﬁts 
of spent fuel management, saying that the reprocessing of nuclear waste could 
eliminate proliferation risks and decrease uranium consumption as well as the 
quantity of the ﬁnal waste and its lifetime. In this regard, he underscored that 
the spent fuel management amounted only to less than six percent of the total 
electricity production costs. 
Subsequently, Kunihide Kobayashi provided background for the extensive 
use of nuclear energy in Japan, listing the scarcity of domestic energy resources, 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and the abundance of uranium, as the 
main reasons. In suggesting solutions to meet Japan’s increasing energy needs, he 
stressed the importance of the reprocessing of nuclear waste to enhance security 
of energy supply by re-using uranium and plutonium recovered from spent fuel, 
noting that the construction of a Japanese reprocessing plant and mixed-oxide 
(MOX) fuel fabrication plant was planned. In this context, he underscored the 
necessity to gain public support for further expansion of nuclear power, to de-
velop high-level human resources in the nuclear industry, to promote nuclear 
power in liberalized markets, and to improve nuclear power related information 
sharing world-wide. 
From an environmental perspective, Bedřich Moldan pointed out that three 
things have to be taken into account in sustainable energy policy: eﬃciency of 
energy use, renewable energy resources, and the appropriate timing of employ-
ing and using these resources. As a major problem in current energy policies, he 
identiﬁed the excessive use of fossil fuels producing greenhouse gas emissions. In 
this regard, he argued that solar power and hydrogen as an energy carrier were 
the most promising energy sources in the long run. He said that technology in 
general oﬀered a number of environmentally sustainable solutions, listing tech-
nological maturity, information sharing, and functional regulatory and econom-
ic frameworks as perquisites for their eﬀective use. He called for internationaliza-
tion of negative externalities of both energy production and consumption and 
stressed that tradable permits should be used as market based instruments. He 
also pledged for the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies. 
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Alvin Trivelpiece then called for a more eﬃcient use of energy by not support-
ing energy projects that do not adhere to the simple rule of making net energy 
inﬁnity. He underscored that before using any energy source, we should always 
count the amount of energy (KW/h of electricity) we produced with that source 
and weight it against the amount of energy (all joules of energy) that had been 
used to make this source a working reality and, in doing so, to ﬁnd out whether 
that source was economically justiﬁed. He also highlighted the role nuclear power 
could play in making hydrogen, fertilizers, or possibly water in a more eﬃcient 
way than producing them separately. 
Panel F
Producers, Consumers, Transit Countries and Geopolitics 
Chair    Michael Žantovský
 
Susan Eisenhower drew the participants’ attention to the importance of nuclear 
power for world’s economic well-being and security. She underscored that the 
world’s future energy demands could not be met without the use of nuclear 
power. She regretted that nuclear energy would lose its share in global energy 
mix in the years of come, despite enormous technological strides to improve 
that technology. In this regard, she called for institutional reform by continu-
ing work in banning ﬁssile material and securing nuclear materials related to 
nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants, long-term disposal of nuclear waste, 
international standards for power plants and cross-national licensing. She also 
stressed the need for international partnerships, especially in developing new 
technologies in areas such as proliferation resistance, the nuclear fuel cycle and 
waste management. Finally, she emphasized the necessity of political will and 
international leadership in securing continuous support for nuclear power, say-
ing that nuclear energy was an essential perquisite for security. She pointed out 
that nuclear power was critical for meeting our nuclear disarmament objectives, 
as without nuclear power neither could we recycle nuclear warhead material 
to nuclear fuel, nor could nuclear weapon scientists be converted to nuclear 
energy researchers. 
Given the rising demand for oil in China and India, Joseph Gilben provided 
a comprehensive assessment of the role the Israeli pipeline could play in the trans-
portation of crude oil from the Mediterranean to Asia. He said that there would 
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be 4 million b/d of Russian and Caspian oil reaching the Mediterranean from 
the Black Sea after the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
in 2010, but only three ways to deliver them to Asia: around the Cape of Good 
Hope in South Africa, through the Suez Canal and through the Israeli pipeline 
from Ashqelon in the Mediterranean to Elat in the gulf of Aqaba. Comparing 
these three options, he argued that the Israeli pipeline was more economical than 
the remaining two because of high transportation costs and draft limitations 
respectively. 
Petr Nečas argued that Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas and Russia’s 
need for European investments in the energy sector would inevitably foster mu-
tual economic and political ties. Noting concerns about political leverage stem-
ming from undue dependence on Russia for natural gas and oil imports, he 
pushed for the diversiﬁcation of supply in Central and East European countries. 
He further referred to Central Asia and the Caucasus as regions of enormous 
energy potential but lacking in political stability, underlining the strategic role 
Turkey might play in this regard, he proposed this as a reason to have Turkey as 
a member of the EU. 
Jan Nehoda concluded the Panel by providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the natural gas industry in the Czech Republic, underscoring low pollution 
emissions, reliability of supply, and competitive price among the greatest ben-
eﬁts of the use of natural gas. He also described the evolution of the European 
transmission network, noting that it would be diﬃcult to liberalize the natural 
gas market inside the EU because the sources of natural gas were located outside 
it, especially in Russia and Norway. Regarding further supply diversiﬁcation, he 
said that liquid natural gas (LNG) imported at competitive prices from other 
gas producing countries might become an important additional source of energy 
in the EU. For the part of the security of supply, he claimed that the EU did 
not have to worry about dependency on imported natural gas, provided it had 
reliable partners, stressing the importance of long-term contracts of natural gas 
supply. In this regard, he also encouraged building strategic reserves of natural 
gas in the EU. 
Discussion
 
Addressing the question of stability in the Middle East, one participant noted 
that the Middle East was politically stable and the region had been a reliable 
supplier of oil for more than thirty years, so there was no reason for concern. As 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
138 ENERGY & SECURITY
a response to inquiry about cooperation in natural gas in the Middle East, Joseph 
Gilben then described the recent involvement of Israel in the natural gas indus-
try, saying that small natural gas reserves had been found in Gaza and oﬀ coast of 
Ashqelon and that there was an agreement in principle between Egypt and Israel 
according to which Egypt would provide for transport of natural gas to Israel by 
pipeline for 20 years. Responding to a question about how to strengthen the role 
of the IAEA when there were widespread public doubts about the eﬀectiveness 
of international organizations, especially in the United States, Susan Eisenhower 
underlined the need for providing resources and reviewing charters of the IAEA 
as well as other international organizations in order to increase their eﬃciency 
and eﬀectiveness needed to carry out their mandates. She also addressed the is-
sue of nuclear safety against the backdrop of recent accidents in nuclear facilities 
in Japan and the United States, stressing the importance to develop the next 
generation of nuclear power plants, which are safer, more reliable and prolifera-
tion resistant, as well as cheaper to build and run; noting that the cost of doing 
it were actually equal to the cost of sustaining the US troops in Iraq for one 
week. Referring to the increasing state control over Gazprom and Transneft, 
one participant raised the question whether we should start worrying about the 
reliability of the natural gas supply in the Czech Republic. As a response, Petr 
Nečas voiced concerns about energy supply being used as political leverage by 
Russia, outlining, therefore, three pillars on which Czech energy policy should 
be based: diversiﬁcation of energy sources, free European energy market, and 
the reduction of dependence on imported fossil fuels, all of which should allow 
utilizing domestic energy sources up to 65 percent. Jan Nehoda said that the 
Czech Republic might consider acquiring additional-the third-source of natural 
gas to sustain a possible supply disruption as a result of state intervention in the 
natural gas supply. 
Closing Remarks    Jan Ruml
 
In his closing remarks, Jan Ruml underscored the signiﬁcance of the Conference 
by bringing together professionals from public, private, and non-proﬁt sectors to 
address the questions of aﬀordability, accessibility, and sustainability of energy 
and its use. He said that the Conference had raised public awareness about the 





TUESDAY — OCTOBER 19
The Residence of the Lord Mayor of the City of Prague, 
Mariánské nám. 1, Prague 1
:  OPENING RECEPTION
  WELCOME REMARKS:
Oldřich Černý, Director, Prague Security Studies Institute
Pavel Bém, Lord Mayor of the City of Prague
  OPENING REMARKS:  
“Geopolitical and Security Energy Concerns 
– Czech Perspective”




WEDNESDAY — OCTOBER 20
The Senate of the Czech Republic, Wallenstein Palace,
Valdštejnské nám. 4, Prague 1
19:00 WELCOME:
Alexandr Vondra, PASS Coordinator
  PANEL A: “PRODUCERS’ PERSPECTIVES”
Security of supply and investment climates: Russia, Middle 
East, Central Asia. Relations between producers and pro-
ducing countries – privatization, subsidies, public support. 
Development of international energy markets – new re-
sources, investments, production and technologies.
  CHAIR:
Heinz Rothermund, Fmr. Managing Director of Shell 
Exploration & Production International
  PANELISTS:
Hisham Khatib, Honorary Vice Chairman, 
World Energy Council
William Martin, Fmr. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy
Robert Skinner, Director, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
10:30  COﬀEE BREAK
11:00 PANEL B: “CONSUMERS’ PERSPECTIVES”
Is the West going to experience a new oil shock? Oil, gas, coal, 
or what? What is the relation between the price of energy and 
economic growth? Diversiﬁcation and liberalization of the 
EU energy market: what are the real beneﬁts for consumers?
  CHAIR: 
Magdaléna Vášáryová, Slovak Ambassador to Poland
  PANELISTS: 
Giulia Bisconti, Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. 
Under Secretary for Energy
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Hiroshi Morimoto, Executive Vice-President, 
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc
Patrick Hardouin, Dep. Assistant Secretary General 
for Regional, Economic & Security Aﬀairs, NATO
John Mitchell, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, 
The Royal Institute of International Aﬀairs
12:30 LUNCHEON IN THE SENATE DINING HALL
  REMARKS:
Václav Havel, Fmr. President of the Czech Republic
  INTRODUCTION:
William Martin, Fmr. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy
  KEYNOTE SPEECH: 
“The World Energy Outlook and Challenges of Europe”
Fatih Birol, Chief Economist and Head, Economic Analy-
sis Division, International Energy Agency
14:15 PANEL C: “ENERGY SECURITY: ASSESSMENT  OF THREATS”
Nuclear energy – challenge or menace? Security of resourc-
es, transit routes and distribution networks. How to avoid 
black-outs and possible terrorist attacks? Sustainability 
through demand management or through boosting supply.
  CHAIR:
Kevin Rosner, Security Advisor, BTC Pipeline Company
  PANELISTS:
Robert Eagan, Vice-President, Emeritus, 
Sandia National Laboratories
Anne Korin, Editor, Energy Security, 
Institute for the Analysis of Global Security
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
David Waller, Deputy Director General, 
International Atomic Energy Agency
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16:15 COﬀEE BREAK
16:45 PANEL D: “INTEGRATION AND CONSOLIDATION: 
  RESOURCES & INFRASTRUCTURE”
Gradual consolidation and integration of energy markets: 
growing competition or cartel behavior? EU regulations and 
national energy policies. Investment in and ﬁnancing of the 
infrastructure – national grids and pipelines. Who will ﬁ-
nance new exploitation and energy research projects?
  CHAIR:
Judy Dempsey, Senior Correspondent, Europe, 
International Herald Tribune
  PANELISTS: 
Nobuya Minami, Fmr. President, 
Tokyo Electric Power Company
Ivan Pilip, Vice-President, European Investment Bank
Vladimír Schmalz, Director for Mergers and Acquisitions, 
ČEZ, a.s.
18:15 ADJOURN
19:30  GALA DINNER AT THE KAMPA 
  MUSEUM
Kampa Museum, The Jan and Meda Mládek Foundation, 
U Sovových mlýnů 2, Prague 1
  INTRODUCTION:
Alexandr Vondra, PASS Coordinator
  KEYNOTE SPEECH: 
“The Energy Challenge: Working in partnership...”
Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State 
for Global Aﬀairs, U.S. Department of State
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21
The Senate of the Czech Republic, Wallenstein Palace, 
Valdštejnské nám. 4, Prague 1
9:00 KEYNOTE SPEECH:
Jerzy Buzek, MEP, Fmr. Prime Minister of Poland
9:30 PANEL E: “ENVIRONMENT AND 
  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT”
Kyoto: international commitments versus national interests. 
International emissions trading: ﬁction or real business? 
Subsidizing of renewable resources or market choice? Green 
taxation: are the customers willing to pay for green energy? 
What are the real costs of nuclear energy?
  CHAIR: 
Karel Schwarzenberg, Fmr. Chancellor of the President 
of the Czech Republic
PANELISTS: 
Jacques Bouchard, Director, Nuclear Energy Division, 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Kunihide Kobayashi, Managing Director, 
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Bedřich Moldan, Director, Environment Center, 
Charles University
Alvin Trivelpiece, Emeritus Director of Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory
10:30 COFFEE BREAK
11:00 PANEL F: “PRODUCERS, CONSUMERS,
  TRANSIT COUNTRIES & GEOPOLITICS”
Diversiﬁcation: a competitive or common interest? Chal-
lenges of trans-border supply: investment in transit infra-
structure and its security. Long-term or short-term con-
tracts? How is the energy security of Europe, Asia and the 
US related to Russia and the Middle East?
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CHAIR:
Michael Žantovský, Czech Ambassador to Israel
PANELISTS:
Susan Eisenhower, Chairman of the Board of Directors, 
The Eisenhower Institute
Joseph Gilben, International Energy Consultant 
& Director of Bellbank Ltd.
Petr Nečas, MP, Vice-Chairman, Committee 
for European Aﬀairs, Czech Parliament
Jan Nehoda, Member of the Board and COO, Transgas, a.s.
12:30 CLOSING LUNCHEON IN THE SENATE DINING HALL
LUNCHEON REMARKS:
Jan Ruml, Vice-President of the Senate 
of the Czech Republic
CLOSING REMARKS:
Alexandr Vondra, PASS Coordinator
146 ENERGY & SECURITY
FAWZI AL-QURAISHI 
Economic Analyst




























PROS & CONS EUROPE, s.r.o.
Prague
FATIH BIROL 




GIULIA R. BISCONTI 
Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. 
Under Secretary for Energy























JERZY BUZEK, MEP 
Member of the 
European Parliament
Fmr. Prime Minister of Poland
Warsaw
WILLIAM J. CABANISS 
Ambassador of the United States 
of America to the Czech Republic









Csekes, Vilagi, Drgonec & Partners
Bratislava
MAZIN DABBAGH 
Crude Oil Marketing Manager
Saudi Petroleum Overseas Ltd.
London
148 ENERGY & SECURITY
HENRY D. DANZIGER 
Member of the Board 
and Commercial Director










PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY 
Under Secretary 
of State for Global Aﬀairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
JAN DOBROVSKÝ 
Member of the Supervisor Board
Appian Group a.s.
Prague
ROBERT J. EAGAN 
Vice-President, Emeritus, Energy, 





































Deputy Assistant Secretary General 





Former President of the Czech Re-
public
Prague
CHARLES B. HECK 
Fmr. Director for Norht America
The Trilateral Commission
Washington, DC
KENNETH M. HILLAS 




Deputy Prime Minister of the 
Czech Republic for Economics
Prague
JOSEF JAŘAB
Member of the Senate 
of the Czech Republic, 



































150 ENERGY & SECURITY
DANIEL KUMERMANN 
Fmr. Czech Ambassador to Israel












Chairman of the Supervisory Board








CEO – Central & Eastern Europe
MARSH
Brussels
H.H. PRINCE MANSOUR 
The Ambassador of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia




Fmr. Deputy Prime Minister 
of the Czech Republic
Prague
WILLIAM MARTIN 








Tokyo Electric Power Company
Tokyo






















The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Osaka
PETR NEČAS, MP 
Vice-Chairman
Committee for European Aﬀairs
Chamber of the Deputies 
of the Czech Parliament
Prague
JAN NEHODA 





















European Investment Bank (EIB)
Luxembourg
ROGER W. ROBINSON, JR.*
Co-Founder











Vice President of the Senate 
of the Czech Republic
The Senate of the Czech Republic
Prague
152 ENERGY & SECURITY
VLADIMÍR SCHMALZ




Member of the Board
Program of Atlantic Security Studies
Prague
KAREL SCHWARZENBERG*
Fmr. Chancellor of the President 








Czech Gas Association Plc.
Prague
RADEK ŠPICAR 
Head of the 
Economic Analysis Department
























Vice Chairman of the Board






ALVIN W. TRIVELPIECE 
Emeritus Director



























Chairman of the 
Research Center Council








International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna
MICHAEL ŽANTOVSKÝ 
Czech Ambassador to Israel, Fmr. 
PASS Coordinator










*) PASS Advisory Board member 
**) PSSI International Advisory 
Board member 
***) PASS Advisory Board 
& PSSI International Advisory 
Board member
154 ENERGY & SECURITY
Acknowledgements
155
Gratitude is owed to the following people and institutions for their support 
of the conference:
PAVEL BÉM
Lord Mayor of the City of Prague
WILLIAM J. CABANISS
U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic
JOSEF JAŘAB
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Aﬀairs, Defense and Security
MEDA MLADEK
President, The Museum Kampa – Jan and Meda Mladek Foundation
JAN RUML
Vice-President of the Senate of the Czech Republic
General Partners:




Central European Foundation (CEF)
Appian Group a. s.
Unipetrol, a. s.
MARSH, s. r. o.
U.S. Embassy in Prague
ČSA, a. s.
Mercedes-Benz
The Museum Kampa – Jan and Meda Mladek Foundation 
Hotel Savoy in Prague
Hotel InterContinental Praha
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS















Jaroslav Bican, Roman Brandejský, Luděk Kočvara, Michal Růžek, Stanislav Petera
VOLUNTEERS
Marek Dvořák, Jan Gallas, Tereza Grunwaldová, Radko Hokovský, Vilém Kolín, 
Jakub Kulhánek, Kateřina Křížová, Petr Lang, Romana Lantorová, Jan Lipavský, 
Iva Neumannová, Alice Savovová, Petra Strejčková, Jan Škoda, Dalibor Tomko, 
Pavel Zástěra, Veronika Zdeňková
SENATE STAFF
Lenka Ningerová
LORD MAYOR’S OFFICE LIAISON
Jana Vávrová
SPECIAL THANKS
Audrey Chriqui, Corbin Miller, Elsa Palanza, Peter Roady, Isamu Seto, Konosuke 
Sugiura
STAFF AND ORGANIZERS

